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Abstract 
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by Saxon T. Bisbee 
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Director: Dr. Bradley A. Rodgers 
Department of History 
 
The development of steam propulsion machinery in warships during the 19th century in 
conjunction with iron armor and shell guns resulted in a technological revolution in the world’s 
navies. Warships utilizing all of these technologies had been built in France and Great Britain 
dating back to the 1850s, but it was during the American Civil War that ironclads powered solely 
by steam proved themselves in large numbers. The armored warships built by the Confederate 
States of America especially represented a style adapted to scarce industrial resources and 
facilities. The development and / or procurement of propulsion machinery for these warships 
have received only peripheral study.   
Through historical and archaeological investigation, this thesis consolidates and expands 
on the scattered existing information on Confederate ironclad steam engines, boilers, and 
propulsion systems. Using a comparative analytical approach, the steam plants of 27 ironclads 
are assessed by source, type, and performance, among other factors. This has resulted in an 
analysis of steam machinery development during the Civil War and also adds to the relatively 
small knowledge base relating to Confederate ironclads. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Looking back from a 21st century vantage point, it can readily be seen that virtually all of 
modern technological society has its origins in the 19th century or earlier. The 19th century saw 
rapid and revolutionary changes in the way people lived, worked, and waged war. Some of the 
greatest effects of the technological advances of the 1800s were seen in the world’s navies, and 
from these changes emerged the concept of modern naval engineering and practice. Wooden, 
sail-driven men-of-war had seemingly remained little changed for centuries, yet in the mid-19th 
century these vessels were made obsolete, giving way to vessels armored with iron and steel, 
equipped with rifled guns, and powered wholly by steam. These powerful weapons were termed 
“ironclads.” 
The acceptance and spread of the armored screw-propelled warship represented a truly 
revolutionary change in warfare at sea, and many remarked upon it. James P. Baxter III (1933:3), 
writing on the introduction of such vessels, perhaps states this change most effectively in relation 
to this work’s focus: 
The Elizabethan seadogs who circled the globe with Drake might have felt at home in the sailing 
sloop of war Cumberland, as she sank with colors flying on the 8th of March, 1862. Of the five 
great naval revolutions of the nineteenth century—steam, shell guns, the screw propeller, rifled 
ordnance, and armor—one only had influenced her design or equipment. Nothing but her heavy 
battery of 9-inch smooth-bore shell guns would have seemed wholly unfamiliar to the 
conquerors of the Spanish Armada. 
 
The vessel responsible for Cumberland’s demise, CSS Virginia, was an ironclad, a product of 
industrialization in Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States.   
The engagement Baxter refers to has become one of the most famous naval battles in 
world history, and took place in its entirety from 8-9 March, 1862. It was fought in two parts, the 
first of which (on 8 March) resulted in the figurative “death of the wooden warship,” while the 
battle on 9 March was the first ever fought between armored steam-driven warships. The two 
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primary participants in these battles were the aforementioned CSS Virginia, more often 
remembered by its previous name Merrimack, and the USS Monitor. Although the former had 
once itself been a wooden warship, it was converted to an ironclad and proved the superiority of 
ironclads against wooden vessels, while Monitor in turn rendered Virginia obsolete by the use of 
a revolving turret. The conflict in which these two vessels proved the worth of the burgeoning 
“new navy” became known as the Battle of Hampton Roads and took place near the height of the 
American Civil War.     
The Civil War has been one of the most scrutinized conflicts in American and world 
history. This conflict, which lasted from 1861 to 1865, saw four long years of bloody fighting 
between Northerners and Southerners. The great land campaigns carried out by Lee, Sherman, 
and Grant have been very well covered in academic studies (such as Barrett 1956, Connelly 
1978, and Fuller 1991), but technological development during what is often considered the first 
“modern” war has not been examined as extensively. As with all large conflicts, the Civil War 
became “…a testing ground for new developments in military technology, including ironclads” 
(Still 1985:5). Armored vessels marked the peak of technological development during the 
conflict and indeed became one of the Civil War’s most famous aspects. This thesis offers a 
comparative analysis and description of the steam machinery used for propelling Confederate 
ironclad vessels. 
Development of effective steam propulsion technology was one of the greatest factors in 
the realization of ironclad warships during the 1850s and 1860s. Unfortunately, serious studies 
concentrating on the marine propulsion machinery of the Civil War era are quite rare. Although 
the South was often quite creative in building and obtaining power plants for these vessels, the 
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Confederate ironclads, especially those improved mid- and late-war models built with experience 
gained from Virginia’s deployment, have garnered little attention regarding machinery.  
Not widely appreciated is the fact that technical data for many Confederate ironclads still 
exists, albeit in scattered locations. Examination of Southern ironclad propulsion systems offers 
not only new data on these fascinating ships, but also offers a broader picture of how marine 
steam machinery was manufactured, obtained, and dispersed to the appropriate vessels 
throughout the Confederacy. This study, therefore, attempts to consolidate as much of this 
information as possible into one source comparing machinery types used in Confederate 
ironclads. In doing this, it builds especially on Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confederate 
Armorclads (Still 1985) and “The Evolution of Confederate Ironclad Design” (Holcombe 1993).  
Although the Confederate States of America ultimately began construction on some 50 
ironclads of varying types, only 25 saw any sort of active service. Among this number were two 
foreign-built: Atlanta, formerly the Scottish iron-hulled blockade runner Fingal, and Stonewall, a 
French-built ironclad corvette. These two vessels are not considered in this study because of the 
great technological differences between them and the American-built ironclads. Fingal’s 
machinery in particular marked the best of British engineering practice in the 1860s, and can be 
considered as at least a generation ahead of American technology, making comparison nearly 
useless. Following in this vein is the Confederate-built Texas, which was provided with British 
engines taken from a wrecked blockade runner. Another important ironclad vessel that is not 
discussed is USS Eastport, a sidewheel river gunboat begun by the Confederates but captured 
and completed for Union service. (Still 1985:227-228; Holcombe 1993:26-30,89)   
In all, this study contains a sample size of 27 vessels—those completed and nearly 
completed, having received at least a portion of their machinery prior to destruction. There were 
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probably more than this number in reality, but a lack of records prevents any certainty. For 
instance, while the mighty CSS Mississippi is well-covered, the “Bigbee boats,” three or four 
ironclads building on the Tombigbee River of Alabama which were quite advanced at the time of 
their destruction, are not. Such is the case with most of the unfinished ironclads—only small 
hints and uncertainties. Therefore, although there are many interesting possibilities for future 
research regarding both the foreign-built and unfinished ironclads, this thesis concentrates only 
on the finished products, as well as some few of those nearly finished, namely: Mississippi, 
Jackson (often called Muscogee), Milledgeville, and Wilmington. (Confederate States of America 
[CSA] 1863:108-117,121-136; Still 1985:212; Holcombe 1993:95-96,109-112,123-130) 
This study of Confederate ironclad propulsion systems is divided into seven chapters, 
each focused on an important facet of the topic. Chapter I is simply an introduction, but also 
offers a brief account of the Confederate States Navy’s formation, Confederate Naval Secretary 
Mallory’s ironclad program, ironclad hull types, and basic operation of 1860s marine steam 
engines. Chapter II presents a general history of the development of steam-powered armored 
warships, and Chapter III follows with an explanation and overview of marine steam machinery 
types commonly used in the United States by 1860. An important aspect in any study of 
machinery is the manufacturing source, and Chapter IV, therefore, presents as complete a picture 
as possible regarding the varied sources of Confederate ironclad machinery. Chapter V offers an 
important and interesting series of firsthand accounts regarding the use of the ironclads’ steam 
engines in actual service, and Chapter VI finishes with a detailed discussion of each ironclad’s 
propulsion machinery. Finally, Chapter VII presents conclusions arrived at during the course of 
this study. In addition, two appendices follow the text; the first presents all relevant machinery 
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data on the 27 ironclads discussed in tabulated form, while the second offers a discussion of 
auxiliary systems onboard the ironclads, such as pumps and “doctor” engines.   
Therefore, this thesis presents a complete list of the machinery types installed in 
Confederate ironclads, as well as an analysis of machinery manufacturers and the qualitative 
theory versus actual performance of these propulsion systems. It delves into trends in 
technological development during the 1860s, epitomized by the steam-driven vessel of war. 
Finally, many stand to benefit from this research: those interested in naval architecture and 
engineering, scholars of the 19th century and the American Civil War (especially those interested 
in maritime matters), those interested in naval history, and finally the general reader interested in 
such topics. 
Formation of the Confederate States Navy 
The beginnings of the Confederate States Navy lay largely in the separate policies of the 
seceding states. When the Civil War began, several vessels had been seized for military service, 
but the Southern naval forces of 1861 were a far cry from those that allowed the completion of 
CSS Virginia one year later. Indeed, by and large the Confederate Navy ultimately pushed the 
boundaries of ingenuity and changed the character of war at sea. All of this is made more 
impressive “If one remembers that to reach its ends the Confederate navy had to start literally 
from zero…” (Luraghi 1996:346), for its first few small and widely scattered vessels were weak 
and unfit. The fledging navy needed the guiding hand of an able administrator, and it soon 
received one.     
The extraordinary resistance shown against the overwhelming Union Navy and the 
skilled development of the ironclad, commerce raiding, and mine warfare programs were mostly 
due to one extraordinary man: Stephen Russell Mallory (Figure I.1). This man served for the 
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entire Civil War period as Confederate Secretary of the Navy, and had built it into a modern and 
effective military service by 1865.  
 
FIGURE I.1. Stephen Russell Mallory, Confederate Secretary of the Navy (Still 1997:21; 
courtesy of Naval Historical Division) 
 
For most of the war the Southern navy and its chief administrator, despite their successes, 
and also being the only Confederate institution to never formally surrender, were looked upon 
with derision by the predominantly agrarian public. Much like today, the news media of the 
Confederacy made the most of negative events. Even with his successes, there was little 
Secretary Mallory could do against the technological and numerical superiority of the Union 
Navy after his programs became widely known. In retrospect, it appears that he did everything 
possible with what he had, and achieved notable successes against long odds. In order to fully 
appreciate Mallory’s ironclad program, his first major challenge, actually organizing a navy, 
must be looked at in detail. (Luraghi 1997:345-349; Still 1997:38-39) 
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In his biography of the Confederate navy chief, Joseph T. Durkin (1954:11) wrote: 
“There is some doubt as to the year of Stephen Mallory’s birth. It was certainly 1810 or 1811 
[more recent research, presented in Still 1997:4, suggests it was actually 1812]”. While little is 
known about the future Secretary’s early life, by the age of nine he was living on Key West, and 
spent his entire youth and early adulthood there. Mallory became quite familiar with the sea and 
ships even while practicing as a Florida lawyer, and his intelligence and reputation paved the 
way to a U.S. Senate seat in 1851. In 1853, he began his first major appointment, that of 
chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, “…a post which foreshadowed his future 
duties during the Civil War” (Durkin 1954:61). The Florida senator had always been interested 
in ships and naval affairs, and he executed his duties zealously. This had the unfortunate effect of 
gaining Mallory few friends in naval service due to his support of unpopular legislation such as 
reinstating the use of corporal punishment and the formation of a Naval Retiring Board for older 
officers. Nevertheless, many of his actions went through and Mallory remained a capable 
chairman until the advent of the Secession Crisis.  
As has been discussed extensively in other works, by the 1850s the Southern states had 
begun to feel underrepresented in Washington, and the question of slavery had become more and 
more pressing, especially with the acceptance of Kansas into the Union and the violent fighting 
over whether it should be a free or slave state. The Southern states were finally persuaded that if 
they did not act accordingly, they would lose their political power by the election of Abraham 
Lincoln as president in November 1860, without any votes from south of the Mason-Dixon Line 
(Still 1997:2-3). Therefore, on 20 December 1861, South Carolina, the center of anti-Union 
sentiments, seceded. By February, six others: Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, 
and Florida, Senator Mallory’s home state, had followed suit. 
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During the Secession Crisis, Senator Mallory, like many other men of the South, was torn 
between conflicting duties to his home state and the federal government. In March 1861, this 
issue became null when the Senators from the seceded states were removed from the Senate 
rosters. Mallory himself, along with several other Southern politicians, had actually left office in 
February (Durkin 1954:121). Soon the future C.S. Naval Secretary was heading for 
Montgomery, Alabama, where both the Confederate government and Mallory’s most challenging 
project were taking shape. 
Montgomery was chosen as the first Confederate capital simply out of necessity. It was 
far from Union lines and the provisional Congress and Standing Committees, among them a 
Naval Affairs Committee, first met there on 19 February 1861. The previous day, Senator 
Jefferson Davis of Mississippi (Figure I.2) was sworn in as President. Davis would never 
interfere much in naval matters, and throughout the war seemed to relegate them to secondary 
importance. Mallory, therefore, always had nearly a free hand. Matters continued to move 
quickly, and the Confederate Navy Department was established on 20 February. Five days later, 
President Davis nominated Stephen Mallory to his Cabinet as Naval Secretary. The organization 
of a true Southern navy soon began. (Still 1997:3) 
Following in a similar revolutionary pattern as that of 80 years before, the seceding states 
quickly set about establishing small state navies for local protection. The newly-established 
organization under Mallory ultimately inherited little from these ragtag forces, for the only 
vessels the seceded states were able to use were small steamers or other secondhand vessels. 
South Carolina’s navy was certainly the best, although: 
 …it was [still] pitifully small, being composed of only the old sailing revenue cutter 
Aiken, one gun; tug James Gray (re-christened Lady Davis), a couple of small sailing boats, 
formerly in the Lighthouse Service, and three little steamers (Catawba, Gordon, and Seabrook), 
each with a small-caliber gun and fitted out haphazardly. (Still 1997:10) 
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Mississippi had no navy at all, choosing to concentrate instead on land defenses, while 
Mallory’s home state of Florida had only a small ex-Coast Survey schooner. Alabama seized a 
revenue cutter and a Lighthouse Service tugboat, Georgia acquired two sidewheelers: Savannah 
and Huntress, while Louisiana and Texas only had three small revenue cutters between them 
(Still 1997:11). This was the entirety of the Confederate vessels obtained in the first round of 
secession, but Mallory later gained the steamers Patrick Henry and Jamestown, tug Teaser, and 
four other small vessels when the states of Virginia and North Carolina seceded. Even when fully 
armed and outfitted, the armament of all the state navy vessels combined amounted to no more 
than 20 guns, “not even the armament of a single U.S. sloop of war” (Still 1997:11). 
 
FIGURE I.2. Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America (Still 1997:4; 
courtesy of Library of Congress) 
10 
 
Secretary Mallory and other Confederate leaders, despite the enormous organizational 
tasks they faced, understood that war with the Northern states was inevitable, and they must act 
quickly. Therefore, with what few vessels he had, Mallory set about organizing a naval 
infrastructure. When the Confederate capital was relocated to Richmond, Virginia, the Secretary 
and his assistants set up the Navy Department offices at the old Mechanic’s Institute on 9th 
Street. Four departments were established: the Office of Orders and Detail, the Office of 
Ordnance and Hydrography, the Office of Provisions and Clothing, and the Office of Medicine 
and Surgery. In addition, a Confederate Marine Corps and the positions of Chief Naval 
Constructor and Engineer-in-Chief were subsequently created. All functioned very similarly to 
the venerable departments of the United States Navy (Wells 1971:3-4). 
Starting with only that handful of vessels gained from the absorbed state navies, Mallory 
quickly implemented a mass building strategy to counter the numerically superior Union Navy. 
Due to his several years as Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, and his great 
interest in new shipbuilding technologies, Secretary Mallory was keenly aware of the latest 
developments in naval armaments and armored vessels. He also took the initiative in developing 
new technologies, such as the use of mine (then called torpedo) warfare, submarines, and 
commerce raiding. Although these weapons had been occasionally used before, Mallory’s 
adoption of them using modern technology of the 1860s allowed their use “…on a scale never 
before seen in naval war” (Still 1997:14). The nascent Confederate Navy stood poised to 
overwhelm the aging wooden ships of the Union with ultramodern cruisers and ironclads: quality 
against quantity, if only enough time could be had to fully realize the construction programs. 
The Confederate Navy Secretary’s approach to new construction was threefold: small, 
simple-to-construct wooden steam gunboats would be built in large numbers, allowing time for 
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smaller numbers of larger and more powerful ironclads to be built in conjunction with the 
construction or obtaining of cruisers, often from foreign contractors, for commerce raiding. 
While the commerce raiders were built primarily abroad due to the Confederacy’s strong ties 
with Great Britain, the wooden gunboats and ironclads were largely contracted out to private 
builders throughout the Confederate States. By July 1861, the gunboat and ironclad programs 
were in full swing, and the first major commerce raiders, led by CSS Sumter, had begun their 
first depredations against Union merchant vessels (Durkin 1954:156). The Confederate Navy, 
although hastily organized with no important base to build on, had successfully begun 
operations.  
The Confederate Ironclad Program 
Of primary relevance to this study are the origins and first steps of ironclad construction 
as envisioned by Mallory and executed by a select few men. It is well-known that the Secretary 
had long been fascinated by the new rifled ordnance developed in Europe and the utilization of 
steam-driven ironclads. He therefore set out to enact a program centered on these two new 
weapons. While armored floating batteries had been tested in action during the Crimean War, the 
new technologies of explosive shells and rifled ordnance had not yet been combined onboard 
steam vessels with armor by the 1860s. Even though nearly 100 ironclads were built or building 
in Europe by the Civil War, they did not utilize rifled guns and still clung to auxiliary sail power. 
While ships like HMS Warrior were certainly powerful, Mallory intended his lesser ironclads to 
be a frontline “ultimate weapon” against the Union. 
As former Chair of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, Mallory had experience in 
funding ironclad construction projects, and he was soon successful in convincing the 
Confederate Congress to raise two million dollars for purchasing one or two European ironclads 
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(Holcombe 1993:7). His views on ironclads as the future of naval technology are easily seen, and 
often quoted, for they proved prophetic: 
I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first necessity. … If to cope 
with them [Union Navy] upon the sea, we follow their example and build wooden ships, we shall 
have to construct several at one time… But inequality of numbers may be compensated by 
invulnerability, and thus not only does economy but naval success dictate the wisdom and 
expediency of iron against wood… (Scharf 1887:43) 
 
Thus began the Southern ironclad program, both at home and abroad, for Mallory also 
began a massive building program for ironclads within the Confederate states. He was aided by 
several men of like mind in those early days of spring 1861. The most important among them 
were riverboat builder E.C. Murray of Kentucky, later builder of CSS Louisiana, Lieutenant 
John M. Brooke (Figure I.3), ordnance expert and later head of the Office of Ordnance and 
Hydrography, and Naval Constructor John L. Porter (Figure I.4), later Chief Naval Constructor 
and designer of nearly all Confederate ironclad types (Holcombe 1993:6-7). Although Porter had 
designed an ironclad as far back as 1846 (Figure I.5), and Murray proposed a design in April 
1861, it was ultimately Brooke’s ideas that were first incorporated into the type of ironclad 
Mallory desired. Many of Porter’s concepts of 1846 were also used, as well as several new ones 
he had developed during the design process for a new Confederate ironclad. By June 1861, the 
process was well underway to constructing what Mallory saw as an ideal design. 
It was determined jointly by Mallory, Brooke, Porter, and Engineer-in-Chief William P. 
Williamson that constructing the Brooke-Porter ironclad would be much easier if an existing 
vessel was converted. For this purpose the submerged, partially burned hulk of the former U.S. 
Steam Frigate USS Merrimack was selected (Figure I.6). It lay at the Confederacy’s largest and 
most valuable naval facility: the Gosport (Norfolk) Navy Yard. Merrimack’s steam power plant 
was largely intact, allowing valuable time and money to be saved without the need of 
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constructing new machinery. Therefore, a burned-out steam frigate became the prototype 
Southern ironclad. 
 
FIGURE I.3. John Mercer Brooke: scientist, inventor, and ordnance expert (Brooke 2002:88) 
 
Merrimack, renamed CSS Virginia, utilized the semi-submerged ends, ram bow, and 
inclined, laminated armor casemate design developed by Brooke and Porter (Figures I.7 and I.8).  
A small, privately-built ironclad, Manassas (ex-Enoch Train) had been completed a year before 
in Louisiana but to an unconventional design. It was protected by a rounded shell of iron plate, 
containing room for only one forward-firing gun, and was the only Confederate ironclad not to 
use an angular casemate. Manassas ultimately remained more of a Mississippian curiosity during 
its brief career than a truly effective fighting vessel (Holcombe 1993:22). 
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FIGURE I.4. Confederate Chief Naval Constructor John Luke Porter (Still 1997:32; courtesy of 
The Mariners’ Museum) 
 
  Virginia was finished as far as possible in March 1862 and rushed into its fateful 
encounter with Union blockading forces in Hampton Roads on 8 March, from which it emerged 
victorious. Even more famous was the fight with the new Union ironclad USS Monitor the 
following day, on which much has been written. Virginia became the first Confederate ironclad 
to see action against another armored ship, and it set the trend toward the standard casemated 
harbor defense ironclads designed by Porter throughout the war. The casemate design was 
effective and simple to construct, and remained “…a distinctive feature of the Confederacy’s 
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home-water armorclads” (Holcombe 1993:10). Although later armored vessels were significantly 
scaled down from Virginia’s massive size, they all retained the same general layout. 
 
FIGURE I.5. Porter’s 1846 Pittsburgh ironclad design. It later became the basis for the 
Confederate Richmond-class ironclads. (Holcombe 1993:64) 
 
 
FIGURE I.6. A lithograph made of USS Merrimack during its 1856 visit to Southampton, UK. 
(Online Library of Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 
Washington, DC, 2012) 
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FIGURE I.7. Brooke’s 1861 ironclad design, with submerged ends (Park 2007:60; from 
Confederate Patent Office Report 1861) 
 
 
FIGURE I.8. Porter’s 1861 ironclad design, with blunt ends (Park 2007:56; courtesy of The 
Mariners’ Museum) 
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The home-built ironclad program as first envisioned by Mallory ultimately came to be the 
Confederacy’s largest shipbuilding program, despite important early shifts in focus. Early 
ironclads such as Virginia, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Georgia were built to large, 
heavily armed, unconventional designs. This was the result of an “untested offensive strategy 
that required them to operate in both shallow harbors and rivers and at sea against Federal 
blockaders” (Holcombe 1993:39). The inability of the South to efficiently build and utilize 
vessels with such capabilities was only made apparent to Mallory’s administration after the 
catastrophic losses of all these vessels except Georgia, which could only be used as a floating 
battery anyway. Thereafter, beginning in 1862, Confederate naval strategy shifted to the 
construction of smaller harbor defense ironclads of somewhat standardized design. 
In the end, Secretary Mallory renewed his attempts to build or procure ironclads in 
Europe, but only one, CSS Stonewall, was actually delivered into Confederate hands. That vessel 
was commissioned too late to take active part in the war, and did not reach Western Atlantic 
waters until after General Lee’s surrender in April 1865. While the European ironclad efforts can 
be considered a failure, Mallory’s domestic program ultimately unfolded much as he had 
proposed in May 1861. By the end of the Civil War, the ironclad program was the largest naval 
construction effort in the South—the early wooden gunboat program had been entirely 
superseded—and over 50 ironclads had their keels laid (Holcombe 1993:151-155). Of these, only 
25 were commissioned into active service. The Confederate ironclads helped greatly in delaying 
Union takeover of the Southern port cities despite their low numbers and success rates in timely 
construction and effective machinery. Mallory’s strong grasp of and appreciation for new 
technology had made the miniscule Confederate Navy of 1861 into a pioneering and 
technologically advanced force to be reckoned with by 1865.    
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Confederate Ironclad Hull Types 
Confederate ironclads can ultimately be grouped into five categories based on hull type: 
conversions, early non-standard types, standard hull designs, diamond hull designs, and late-war 
types. All are covered in great detail in A. Robert Holcombe, Jr.’s 1993 MA thesis, “The 
Evolution of Confederate Ironclad Design”, but require some explanation here. All 27 
Confederate ironclads discussed in this thesis fall under these categories. In brief, the 
conversions were Manassas, Virginia, and Baltic; the early non-standard types were Arkansas, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Georgia; the standard hull designs were the “Richmond-class” 
(Richmond, Chicora, Palmetto State, North Carolina, Raleigh, Savannah), “Tennessee-class” 
(Tennessee, Columbia), vessels designed by Acting Naval Constructor William Graves 
(Charleston, Virginia II), and large sidewheelers (Nashville); the diamond hull designs were 
Tuscaloosa, Huntsville, Albemarle, Neuse, Fredericksburg, Missouri, and Jackson; finally, the 
late-war ironclads were Milledgeville and Wilmington. All groupings contain other ironclads that 
were never finished or even named in some cases, and others contain vessels that were either 
foreign-built or contained foreign-built machinery, which is not discussed in this study.   
Some vessels were never completed, but came close enough that significant details are 
known. Namely, these are Mississippi, Jackson, Milledgeville, and Wilmington. In addition, there 
remains some doubt about the exact hull configurations of Nashville, for now listed as “standard 
hulled,” and Tuscaloosa and Huntsville, for now listed as “diamond hulled” (Holcombe 1993:83-
84,93-95). Fortunately, these latter two ironclads are preserved in the archaeological record, 
making future positive identification of hull structure likely. 
Explanation of the exact configurations of the different types permits a better 
understanding of their machinery requirements and layout. The converted ironclads varied 
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greatly: Manassas was formerly the twin-screw towboat Enoch Train, Virginia was formerly the 
USS Merrimack, a single-screw auxiliary steam frigate, and Baltic was formerly a sidewheel 
towboat and cotton lighter (Still 1985:80). Among the early non-standard ironclads, Arkansas’s 
design combined elements of both riverboats and coastal steamers in a twin-screw layout, while 
Mississippi’s layout reflected the intention of expediting construction time and employing 
unskilled labor. It was accordingly utterly devoid of shiplike curves. Mississippi was also one of 
the first triple-screw vessels constructed (Holcombe 1993:44-45).   
Louisiana was similar to Mississippi in that its hull contained few or no curves, but its 
power plant was very unusual, consisting of two center paddlewheels mounted one behind the 
other, and two small propellers for steering. Almost nothing is known currently about Georgia’s 
hull design other than that it must have been simple and was provided with two propellers 
(Panamerican Consultants, Inc. [PCI] and Tidewater Atlantic Research [TAR] 2007:14). 
The standard hull ironclads are, appropriately, much more easily grouped. The six vessels 
of the Richmond-class, although differing slightly in casemate and pilothouse layout, employed 
the same hull design as seen in Figure I.9. All were driven by a single ten-foot diameter screw 
(Holcombe 1993:68). In a similar vein, the Tennessee-class vessels employed a standard hull 
form, but with greatly differing casemate designs and armor layout, as seen in Figure I.10. They 
were single-screw, although Columbia was originally planned to carry two. 
Those ironclads designed by William Graves, Charleston and Virginia II, for the most 
part followed the same layout as the previous classes, but were larger with more rounded bilges 
(Figure I.11). These vessels were also fitted with a single propeller and carried rams of an 
unusual protruding design.   
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As previously stated, the exact hull configuration of Nashville is unknown, although it 
appears to have been of the standard type (Holcombe 1993:83). This ironclad was a massive 
vessel propelled by sidewheels, and was the only Confederate ironclad to have equipped 
sidewheels besides the converted Baltic. 
 
FIGURE I.9. Midships section of a Richmond-class ironclad (Holcombe 1993:67) 
 
 
FIGURE I.10. Comparative bow views of sister ships Tennessee, left, and Columbia, right 
(Adapted from Holcombe 1996:71,73) 
 
Following the more traditional hull layout of the standard types, the diamond hull 
ironclads utilized a design intended for ease of construction and shallow draft (Holcombe 
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1993:92). As many curves as possible were eliminated from the hull, resulting in a hexagonal, or 
“diamond” cross-section (Figure I.12). The diamond hull ironclads differed based on size and 
propulsion. Almost nothing is known about the exact layout of Tuscaloosa and Huntsville, but 
they are thought to have been twin-screw (Holcombe 1993:94). Albemarle, Neuse, and 
Fredericksburg employed twin-screw propulsion, while Missouri and Jackson were designed for 
a center paddlewheel. Jackson was altered in the course of construction to mount twin screws, 
making Missouri the only completed Confederate centerwheel ironclad (Holcombe 1993:108). 
 
FIGURE I.11. Midships section of Virginia II (Holcombe 1993:81) 
 
The final two ironclads for which significant engineering data exists were never finished, 
but they differed greatly in design. Milledgeville was an improved version of the standard hull 
type, employing twin screws and a greatly-improved armor configuration. Figure I.13 shows a 
midships section of the vessel. Its most important difference was a lighter draft than the standard 
hulls (Holcombe 1993:125).   
Wilmington was one of the very last ironclads designed in the Confederacy. From the 
outset it appears to have been intended to be a blockade-breaker. In cross-section this ironclad 
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reflects similar improvements in the standard hull form as employed in Milledgeville, but sports 
a deeper draft and very fine lines (Holcombe 1993:128). Figure I.14 represents this 
configuration. Like Milledgeville, Wilmington was driven by twin screws and appears to have 
lacked a ram. Neither of these two ironclads were completed, but their designs certainly 
represented great improvements in hull and machinery layout. 
 
FIGURE I.12. Midships section of Albemarle (Holcombe 1993:99) 
 
The evolution of ironclad hull forms reflected a continuous trend toward better, cheaper, 
and more easily-constructed vessels by war’s end. Acquisition or construction of steam 
machinery also played an important part in this process. It has been seen that Secretary Mallory 
and “…the Navy Department made conscious efforts to … improve the basic ironclad model 
established by the Virginia” (Holcombe 1993:147). Although less successful in the long run with 
providing totally reliable engines, the Confederate ironclad program still achieved notable 
successes in the field of marine steam engineering. Unfortunately, these successes did not 
guarantee to make the mid-1800s American steam engineer’s job any easier. 
23 
 
 
FIGURE I.13. Midships section of Milledgeville (Holcombe 1993:125) 
 
 
FIGURE I.14. Sheer, body, and plan views of Wilmington (Holcombe 1993:129) 
 
Marine Steam Engine Operations in the Mid-19th Century 
Marine steam engines of the Civil War era were quite different from the complicated 
triple- and quadruple-expansion behemoths that powered most ships of the late 19th- to mid-20th 
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centuries. Steam power in the 1860s was still a relatively new technology, and as such, it 
remained simple and full of quirks that had not yet been studied exhaustively. Operating a steam 
engine onboard a vessel, especially those on poorly-ventilated warships such as ironclads, 
required a special type of seaman, the naval engineer.   
By the Civil War, “…engineering was still a comparatively new field in the navy, [and] 
the status of engineers was not [yet] clearly defined” (Wells 1971:107). Engineering duties 
encompassed a wide range of functions, and more were added as steam plants grew in 
complexity. The engineers of the Confederate Navy were not immune to this trend, although 
engines onboard Confederate vessels were often simpler than those in other navies. 
The steam engineers of the Confederate Navy were organized similarly to those of the 
U.S. Navy. An Engineer-in-Chief, William P. Williamson, answered directly to Secretary 
Mallory, while under him there were four ranks of engineering officers. One of these was 
commissioned, the chief engineer, and three were warrant: first, second, and third assistant 
engineers (Wells 1971:107). In addition to the officers, the engine and boiler room crews 
contained a variable number of coal heavers (these were the days before the term “stoker” came 
into common usage) and firemen. Coal heavers were mostly unskilled, but firemen were 
“…supposed…to manage fires with different kinds of fuel… [and be capable] of handling the 
engines without supervision…” (Wells 1971:115). Firemen were also required to have some skill 
in repair and maintenance. 
Besides ensuring the smooth operation of a warship’s steam plant, it was the duty of the 
engine room crew, who usually numbered about twenty on the ironclads, to affect necessary 
repairs onboard (Wells 1971:117). Only the most difficult jobs such as replacing cylinders, 
valves, or shafts were given over to outside works such as the Charlotte Navy Yard. During 
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repair procedures or in anything to do with the propulsion systems of the warship, the chief 
engineer often had authority approaching even that of the captain, and many disputes among the 
executive officers of the vessel and the engineers would arise because of this (Wells 1971:114). 
Like the technology of steam propulsion itself, the scope of authority of naval engineering 
officers was not fully defined in the 1860s. 
Terminology was also a bit different than in later times. It appears that a good deal of 
modern confusion over the true number of engines onboard the ironclads and other vessels has 
come from the 19th century use of the term “engine.” As Brown (1993:67) states: 
Contemporary usage defined each cylinder as an ‘engine’ and hence multi-cylinder machinery 
took the plural—engines. For example, … [a vessel] fitted with ‘two engines of 100HP each’ … 
[would] Today… be described as a single 2-cylinder engine of 200HP. 
 
The number of engines onboard the Confederate ironclads in particular has thus often been 
confused. Part of the problem lies in the fact that vessels with multiple screws often could not 
operate them separately, as all units were linked. There were a few exceptions, but usually “…all 
boilers gave steam to all engines and it was impossible to run with one engine crippled, unless 
the engines were stopped and the disabled unit disconnected” (Wells 1971:116). Many of the 
twin-screw Confederate ironclads, such as Albemarle, followed this pattern. 
Types of fuel used onboard mid-19th century vessels also varied widely. Western river 
steamboats nearly always used wood, while naval vessels burned coal of varying types—oil had 
not yet been developed as a fuel source for marine boilers. The Confederate Navy often had to 
rely on a combination of wood and coal for its vessels, even the ironclads, due to its chronic 
shortage of resources during the war. Coal from North Carolina was usually fairly abundant, but 
was considered almost as bad as wood for the amount of smoke it gave off (Wells 1971:116).  
Wood often had to be resorted to while in port and even occasionally while in action. 
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Starting a steam engine in the days before separate starting engines were widely utilized 
was a monstrous task. Once a suitable amount of coal or wood had been procured, steam was 
accordingly built up in the boilers. This was often much more risky than in later years, especially 
onboard riverboats, for the firetube or flue boilers in common use at the time exploded much 
more easily than later watertube models. Once a sufficient head of steam was built up, the entire 
engine room crew on duty needed to work together, as described by Bathe 1951:5-6: 
First, the whole of the engine had to be slowly warmed up by live steam, then steam was by-
passed from the valve chest into the condenser to expel the air. After all was ready, the crew had 
to bar the crankshaft round a few times by main force…, then the condenser injection valve was 
opened and the chief engineer, praying for a good vacuum in his engine, moved over the steam 
throttle a notch or two and hoped for the best. 
 
Figure I.15 shows a humorous but largely accurate depiction of this unenviable process. 
 
FIGURE I.15. “Barring,” or turning over a steam engine for startup (Bathe 1951: Plate II) 
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Starting the high-pressure non-condensing engines of Western riverboats was a slightly 
different procedure. The typical lever and wiper setup (Figure I.16) had first to be configured by 
lifting the levers off the wipers. “To start the engine the reversing link, block, or sawbuck is set 
to the desired direction. Next, the levers are lowered to the wipers, and, finally, the throttle is 
opened” (Bates 1996:51). This procedure was made less arduous by the smaller size of riverboat 
engines and their open design with easy access. 
 
FIGURE I.16. Levers and wipers of a typical high-pressure riverboat engine. The setup is 
positioned on the top center of the engine cylinder as seen in the expanded view. (Adapted from 
Bates 1996:41-42) 
 
Once the vessel’s power plant was running, typical operational procedures involved 
maintaining proper boiler water levels, monitoring engine functions, awaiting orders from the 
helm, and simply trying to survive in the extreme heat. Making sure the boilers contained enough 
cooling water was perhaps the most important of these tasks, as overheated or unclean boilers 
had a nasty tendency to explode, especially the high-pressure systems onboard Western river 
steamboats. Consequently, during each voyage, the mud drums, which collected sediment from 
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the boilers, were “blown out” several times (Bates 1996:10). While this practice was most 
common onboard river steamers, it was also necessary for coastal and harbor defense vessels like 
the majority of the Confederate ironclads. 
Monitoring engine functions still mostly involved simple observation and an engineer’s 
“feel” for his engines during the 1860s. Glass gauges for monitoring steam pressure, lubricant 
levels, etc. were fairly uncommon, being considered unreliable, dangerous, and, at best, a 
“dubious innovation” (Bathe 1951:6). Safety valves were rarely equipped with any tamper-proof 
mechanism, and direct observation of troublesome areas was often hindered by cramped 
machinery spaces. As a result, engineers of the Civil War navies most often had to rely on sheer 
familiarity with their charges. 
Orders to the engine room onboard Confederate ironclads or other mid-19th century 
vessels were relayed by a combination of bells or shouted orders. Several ironclads had their 
pilot houses and helm stations positioned directly over the engine room, making dispersal of 
orders simpler and faster. Shifting gears was the most common ordered task, but, like starting the 
engine, it was labor-intensive. There were several different gear types in common use by the 
Civil War, but all functioned similarly, differing mainly in complexity. One of the simplest, most 
common and versatile was the Stephenson valve gear, seen in Figure I.17. 
 
FIGURE I.17. Stephenson valve gear. This setup was also commonly employed by steam 
locomotives, for which it was originally invented. Moving the lever attached to the link motion 
allows for forward, reverse, and a nearly infinite range of adjustments if the engineer’s strength 
holds out. (Bates 1996:47) 
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In addition to other miscellaneous duties such as occasionally running bilge pumps, 
testing fire pumps, and taking onboard fresh boiler water (using the so-called “doctor” engine, if 
present), a Civil War engineer’s main concern was trying to endure the extreme heat of the 
engines and boiler furnaces. There were rarely, if ever, provisions made in the early days of 
steam for proper ventilation of the below-deck spaces other than hatches and gunports (Bathe 
1951:6). The problem was made even worse onboard the ironclads with their layers of insulating 
armor and dearth of hatches. As a consequence, the amount of air reaching the furnaces was 
usually insufficient for ideal combustion, and this, combined with a reliance on natural draft and 
almost complete lack of insulation on the boilers and steam lines led to excruciating conditions 
in the machinery spaces. It was not uncommon for the men to endure temperatures over 120° 
Fahrenheit, and onboard at least one ironclad, CSS Richmond, temperatures were reported to 
exceed 150° on occasion (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 10]:792). Exposed parts of 
the boilers, such as the stack breechings, could be seen to glow red even in daylight, and gases 
from the furnaces often permeated the living quarters, further contributing to the ill effects of 
serving onboard an ironclad for any length of time (Wells 1971:149). Little wonder then that it 
was typical for an engineer’s appearance to vary greatly between watches, shown in Figure I.18. 
It can readily be seen that the duties involved in maintaining and operating an 1860s 
marine steam plant were varied, dangerous, and labor-intensive. Engineers of the day were 
required to be familiar with not only a high degree of technical detail, but operate based on gut 
instinct and sheer strength. Their relatively new place in the hierarchy of naval officers often 
brought them into conflict and led to confusion about the full extent of their duties. During the 
Civil War, these problems remained common, but like many other aspects of steam engineering 
at that time, progress was made. 
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FIGURE I.18. Appearance of an engineering officer going on watch, left, and coming off, right 
(Bathe 1951:Plate II; sketch by Robert Weir 1862) 
 
The veteran engineers of the Civil War navies observed and experienced firsthand the 
transition from combined sail and steam power to vessels driven purely by steam. This change 
happened especially early onboard the ironclads. Experience gained during wartime service 
allowed for the effective training of the next generation to serve on vessels built after the 
transition from sail to steam, and wood to iron was complete. Similarly, in their time the marine 
steam engineers of the Civil War had been trained by men who had seen the very earliest marine 
steam engines in operation, one of the first great revolutions of the 19th century.
CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF STEAM-DRIVEN ARMORED VESSELS 
Technological developments during the nineteenth century were myriad and important. In 
the span of 100 years, transportation was revolutionized by railways, steamships, and, at the end 
of the century, automobiles. Gas lighting, then electricity introduced reliable sources of artificial 
light to whole communities. Scientific and technological progress rushed forward at an 
incredible pace, and even became a popular social topic of the day. Often sparking in the popular 
imagination during these times was the new science of marine engineering and naval technology 
coupled with advances in gunnery and armor plating. By the time of the Civil War, the leading 
world powers of Great Britain and France, and to a lesser extent the United States, had made 
great strides in providing reliable steam power to warships.  
Unquestionably the leader in both political power and technology throughout most of the 
19th century was Great Britain. Although France often followed close behind in new technology, 
Britain was at most times at least a generation ahead of American engineering practice. Steam 
power came of age in the period between 1811 and 1860 mainly due to British engineers, 
although mercantile developments in America should not be overlooked. The great British yards 
pioneered developments in iron and steel ship construction as well, producing at one time some 
80 percent of the world’s seagoing steam vessels (Smith 1937:2). Therefore, any discussion of 
armored steam warship development must relate primarily to Britain. 
 According to Lambert (1992:14), “The steam engine was the first major manifestation of 
the industrial revolution to have a profound impact on warship design”. Although many 
independent inventors had experimented with steam power dating back into the 1500s or even 
earlier, it was primarily the work of Thomas Newcomen and James Watt that led to the first 
practical steam engine in 1775. Newcomen’s original engine design of 1712 had been greatly 
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improved upon by Watt, but was designed primarily for pumping wells or mineshafts as seen in 
Figure II.1. It did not take long for others to realize steam power’s potential for transportation. 
Indeed, experiments with steam-powered vessels were reportedly carried out in France as early 
as 1776 and 1783. These did not have much influence on the introduction of steam navigation 
(Smith 1937:4), while later advances made in Britain by men such as Napier and Ericsson 
generally pointed the way forward. In the United States, pioneers such as Robert Fulton 
developed steamboats for mercantile purposes. In particular, Fulton’s designs for river 
paddlewheelers eventually gave rise to that classic symbol of American ingenuity, the Western 
river steamboat. In any case, by about 1800 serious attention was being given to steam 
propulsion on both sides of the Atlantic. (Smith 1937:143; Brown 1990:44) 
 
FIGURE II.1. Boulton and Watt pumping engine, post-1775 (Courtesy of Carl T. Lira 2006; 
from Stuart 1824:114) 
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The earliest steam-driven vessels were paddlewheel propelled, but lacked several 
qualities found in sailing line-of-battle ships that limited their strategic use. Despite these 
deficiencies, the steam warship had been mostly accepted in the major fleets by 1830. As usual, 
the Royal Navy led the way in development and application of this new technology, although at 
first it often had to turn to private shipyards for new construction. As in the United States, British 
mercantile interests were quick to apply steam machinery to new vessels in the interest of regular 
schedules for greater profit. They were not constrained by worries of effectiveness in battle or 
long-distance voyages. As a result, steam technology often developed much more quickly in the 
private sector than in the military. (Brown 1990:44; Lambert 1992:14-16) 
It has often been said that the major navies were against the new technology, but in fact 
the Royal Navy carefully studied steam, taking a cautious and experimental approach. France 
attempted to closely follow British practices but was forced to rely on British-built machinery. 
Progress was made slowly but gradually, with time given over to carefully testing new designs.  
There was no rush into steam technology simply because it was not yet proven, but important 
results were soon forthcoming. 
The First Steam-Powered Warships 
Despite lagging behind Britain and France in naval technology, the United States Navy 
utilized the first practical steam warship, Robert Fulton’s Demologos of 1815. This vessel was a 
catamaran gunboat with a single paddlewheel mounted between the hulls, and was designed as a 
floating battery (Figure II.2). Although strongly-built, Demologos was capable of only 5.5 knots 
and reflected America’s policy of coast defense during the War of 1812 period (Lambert 
1992:19). Several nations expressed interest in the design, including France, but Demologos 
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remained a one-off warship. No similar designs were ever utilized in the United States or 
elsewhere, although the self-powered floating battery concept did not die for some time. 
 
FIGURE II.2. Plans of “Fulton’s Steam Battery” of 1815, officially named Demologos; the 
world’s first steam-powered warship. These were drawn by Fulton himself. As finished the ship 
was also equipped with lateen sails on two masts. (Online Library of Selected Images, Naval 
Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
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Developments in Great Britain among the mercantile fleets closely followed the exploits 
of the famous early American steamers such as Colonel John Stevens’s Little Juliana of 1804 
and Fulton’s North River Steamboat of Clermont of 1806. The British contemporaries to these 
pioneering vessels were William Symington’s Charlotte Dundas of 1801 and Henry Bell’s 
Comet of 1812 (Smith 1937:13-14). All of these vessels were civilian and designed for local 
service on rivers or harbors. The Royal Navy studied the improvements in steam propulsion 
made in these vessels and others, and in 1815 the decision was made to convert the small vessel 
Congo, intended for exploring the river of that name, into a steamer. A 20-horsepower Boulton 
& Watt beam engine (Figure II.3) was accordingly installed, but Congo’s trials revealed the 
deficiencies of putting engines into hulls designed for sail (Lambert 1992:15). With these 
disappointing results, naval interest in building steam-powered warships declined for a time. 
After the famous and successful voyage of the small steamer Enterprise to India in 1825, 
the possibilities of steam propulsion over long distances were considered. New engines were 
much more capable than those first used, and naval shipbuilders better understood how to 
combine efficient hull design for paddlewheels with that of sail. Perhaps the Royal Navy’s first 
successful steam warship was HMS Comet of 1822 (Lambert 1992:17). This vessel was intended 
primarily for towing, and several later vessels were built for similar purpose. Up to 1830, this 
auxiliary role was common in both the British and French navies. During the same period the 
French still relied on British companies for machinery, but constructed their first naval steamers, 
Africain and Voyager in 1818 (Lambert 1992:18). All of the steam warships, British, French, and 
American, built during this time period reflected the inadequacy of steam to propel large 
warships or oceangoing steamers effectively for long distances. It was also difficult to mount 
many guns in a hull filled with bulky and exposed paddlewheel machinery. This made 
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paddlewheelers unsuitable for the battle line, but their ability to mount large fore- and aft-firing 
guns, coupled with long range under steam and sail, made them ideal for use as cruisers once that 
strategy was fully developed (Rodgers 1996:31). 
 
FIGURE II.3. Boulton and Watt 20-horsepower beam engine of HMS Congo, 1815 (Smith 
1937:51; courtesy of Birmingham Reference Library, Birmingham, UK) 
 
 The large and very powerful paddlewheel frigates of the 1840s evolved directly from the 
small experimental auxiliaries of the 1820s like those vessels discussed above. The paddlewheel 
warship, despite eventually growing to tremendous size, was always limited by its exposed 
machinery and poor sailing qualities. While the machinery problem could be remedied to a 
certain extent, paddlewheelers always remained inefficient sailing vessels because of drag 
created by the wheels and the difficulty of arranging masts around the machinery spaces (Brown 
1993:75). Sailing ships therefore remained the main force in the line of battle until the wide 
acceptance of the screw propeller, which allowed for acceptable sailing qualities in conjunction 
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with the advantages of steam power. Despite the known deficiencies of paddlwheelers, 
improvements were made, and the major navies continued to augment their inventories of steam 
warships, with the exception of the United States, which did not really begin serious steam 
frigate construction until the 1840s.   
HMS Cyclops of 1838 was the first war vessel to be termed a steam frigate, and all large 
naval steamers after that retained the title (Lambert 1992:23). The term “frigate” implied a 
warship capable of serving as a cruiser or part of a battle line, but apparently there were never 
any serious proposals for a true paddle line-of-battle ship; this was probably due to an 
exaggerated fear of damage to the wheels (Brown 1990:71). Marine engines, the more correct 
source of unease regarding a paddlewheeler’s use in a battle line, had become smaller and more 
efficient. They were now considered powerful and reliable enough to drive large men-of-war, but 
prevented a full broadside from being carried on smaller vessels. The trend towards larger and 
larger paddlewheelers was thus begun in response to this problem. By 1845 HMS Terrible 
represented the peak of the trend as the largest paddlewheel warship ever built (Figure II.4).  
This vessel carried an excellent power plant and served honorably during the Crimean War 
(1853-1856). Unfortunately, like all paddlewheel frigates, the sailing rig provided for 
accompanying the fleet on long-distance cruising was only of limited value, being restricted in 
mast placement by the machinery. This was inherently true of all paddlewheelers, but it took 
some time to realize. The necessary compromise between sail and bulky machinery therefore 
limited the effective deployment of paddle warships as part of a mixed fleet (Lambert 1984:19). 
France was always eager to match Britain in the development of steam warships, but 
during the 1830s to 1840s it remained reliant on British machinery. French paddle frigates were 
smaller than British vessels during this period, being used primarily as dispatch vessels. Some of 
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the more useful French steamers were Phaeton and Meteore, but both had unreliable machinery 
(Lambert 1992:26). French engineers were often quite creative in their quest to find a new 
strategy for steam that would trump the British, but no real success was achieved. France was 
finally forced to concede the weaknesses of the paddlewheel naval vessel some time after the 
British had done so. 
 
FIGURE II.4. HMS Terrible, world’s largest steam warship when completed in 1845 (Lambert 
1992:24; courtesy of Conway Maritime Press Ltd. 1992) 
 
Developments in the United States followed those in Great Britain, while the rest of the 
world, even such powers as imperial Russia, showed little interest or initiative in employing 
steam warships during this period. After Demologos, no steam warships were built in America 
until 1835, with the completion of Fulton II. This vessel was not successful, although it carried 
as one of its crew the first-ever appointed Chief Engineer (Lambert 1992:27). No more steam 
paddle frigates were built until 1841, with the launch of the large and powerful Mississippi and 
Missouri (Figure II.5). These famous vessels served admirably during the Mexican War (1845-
1848), and Mississippi also played a part in the Civil War. Despite their strength and reliability, 
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these two ships still represented all the weaknesses of the paddle frigate, namely, bad sailing 
qualities, inefficient fuel usage, and large machinery space. Only two more warships of this type 
were built in the U.S. by 1850. Powhatan and Susquehanna were larger and more powerful yet, 
but they were limited in coastal and river operations during the Civil War because of deep draft 
(Canney 1990:35). By that time, the U.S. Navy was concentrating on smaller sidewheel sloops 
and screw-propelled warships. The latter was on the verge of creating important changes in naval 
construction and tactics.  
 
FIGURE II.5. USS Mississippi photographed during wartime service, about 1863 (Suydam 
Collection MSS 1394015, Louisiana State University 2012; photo by McPherson & Oliver, 
Baton Rouge) 
 
The Screw-Propelled Warship 
Edgar C. Smith (1937:64) neatly states the uncertain origins of arguably one 
humankind’s most important inventions: “Though generally associated with the name of the 
great geometer, Archimedes, who lived in the third century B.C., we are told that the screw was 
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probably used…even before his time”. Despite its ancient history, using this device to propel 
ships was a 19th century idea, although many inventors claimed the idea theirs. One work 
published in 1867 listed 470 names associated with the propeller’s invention (Smith 1937:64). 
What is clear is that by the 1830s, the propeller had gained enough acceptance for extensive 
trials to be carried out. 
Screw propulsion had been used on a British vessel, the government transport Doncaster, 
as far back as 1802. This system consisted of an outboard removable frame with the screw 
attached. It was powered by eight men walking around the capstan, and in this manner Doncaster 
made about 1.5 knots up and down Gibraltar Bay (Smith 1937:65). As interesting as this test 
was, it did not employ steam power and the propeller rig used remained a curiosity. Several 
similar experiments were apparently carried out in France and elsewhere, but there is little 
documentation concerning this. Propeller designs at the time were quite varied as many inventors 
submitted patents for new designs continually through the 1810s and 1820s. 
The two most important men associated with the modern incarnation of the screw 
propeller were Francis Pettit Smith and John Ericsson. Smith’s patent was submitted on 31 May 
1836 and Ericsson’s six weeks later (Smith 1937:67). Although their designs were different, as 
shown in Figures II.6 and II.7, each in its way showed great promise. Ericsson’s propeller launch 
Francis B. Ogden successfully towed the Admiralty barge in the summer of 1837, demonstrating 
firsthand the power of even the early designs. After Ericsson departed for the United States in 
1839, he continued his work, designing several screw-propelled vessels. One of these, USS 
Monitor, would ultimately bring him international fame during the Civil War and would result in 
a whole new type of warship. Back in Great Britain, the frigate HMS Amphion was the only 
warship to incorporate Ericsson’s screw design (Lambert 1992:32). 
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FIGURE II.6. Smith’s screw propeller as equipped on Archimedes. It was originally designed 
with two turns of the thread, or blade, but was found to be more effective with just one. (The 
Archimedes Screw History Project 2012; from The Journal of the Franklin Institute 3 [7] 
1844:90-94) 
 
 
FIGURE II.7. Ericsson’s screw propellers on Robert F. Stockton, 1838 (Smith 1937:67; from 
Woodcroft 1848) 
 
Smith’s propeller design was meanwhile incorporated into the screw sloop Archimedes of 
1838 (Figure II.8). This small vessel was the world’s first seagoing propeller-driven ship. 
Although its machinery was underpowered, Archimedes easily beat the cross-Channel 
paddlewheel packets during a series of speed trials and played a vital part in securing British 
naval interest in the screw (Lambert 1992:32). This paved the way for the first screw-propelled 
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naval vessels, Rattler for the Royal Navy, Princeton for the U.S. Navy, and Le Napoléon for the 
French Navy. Of these vessels, the first became somewhat of a celebrity. 
 
FIGURE II.8. Screw sloop Archimedes of 1838 (Brown 1990:103; courtesy of Science Museum) 
 
HMS Rattler was originally designed as a paddlewheeler named Ardent, but was altered 
for screw propulsion while still on the stocks. The vessel was not finished until 1843, and 
extensive testing took place until 1845. In April of that year, the famous tug-of-war between 
Rattler and the paddlewheeler HMS Alecto took place. These two vessels had raced each other 
during previous trials, but were now lashed stern to stern. According to Smith (1937:73), “With 
the Rattler’s engines stopped, the Alecto was allowed to go full speed ahead, but on the Rattler 
going ahead the Alecto was brought to a standstill, and finally was towed astern at the rate of two 
miles and a half an hour…”. This demonstration is widely supposed to have influenced the 
Admiralty’s decision to fully support screw propulsion, but that agency was already well-aware 
of the propeller’s benefits. It must also be noted that Rattler was 60 tons heavier than Alecto, 
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with more powerful engines; therefore, “…the only thing proven was that a larger, more 
powerful ship can outrun and outpull a smaller, less powerful ship” (Rodgers 1996:32). In the 
end, this “test” had far more of an effect upon popular imagination than it did with naval policy 
(Figure II.9). 
 
FIGURE II.9. The famous “tug-of-war” between the screw sloop HMS Rattler and the paddle 
sloop HMS Alecto in 1845 (Lambert 1992:30; courtesy of Science Museum) 
 
As steam machinery for propelling vessels via screw grew in size and power, it became 
apparent that this new technology was ideal for warships. Unlike paddlewheel frigates, the 
machinery could remain in the hold, unexposed to combat damage and not taking up room on the 
gundecks. Also unlike paddlewheelers, the propulsion unit itself was completely underwater and 
protected during battle. Sailing qualities, still considered very important, were less affected by 
propellers as well. As these facts came to be appreciated, large warships, especially in Great 
Britain, began to be adapted to or constructed for screw propulsion. 
The first large screw-driven warships of the Royal Navy were intended primarily as 
floating batteries, or blockships, of minimal steam power and reduced sailing rig (Brown 
1990:122). These qualities were designed to make sailing between stations practical in all 
weather and also to avoid the use of tugs. As a result, the original vessels chosen for conversion, 
“…worn out hulks—were replaced by the more seaworthy ships eventually converted” (Lambert 
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1984:30). The 4 vessels chosen were originally “Armada class” 74-gunners: Ajax, Blenheim, 
Edinburgh, and Hogue. When Ajax was completed on 23 September 1846, it was the world’s 
first steam battleship (Brown 1990:122). 
The British quickly began building many steam battleships of improved design after the 
success of the blockships. By 1850 the Royal Navy had at least 50 vessels of different types 
driven by propellers. Several of these vessels were old sailing ships converted to screw 
propulsion, while other battleships had been altered on the stocks to carry propellers, HMS 
Agamemnon being the first of these (Smith 1937:75). In the United States, Ericsson’s vessel USS 
Princeton proved very reliable and economical, serving well during the Mexican War, but 
remained the U.S. Navy’s only successful screw-propelled warship until the 1850s. French 
policy was, as always, to build fewer but better warships than the British, and they succeeded 
briefly with the 90-gun screw battleship Le Napoléon of 1850 (Figure II.10). A highly-successful 
design, eight sisters were built, but the British were, as always, able to improve upon and 
construct more vessels than the French.  
 
FIGURE II.10. French steam battleship Le Napoléon of 1850 (Lambert 1992:37) 
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While very powerful, the wooden steam battleships were simply an evolutionary step 
between the old sailing navy and the new iron and steam one. As theories of how best to employ 
propeller-driven warships stabilized, more and smaller screw warships were built, leading to 
large classes of steam sloops, corvettes, and frigates. The United States in particular pursued the 
development of the screw frigate. (Lambert 1984:114,117) 
Frigates were always a desirable candidate for auxiliary steam due to their need for long-
distance cruising and maneuvering in and out of foreign ports. They were also much less 
expensive to construct than battleships, and remained relevant on most stations. As a result, 
screw frigates were always more common than the battleship (Lambert 1992:42). Nations unable 
to compete with France and Great Britain in the building race, such as the United States and 
Russia, concentrated on building this type of vessel. 
The United States Navy had a long history of building very large, powerful frigates that 
defied traditional classification. “Old Ironsides,” USS Constitution, that famous veteran of the 
War of 1812, is the most famous of these ships. In April 1854, a new round of large frigate 
construction began with the Merrimack class of screw steam frigate. Merrimack and its five 
sisters were very large and powerful, but their engines were too weak to propel them at more 
than eight knots (Figure II.11). Nevertheless, they created quite a stir in Europe, and the British 
responded with the even larger and more powerful Mersey and Orlando of 1858 (Lambert 
1992:43). These vessels were structurally weak, and represented the limits of what a wooden hull 
could support without iron components. The case for iron warships was thus further advanced.  
Mersey and Orlando were, in fact, the direct ancestors of Great Britain’s first seagoing ironclad 
frigate, HMS Warrior. USS Merrimack had an unremarkable career as a frigate, but would go 
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down in history as the Confederate ironclad Virginia during the American Civil War. Therefore, 
the large steam screw frigates of the 1850s were the direct ancestors of the first ironclads. 
 
FIGURE II.11. A sectional view of Merrimack, showing machinery arrangement (Canney 
1990:47; courtesy of National Archives) 
 
A large number of other screw-propelled vessel types were constructed by the major 
navies during the 1850s. In the United States, a large number of wooden screw sloops were built.  
Among them were the Brooklyn-class sloops, of which Admiral David Farragut’s flagship USS 
Hartford was a member. All of these vessels served with distinction during the Civil War. 
With new battlefleet units being built of iron or ironclad, wooden screw battleships and 
other wooden warships became less popular, but did not immediately disappear from the lists.  
Wooden hulls were still more accepted, cheaper, and flexible than iron hulls, but the size of new 
warships was approaching the limits of the centuries-old technology of wooden shipbuilding.  
Iron bedplates and frames for engines and boilers put great stress in wooden hulls, and problems 
with propeller alignment were common due to wood’s flexible nature. Nevertheless, wooden 
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cruisers continued to be built alongside iron and steel warships into the 1860s and 1870s 
(Lambert 1992:45). Like all tried-and-true technology, the wooden warship did not die away 
immediately, but gradually disappeared in the face of an immense technological revolution. The 
day of the screw-propelled, metal-hulled modern warship had come.         
The Iron-Hulled Steam Warship 
Coupled with the steam engine, the most important product of the Industrial Revolution 
was the large-scale production of iron, and later steel. This came at a time when, as has been 
seen, the size of wooden warships was nearing its limit, and new weapons and the need for 
supporting machinery necessitated a different construction material. In particular, the 
development of the shell gun by French army officer Henri-Joseph Paixhans in 1824 played an 
important part in the realization of metal-hulled and armored vessels. Paixhans’s new weapon 
upset the delicate balance between the sailing ship’s wooden walls and cannon firing solid shot 
that had existed for centuries (Holcombe 1993:2). The destructive power of shell against wood 
forced naval thinking towards armor-plated men-of-war, but employment of unarmored iron- 
hulled warships grew simply from iron’s superior strength as a construction material. 
Iron hulls were pioneered by merchant establishments, and as usual this fundamental 
change in ship construction first took place in Great Britain. Lambert (1992:47) states, “The first 
scientifically constructed iron vessel [was] the passenger barge Vulcan, built in 1819…”. This 
vessel was built for service on the River Clyde in Scotland. Shipbuilders in this area and on the 
River Mersey became the pioneers of iron ship construction, away from the traditional 
shipbuilding centers of the Thames. Prior to the first orders for iron warships, a large number of 
iron merchantmen from these areas had been constructed and proven in service. 
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The first iron-hulled vessel to make a sea voyage was Aaron Manby of 1822. This small 
paddlewheeler had a successful career lasting into the 1850s. Many other vessels such as Aglaia, 
Manchester, and Princess Royal were constructed in the 1830s by such iron pioneers as Napier, 
Laird, and Fairbairn (Smith 1937:98-99). Perhaps representing the culmination of iron 
steamships during the period before 1860 was Isambard Kingdom Brunel’s paddlewheeler Great 
Western of 1837 and the screw-propelled Great Britain of 1843. These vessels were intended 
exclusively for transatlantic passenger service, and the latter is preserved today as the first 
modern merchant vessel (Figure II.12). The success of these fine ships and others was closely 
watched by naval interests in Great Britain and elsewhere. 
 
FIGURE II.12. SS Great Britain, considered the world’s first modern ocean liner (Courtesy of 
John Speller 2012; photo by Henry Fox Talbot 1844) 
 
Iron as a construction material allowed for larger vessels and a reliable foundation for 
improved machinery. As experience was gained with building ships of metal, rapid technological 
changes that have come to be representative of modern ship construction took place. Watertight 
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bulkheads were pioneered by Laird, and a large number of tests were performed that produced a 
system of corrections for compass deviation. The Royal Navy at first relied on private shipyards 
for these tests and others, and even ordered its first iron warships from civilian yards. The first of 
these vessels was Nemesis of 1840 (Figure II.13). 
 
FIGURE II.13. Nemesis, world’s first iron-hulled warship (National Maritime Museum, 
Greenwich, London, UK, 2012) 
 
Nemesis was built by Laird’s of Birkenhead under great secrecy, ostensibly for the East 
India Company, but in fact formed part of the British Squadron in China (Smith 1937:115).  
Laird’s had by 1840 probably built more iron ships than any other firm. Nemesis was a paddle 
vessel, and went on to serve in a distinguished career, serving as the lead ship in the First Opium 
War (Lambert 1992:48). Following Nemesis were a large number of paddlewheel iron sloops 
such as Guadeloupe, Phlegethon, and Mohawk. The French in particular paid attention to these 
developments, but neither the French Navy nor the Royal Navy made overt moves to begin 
building iron warships in naval yards until the type was further proven. 
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The Royal Navy, in 1845, began an ambitious program of ordering large iron-hulled 
frigates, starting with HMS Trident. The four large vessels following this were Birkenhead, 
Megaera, Simoom, and Vulcan—the latter three were screw-propelled. Although strongly-built, 
all of these vessels were hastily downgraded to troopships prior to completion (Smith 1937:118).  
Concern over the results of firing trials caused this decision, as it appeared that wrought iron was 
much too brittle to stand up effectively against naval gunfire. In truth, the firing test results were 
largely ambiguous (Rodgers 1996:37). Nevertheless, these warships rendered valuable service, 
and Megaera, Simoom, and Vulcan participated effectively in the Crimean War. 
During the period the British were constructing iron-hulled warships, the French and 
Americans built a few similar vessels. The French attempted to follow British practice beginning 
in 1837, but as usual were limited by inferior marine engineering facilities and a lack of 
expertise. The French program was originally designed to help bolster France’s iron industries, 
but following the British lead, the iron warship program had largely ended by the late 1840s 
(Lambert 1992:49). Lingering concerns over iron’s weakness under fire and rapid fouling 
problems prevented for a time the further development of iron warships in Europe. For this 
reason it was the composite ironclad warship that revolutionized naval warfare in the 1860s. 
The only successful iron-hulled war vessel constructed in the United States before the 
Civil War was the paddle frigate USS Michigan, ordered in 1842 (Figure II.14). At this time no 
yards in America had yet produced an iron seagoing vessel, looking primarily to Britain for 
expertise and materials. Michigan’s design as such was largely based off Nemesis (Rodgers 
1996:20). Intended for Great Lakes service, Michigan enjoyed all the benefits of serving on cold 
freshwater, having a working life of 80 years. During this time span, the iron-hulled warship’s 
counterpart, the ironclad, subsequently proved its superior strength in battle. 
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FIGURE II.14. The iron paddle frigate USS Michigan, launched in 1844, went on to serve for 80 
years. (The Archimedes Screw History Project 2012) 
 
The Armor-Plated Steam Warship 
 Like the other innovations discussed in this chapter, the concept of armoring warships 
dated back far beyond the 19th century, but was not truly realized until then. The first well- 
documented armored warships were the “turtle ships” of Korean admiral Yi Sun-sin in the 
1590s. These were used to repel a Japanese invasion, but their armor was primarily for the 
protection of the crew, not the ship (Lambert 1992:50). In the centuries between 1590 and 1859, 
many proposals towards protecting ships with armor were put forward, but little is known about 
them. “Prior to the second quarter of the 19th century there existed neither the incentive nor the 
technology to produce viable armored warships” (Holcombe 1993:2). Cannon fire was usually 
unable to significantly penetrate the wooden walls of the fleets. As has been previously 
discussed, it was the invention of the shell gun in 1824 by Paixhans that led to the first serious 
considerations for armoring modern war vessels. 
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During the 1840s, construction of a purpose-designed ironclad began in America. A 
wealthy industrialist and shipbuilder from Hoboken, New Jersey, James Stevens, had received 
from Congress an appropriation of $250,000 to construct what was probably the first ironclad 
ordered for any navy (Durkin 1954:63). The vessel came to be called the “Stevens Battery,” but 
was never finished due to constant design changes and lack of funds. Construction finally came 
to a stop in 1853, just as Europe was beginning to recognize the need for such a vessel. Stevens 
lobbied for more funds, but was largely rebuked in Congress; one Senator, future Confederate 
Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory, supported him. Ultimately, the project was allowed to 
limp along until 1881, when the Stevens Battery was finally broken up on the ways. In the course 
of its construction this remarkable vessel was altered from a length of 250 feet with one propeller 
and 4.5-inch armor to a length of 415 feet with massive engines driving two propellers and 6.75-
inch armor (Lambert 1992:51). If it had been completed, the Stevens Battery would have been 
the world’s largest and most powerful warship; there seems little doubt of its potential influence 
on future ironclad construction. 
There were no major wars involving the new naval technologies of steam power and shell 
guns combined until the Crimean War. It began in 1853 at the Battle of Sinope, where the 
Russians employed shell guns with devastating effect against a Turkish squadron of wooden 
warships. The British and French allied themselves with Turkey against Russia and in 1854 
declared war. Russian fortifications and naval forces in the Black Sea were therefore targeted. At 
Sevastopol in particular, the Russian guns again proved the strength of shell against wood. This 
British-French defeat, coupled with lessons learned from Sinope, led to the first combat use of 
armored vessels in modern naval warfare (Holcombe 1993:2-3). France, with its smaller navy, 
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quickly sought a method of invulnerability for its warships, and settled upon the tried-and-true 
floating battery concept. 
Dévastation, Lave, and Tonnante were accordingly completed in 1855 (Figure II.15).  
These ungainly vessels were driven by sail and steam, but could not move efficiently on their 
own, echoing the motive power of 40 years before. Andrew Lambert (1992:51) reinforces the 
point: “Just as steam came to naval use in a floating battery (Demologos) so armour was first 
applied to a similar type”. Protected by 4.5-inch armor, these vessels were intended to be 
anchored in front of coastal forts and reduce them. They did just that at the Battle of Kinburn on 
17 October 1855, leading to widespread acclaim of the ironclad’s merits. 
 
FIGURE II.15. The French ironclad floating battery Dévastation was used to great effect at the 
Battle of Kinburn during the Crimean War. (Lambert 1992:51; courtesy of Marius Bar) 
 
Closely following the French in pressing ironclad floating batteries into service were the 
British, who took extra time to refine the design and make it more ship-like, as seen in Figure 
II.16. The first British ironclads were Glatton and Meteor, followed later by Aetna, Erebus, and 
Terror. Aetna was destroyed by fire prior to completion, but the others lived out their war service 
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without seeing action (Lambert 1992:52). These vessels were well-constructed, but as floating 
batteries they did not point the way forward. After the conclusion of hostilities in 1856 it was the 
French who first sought to pioneer the development of the ironclad cruiser. 
 
FIGURE II.16. British ironclad floating battery HMS Terror at Bermuda during the American 
Civil War (Lambert 1992:53; courtesy of National Maritime Museum) 
 
Accordingly, in 1859 warship technology took another leap forward with the completion 
of the French ironclad frigate La Gloire (Figures II.17 and II.18). This powerful warship was 
essentially a cut-down version of a wooden screw battleship fitted with four-inch armor. Despite 
the stir caused in Europe by La Gloire’s debut, the ship suffered from serious weaknesses, 
including poor seakeeping qualities and weak engines. Its career was short and unremarkable, as 
wooden hulled seagoing ironclads “…were not a healthy type…” (Lambert 1992:53). La Gloire 
did inspire the British to ironclad construction and thus initiated a new naval arms race. 
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FIGURE II.17. La Gloire, laid down 1859, was the world’s first seagoing ironclad frigate. 
(Courtesy of Larry Neilson 2012) 
 
 
FIGURE II.18. Longitudinal cutaway and deck plans of La Gloire, showing machinery 
(Courtesy of Larry Neilson 2012) 
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Great Britain entered the new naval race strongly with the impressive HMS Warrior, 
completed in 1860. This large 400-foot vessel had an iron hull with 4.5-inch armor and was 
capable of 13.5 knots, fitted with the largest marine engines of the day (Figures II.19 and II.20).  
Warrior was essentially an enlarged and improved version of the steam frigates Mersey and 
Orlando, but was far more powerful than any ship afloat when completed. Considered to be the 
first truly modern warship, the first British ironclad “…would have been in no danger from any 
combination of wooden ships, and would have had little trouble with Gloire” (Lambert 1992:56).  
In one well-executed move, the British had regained the lead in the naval race. 
 
FIGURE II.19. HMS Warrior (Lambert 1992:55) 
 
In the years leading up to and during the American Civil War, many more ironclads were 
built, each class attempting to improve upon the excellent example set by Warrior. This trend 
culminated in the 1860s with the huge Minotaur class of 36 guns. The abundance of ironclad 
vessels in Great Britain and France during this time was matched only by those built for wartime 
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service in the United and Confederate states during the Civil War. In 1862 alone, approximately 
88 ironclads of various types had been built or were building in Britain and France (Baxter 1933: 
209). The future of warfare at sea was now fully committed to the naval-industrial complex. 
 
FIGURE II.20. Section through Warrior’s engine room showing Penn trunk engine—the largest 
of the time. Warrior had two of these, capable of propelling the ship at 12-13 knots without the 
use of sails. (Brown 1990:183; courtesy of Science Museum) 
 
 A keen observer of the revolutionary naval changes taking place in Europe during the 
1850s was Senator Stephen Mallory of Florida, already mentioned as the future Confederate 
Naval Secretary. At this time he was chair of the U.S. Senate’s powerful Naval Affairs 
Committee (Holcombe 1993:6). It was Mallory’s business to keep track of any promising new 
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naval technology; he especially continued to advocate the adoption of ironclads and the 
construction of other modern steam warships. Mallory also worked towards disciplinary reforms 
and more efficient disposition of naval personnel. As Robert Holcombe (1993:6) states,  
Thus when empowered to produce a navy for the fledgling Confederacy in early 1861, 
Mallory’s appreciation of naval innovations in progress, and the industrial liabilities that 
prevented the South from rapidly building a conventional fleet, led him to consider the 
construction of ironclad warships a priority. 
 
The Confederate ironclad program, and indeed its entire naval effort, came to hinge upon 
industrial capacity. Those penultimate products of the Industrial Revolution, the steam engine 
and mass-produced iron, were still scarce in the agrarian South by 1861. As Confederate industry 
developed, Mallory’s policy saw more success in building and armoring vessels, but effective 
propulsion systems too often remained out of reach. Although the armored steam-powered 
warship had come of age by 1860, the technology to build quality engines still rested primarily in 
Europe and the Northern states. There were several types of steam engine uniquely American in 
design, but ideas were regularly exchanged back and forth across the Atlantic. As a result, 
marine steam engines employed in the United States on the eve of the Civil War were as varied 
as anywhere else in the world.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: STEAM MACHINERY TYPES IN AMERICA, 1800-1860 
By the 1860s, the industrialized world had seen an explosion in types of steam machinery 
being produced for vessels of every description. New ideas were continually put forth and 
improved and new designs manufactured as the technology continued to advance. In Great 
Britain, the large iron and steel shipbuilding firms competed with each other in producing more 
powerful and effective engine and boiler designs. Much of this energy was directed towards new, 
compact systems for screw-propelled warships. Paddlewheel-driven vessels also continued to be 
built, especially on the Mississippi River system of the United States. 
The United States was probably second in industrial capacity behind Great Britain during 
the 1850s, although France was always a close contender as well. Steam engine development in 
the U.S. was mostly driven by mercantile interests. Prior to the Civil War the U.S. Navy was 
small and did not have many steam warships. While the large companies in Britain such as 
Laird’s received many government contracts for naval steam engines, many U.S. companies such 
as the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia, only occasionally built steam engines or their 
components in addition to other work. By the late 1850s this had begun to change, especially in 
the North, but as a whole the American marine steam machinery business lagged significantly 
behind that of Britain. Often, American-built or designed engines differed considerably from 
their European counterparts. A few distinctively American styles emerged and came to be used 
onboard several of the Confederate ironclads. This chapter will, therefore, examine the 
development and variety of steam engines in the United States, as well as the exchange of ideas 
across the Atlantic. (Tomblin 1988:1-8) 
It has already been seen how the marine steam engine was first applied to navigation and 
military use in Europe and the United States at the beginning of the 19th century. By the start of 
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the Civil War in 1861, this technology had matured to a considerable extent. Manufacturers and 
officials of the British Royal Navy had begun to attempt some degree of standardization in vessel 
propulsion systems, but during the 1850s and 1860s a large amount of variation still existed. 
Many vessels were still powered solely by sail, others utilized the tried-and-true paddlewheel, 
newer vessels had screw propulsion, and still others utilized a combination of all three methods.  
Many different engines were developed that were thought to be most effective, but only a few 
major types gained widespread recognition and usage. In the United States, the preferred engine 
types often differed from those in Great Britain and France. (Atherton 1851:28-33; Foster 
1986:67-70)   
In the years leading up to the Civil War, beginning in the 1840s, the U.S. Navy and that 
of France took the lead in adopting steam technology for warships (Baxter 1933:3-4). As 
paddlewheels were still the only well-tried way of moving a ship by steam until the 1840s, the 
Navy utilized paddle frigates, beginning with USS Mississippi and Missouri. The U.S. trend 
continued with steam screw sloops and frigates built beginning in the 1850s with USS 
Merrimack. Like the other navies, the U.S. Navy was cautious in its approach to adopting the 
new technology completely, particularly after experiments with the horizontal underwater 
“Hunter wheel” ended in spectacular failure (Rodgers 1996:34). All of the new vessels were 
accordingly fitted with masts and yards. This practice would continue for many years, although 
most of the Civil War ironclads were driven by steam alone. The U.S. Navy also followed the 
practice of the Royal Navy in relying on private works to construct steam machinery. Until the 
large-scale adoption of iron shipbuilding, “…most wooden naval steamers in the United States 
were built in government shipyards and their engines and boilers in private engine works…” 
(Tomblin 1988:284). This practice resulted in few vessels with power plants designed by naval 
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engineers until the Civil War, but plenty of experience was gained in testing and utilizing steam 
systems by that time.   
In April 1861, the United States Navy had in its possession “…seven screw frigates, five 
screw sloops, four sidewheel sloops, and eight gunboats for a total of 24 steam-powered vessels” 
(Tomblin 1988:254). During the war, the number of steam warships would increase 
exponentially as both sides frantically initiated new construction and converted merchant vessels 
to naval service. A wide range of engine types thus fell under naval operation, both Union and 
Confederate. Most had their origins in merchant service, and were not ideally suited for 
warships. Nevertheless, several of these came to be utilized onboard Confederate ironclads.     
Engines for Paddlewheel Propulsion 
Paddlewheel engines were fully developed by the time of the first effective application of 
screw propellers. There were many different ways to effectively transmit the engine’s power to 
the main shaft, but the ideal arrangement of paddlewheel engines was quite different from that 
needed for screws. First, “All engines for driving paddle wheels necessarily revolved at slow 
speeds…” (Smith 1937:145). A long piston stroke was recognized as being most efficient for 
turning wheels, as compared to short, fast piston strokes for propellers. Second, the whole 
arrangement of paddlewheel machinery was quite bulky and seemingly exposed—not desirable 
features in a fighting ship, although coal bunkers usually protected both boilers and engines. 
Arrangement of the engines was restricted by the athwartships nature of the main wheel shaft, 
which also prevented the mounting of broadside guns (Rodgers 1996:31). The search for a 
suitable and simple arrangement for maintenance led to some very tall engines, often causing 
top-heaviness. Most steam engines had to be placed either directly above or below the main shaft 
in the center of the vessel, leading to both a high center of gravity and sagging problems in 
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vessels with heavier engines. Inclined engines were a largely-successful attempt to remedy these 
issues; a particularly fine example of this system was that onboard the iron sidewheel frigate 
USS Michigan (Rodgers 1996:28).   
Merchant vessels did not have the same concerns as warships, and paddlewheel-driven 
vessels continued to thrive on American rivers until the early 20th century. Many different 
engines were tried in the period between 1800 and the Civil War: “There was no orderly 
development of a perfect engine, but an explosion of efforts in many directions” (Foster 
1986:67). While most of these experiments were unsuccessful, a small number of engine types 
became widely adopted for one reason or another. Foremost among these were the “crosshead,” 
“walking beam,” “oscillating,” and “direct-acting” types. These became staples of American and 
British merchant steam power. There were other successful early engine types developed in 
Britain, such as “Siamese,” “Gorgon,” and “grasshopper” engines. These did not see common 
use in the United States, but some vessels, including naval units, employed these designs. 
Crosshead engines were the first type to see widespread usage in America. These had 
been developed directly from Boulton and Watt’s beam engines of the 1780s. Steamboat pioneer 
Robert Fulton was the first to use this system on shipboard in 1807, but it was complicated by 
gearing to a large flywheel. The type was soon simplified to the form it would keep until the 
1840s, when crosshead engines were phased out in favor of more efficient layouts (Foster 
1986:67). In its heyday, the crosshead engine epitomized the simplicity and practicality sought 
by most private enterprises. A typical arrangement is shown in Figure III.1. The steam cylinder 
or cylinders were placed vertically over the main shaft, supported by a frame, usually wooden, of 
appropriate size. A large horizontal beam called the crosshead was moved up and down in frame 
guides by the stroke of the piston rod, transmitting the engine’s energy to a connecting rod that 
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turned a crank shaft on each side of the cylinder. This arrangement allowed for ease of access 
and relatively smooth operation, but it was handicapped by the placement of so much weight 
high above the waterline. As steamboats got larger, a practical limit of engine size was reached 
due to balance issues (Foster 1986:67). A similarly effective engine needed to be utilized that 
would not disturb vessel stability. 
 
FIGURE III.1. Typical crosshead engine, with paddlewheel outlined (Hutton 1897:25) 
 
Walking beam engines, sometime called “vertical beam,” solved many of the problems 
encountered with simple crosshead engines. Many paddle steamers came to use this arrangement, 
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particularly those vessels used in coastal trade, the Great Lakes, and the East Coast.  The walking 
beam setup involved a vertically-placed cylinder, but it was placed in front of or behind the main 
shaft. Movement of the piston raised and lowered one end of a beam pivoted on its center on top 
of a large frame. The other end of the beam moved a connecting rod that turned the paddlewheel 
crankshaft. Figure III.2 shows a complete diagram of this interesting machinery arrangement. 
(Foster 1986:67) 
 
FIGURE III.2. Typical walking beam engine (Roper 1897:210) 
 
The walking beam engine remained a popular type in American merchant paddlewheelers 
into the 1920s. It was simple and easily accessible, and had a lower center of gravity than the 
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crosshead type. The name “walking beam” came from this engine’s easily-observed mode of 
operation due to its moving parts being exposed above a vessel’s decks, as in Figure III.3. For 
this reason, its merits as a system for driving warships are obviously very few, as a single well-
placed hit could easily disable the walking beam. This was true of crosshead engines as well.  
Consequently, no purpose-built warships in the United States used these engine designs. 
 
FIGURE III.3. United States Revenue Cutter Louis McLane, ex-USS Delaware, an acquired 
naval vessel—note the exposed walking beam (Online Library of Selected Images, Naval 
Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
Another alternative to the crosshead engine which was popular in Great Britain and used 
in at least one important United States naval vessel was the side-lever engine. Many of the 
earliest naval steamers and merchantmen were driven by this engine, which was effective but 
quite large and heavy (Lambert 1992:170). In the United States, the pioneering paddle frigate 
USS Mississippi was fitted with British-style side-lever engines designed by Charles Copeland, 
superintending engineer at West Point Foundry in New York (Tomblin 1988:61). Its sister-ship 
Missouri was built with inclined engines for the purpose of comparison. Unfortunately, Missouri 
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was destroyed by fire before the comparison trials were complete (Tomblin 1988:171). Despite 
the inconclusiveness of the results, and Mississippi’s acceptable performance with side-levers, no 
more major American units were built with this engine type. 
The side-lever engine worked on the same principles as the walking beam type, but was 
arranged in a slightly different manner, as shown in Figure III.4. Kevin Foster (1986:67) 
describes this complex arrangement best: 
An upright, vertical cylinder pushed a long crosshead up and down.  The crosshead was 
connected on each side to the end of a low-placed pair of center pivoted beams called side 
levers…  The end of the side levers opposite to the cylinder used another connecting rod to turn 
the paddle crankshaft above them.  
 
Side-lever engines were not much exposed above the waterline, but they were fairly complex and 
bulky. As such, they were not often used in naval vessels, and were not very common outside of 
Great Britain. By the 1860s more compact and powerful engines had become available, and side-
levers and their variants went out of widespread use. 
 
FIGURE III.4. A typical side-lever engine. Many early engines had decoration as shown here by 
the Doric columns. (Smith 1937:144) 
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British manufacturers were, for a time, determined to overcome the weaknesses of side- 
lever engines, resulting in the “Siamese,” “Gorgon,” and “grasshopper” engine designs. The first 
was patented in 1839 by Joseph Maudslay, and was used onboard a number of British paddle 
frigates. Maudslay’s twin-cylinder design “…quickly became known as a Siamese engine after 
the famous Siamese twins, Chang and Eng, then being exhibited in Britain” (Lambert 1992:170).  
This engine type became most widely-used in naval service, while Gorgon engines remained less 
common and grasshopper engines were best suited to small merchant vessels.  
Siamese engines consisted of a pair of independent twin cylinders, with the piston rods 
connected to a crosshead above, which turned the main shaft via a connecting rod crank (Figure 
III.5). Air pumps and other equipment were also operated by the crosshead via extensions.  
“Ships were provided with two such engine units for each shaft, the engine units usually being 
capable of operating independently from each other” (Lambert 1992:170). This arrangement 
occupied less space than regular side-levers, had a longer piston stroke, and allowed for greater 
maneuverability, but it was still heavy and complex. Siamese engines were used onboard a 
number of British warships, including the famous screw sloop HMS Rattler, but never gained 
widespread use. No U.S. Navy warships utilized this design. 
Gorgon engines were developed at about the same time as the Siamese type, and 
similarly remained an exclusively British design. They were patented by John Seaward and first 
used onboard HMS Gorgon of 1837, hence the common name. Gorgon engines worked by 
employing two vertical cylinders for each engine unit, positioned below the paddle shaft cranks, 
and linked to it by connecting rods. “Just as with the side lever engine, a parallel motion 
mechanism ensured that the piston moved vertically and a system of levers also operated pumps 
from the piston crosshead” (Lambert 1992:170-171). This layout can be seen in Figure III.6.  
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Gorgon engines were ultimately utilized by several British warships due to their relatively light 
weight, but they were never as common as Siamese engines.  
 
FIGURE III.5. Model of the 1841 paddle sloop HMS Devastation’s Siamese engines (Lambert 
1992:171; courtesy of Science Museum) 
 
 
FIGURE III.6. Typical Gorgon engine (Lambert 1992:171) 
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Grasshopper engines were essentially a modified side-lever arrangement. The only real 
difference was the location of the pivot points—on the grasshopper design, the lever had the 
pivot point on one end instead of in the center, with the connecting rod attached toward the 
opposite end, as seen in Figure III.7. This created a “hopping” motion of the lever, resulting in 
this engine type’s given name. The grasshopper engine was never very common, and it still 
suffered the drawbacks of conventional side-lever engines in having a large size and weight. Its 
main advantages were cheapness of construction and robustness. For these reasons, the 
grasshopper engine was employed almost exclusively onboard tugboats and other small, 
hardworking craft. 
 
FIGURE III.7. Typical grasshopper engine (Seaton 1886:5) 
 
A powerful and unusual engine type for paddle-driven vessels was utilized by some of 
the fastest ships of the 19th century. The oscillating steam engine came into favor beginning in 
the 1840s due to its compactness and lack of separate connecting rods. “That arrangement 
allowed for a long stroke and avoided the problems involved with connecting rod forces as well 
as the need for crosshead guides or parallel motion mechanisms” (Lambert 1992:171). 
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Oscillating engines were also lightweight and simple, but frequently suffered from loss of power 
from steam leakage. This was due to their unique design. 
The oscillating engine, like so many other developments in steam technology, was first 
patented in Great Britain in 1827 by Joseph Maudslay and improved by John Penn in 1838. It 
was designed from the outset to overcome the problems with weight in side-lever engines and 
stability problems with crosshead and walking beam engines. There were no connecting rods on 
this engine. The cylinders, usually a pair, were mounted below the main shaft and designed to 
pivot on center trunnions. The crankshaft was thus driven directly by the piston rods as the 
cylinders themselves rocked back and forth, imparting a rotational motion to the shaft. Steam 
was delivered to and exhausted from the cylinders through the trunnions. Figure III.8 shows a 
diagram of this unique arrangement. (Foster 1986:67) 
 
FIGURE III.8. Typical oscillating engines (Lambert 1992:171) 
 
Many of the Confederate blockade runners and other fast steamships during the Civil 
War era utilized oscillating engines for their low center of gravity and high-speed capability. 
These engines were not well-suited for many other vessel types, and were not used by any 
Confederate ironclads. Major problems with the type included high cost, problems with the 
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steam joint at the trunnions, and a large amount of wear. The steam joint problem was never 
completely solved due to the ever-increasing operating pressure of new power plants. Despite 
these problems, it is fair to say that the oscillating engine represented a peak in steam engine 
design for paddlewheelers. Unfortunately, like virtually all paddlewheel machinery, it was not 
ideally suited for use onboard warships. (Foster 1986:67; Lambert 1992:171) 
A final paddlewheel engine that was common in the United States was the direct-acting 
type. Its simplicity and versatility led to its adoption on a number of vessel types, and even 
allowed for adaptation to screw propulsion. There were a number of forms of this engine 
arrangement, usually designated by the cylinder’s position relative to the keel. These were the 
“vertical” or “vertical inverted,” “steeple,” “return piston rod,” and “inclined.” In the United 
States the vertical inverted and inclined forms were by far the most common in the 1850s and 
1860s. The inclined engine was favored for the ubiquitous Western river steamboats, while the 
vertical inverted was common onboard small coastal vessels and tugboats. Each form had its 
advantages and disadvantages, but as a whole the direct-acting engine was much favored in both 
the U.S. Navy and merchant marine during the mid-19th century. (Foster 1986:67-70) 
Direct-acting steam engines, like virtually all other engines during the first half of the 
1800s, were usually single-cylinder, simple expansion. They worked the same way no matter 
what their arrangement: the cylinder was positioned to transmit power directly to the crankshaft 
via the piston rod. In the vertical form, the cylinder was placed directly below the main shaft, 
while in the vertical inverted form it was placed over the shaft. A typical vertical inverted engine 
is shown in Figure III.9. The major drawback of these two forms was the short stroke resulting 
from the lack of space between the paddle shaft and engine in all but deep-draft hulls (Foster 
1986:67). 
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FIGURE III.9. Typical vertical inverted direct-acting engine (Roper 1897:204) 
 
Steeple engines and return connecting rod engines were designed to avoid the 
disadvantages inherent with the short piston stroke of the vertical types. Steeple engines “…had 
two piston rods from the same cylinder connected over the crankshaft by a crosshead. A 
connecting rod returns from the crosshead down to turn the crankshaft” (Foster 1986:67). This 
arrangement was quite tall and bulky, much like the crosshead and walking beam types. It was so 
named because the guides for the crosshead usually extended above deck, were A-frame shaped, 
and when sheathed with a protective covering resembled a church steeple. Figure III.10 shows a 
diagram of this arrangement.   
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FIGURE III.10. Typical steeple engine (Kennedy 1905:56) 
 
Return connecting rod engines used a single piston rod split into two or more arms which 
passed down each side of the cylinder and were joined by crossheads on either side. “A 
wishbone shaped connecting rod extended up from the short crossheads to turn the crankshaft 
above” (Foster 1986:67), as seen in Figure III.11. They were often called “back-acting” for this 
reason, and essentially acted as horizontal steeple engines. Steeple engines were not used much 
for naval service, but the back-acting type came to be used frequently onboard mid-19th century 
warships, and was easily adaptable to screw propulsion. 
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FIGURE III.11. Typical return connecting rod engine (Smith 1937:146) 
 
Inclined direct-acting steam engines were the type most commonly used by the U.S. 
Navy in its paddle frigates. Their low profile made them preferable for rigorous service onboard 
warships, but inclined engines were also ideally suited for service onboard river steamboats. The 
design as applied to naval vessels was one of the most sophisticated used widely for paddlewheel 
propulsion (Foster 1986:70). As in the other direct-acting forms, a long connecting rod drove the 
crankshaft directly from the piston rod, but in this case the cylinder was positioned near the 
bottom of the hull below the waterline and angled upward towards the main crankshaft. A low 
profile, efficient, and relatively lightweight arrangement of machinery resulted, among the best 
that could be obtained for naval service. Many U.S. naval steam vessels, beginning with USS 
Missouri, used this layout. 
An important and interesting outgrowth of the inclined marine steam engine, which also 
combined attributes of the horizontal direct-acting engine used for screw propulsion, was the 
type epitomized by the Western river steamboat. The shallow waters on which these boats ran 
emphasized light, flexible construction and small but powerful engines. A large area of even 
weight distribution and an efficient stroke made the inclined engine desirable, but many changes, 
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including a significant increase in operating pressure, were made to it, resulting in the type used 
onboard riverboats.   
The availability of unlimited fuel supplies and the desire for simple mechanics led to the creation 
of the western rivers high pressure steam engine. The design incorporated a cylinder on each side 
of the hull to drive a crank on the sternwheel [or sidewheel] by using a very long wooden 
connecting rod called a Pittman. (Foster 1986:70) 
 
This simple but powerful engine type was used onboard virtually every one of the thousands of 
paddlewheel steamboats plying the rivers of the Mississippi Basin and other rivers in the 
American South and West (Figure III.12). Although influenced by other factors, riverboat 
engines evolved largely through practical experience, with little thought being given to 
standardization of power plants or formally-trained engineers until after the Civil War (Bates 
1996:7-8).  
 
FIGURE III.12. Typical Western rivers steamboat engine (Bates 1996:42) 
 
Former steamboat captain Alan Bates (1996:7) states, “In its fully developed form, 
basically achieved by 1840…”, the standard power plant of river steamers represented a marvel 
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of compact, simple engineering but remained inefficient and dangerous for many years due to the 
simultaneous abundance of fuel and lack of highly trained engineers. Other factors played into 
this as well, such as mud clogging the hot wells and pipes, the high operating pressure of the 
fairly brittle wrought iron boilers, and feedwater pumps that only functioned when the vessel was 
underway. Machinery of this type was utilized by the hundreds of steamers pressed into Union or 
Confederate war service in the West, and several sets of machinery were salvaged from wrecked 
boats for use onboard new vessels, including ironclads. Western riverboat engines and boilers 
were even adapted by the Confederates to turn screws. The relatively late arrival of screw 
propeller technology in the United States had left the South with a dearth of propeller engines, 
but there were several types in use in America by the 1860s.  
Engines for Screw Propulsion 
Screw propulsion, although still a new technology in the 1850s and 1860s, was quickly 
recognized as being much better-suited for warships than paddlewheels. Propellers and their 
accompanying equipment such as shafting took up much less space in a hull, were always 
capable of driving a vessel due to their submerged nature, and were also protected from damage 
for these same reasons. While these benefits were realized quickly, propeller design at first went 
in a few different directions. The screw itself created drag when a ship was under sail, and there 
were attempts to design different propellers with adjustable blades or capability of being 
disconnected while underway (Atherton 1851:45). Concerns such as these were primarily 
relevant to the very early days of screw propulsion, when efficient engines were just being 
developed. Like paddlewheel machinery, initial efforts in propeller technology used adapted 
existing technology before moving in different directions as data and experience accumulated. 
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By the Civil War, there were a large number of engine types designed for turning screws.  
A few of the older engine forms designed for paddlewheel propulsion were also utilized. These 
were the first to be used in conjunction with the new technology. Because of the relatively slow 
turning rate of paddlewheels, “…an engine need only develop about twenty-five revolutions per 
minute (RPM) to make a paddle-wheel practical” (Taggart 1991:99). Propellers, in comparison, 
need at least 50 RPM to function properly. In the first days of screw propulsion, therefore, the 
most common way to achieve the desired speed was through gearing. (Taggart 1991:99) 
Before the widespread use of direct-acting engines for screw propulsion, it “…was 
considered impracticable, even in short-stroke engines [to obtain 50+ RPM], consequently, it 
was the universal custom to obtain it by the intervention of multiplying cog-wheels” (Roper 
1897:208). These wheels were often fitted with wooden teeth when attached to the engine shaft, 
and iron pinions on the propeller shaft. Many vessels used this arrangement, including HMS 
Rattler, which was fitted with a Maudslay Siamese engine geared to the propeller shaft, and SS 
Great Britain, fitted with geared oscillating engines (Smith 1937:145). During the Civil War, 
several Confederate ironclads including Tennessee, Tuscaloosa, Huntsville, Albemarle, Neuse, 
and Wilmington were fitted with geared machinery of various types.   
The use of geared engines, particularly in warships, was largely a stopgap measure until 
better systems were developed. In the case of the Confederate ironclads, the only available 
machinery was not ideal for screw propulsion, so gearing was used by necessity even at that late 
time. Geared engines had many disadvantages, including excessive weight and occupying more 
space than regular power plants (Roper 1897:208). After the 1840s, they had largely fallen into 
disfavor, as the direct-acting engine became more refined and popular. 
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The 1850s saw the flowering of the direct-acting engine type as applied to turning 
propellers. Compared to beam engine types, most forms of the direct-acting engine could be 
easily adapted to screw propulsion, and indeed a few forms were ideal for it. Direct-acting 
engines powered the propeller shaft directly, and were, therefore, capable of developing high 
RPMs through short-stroke motion. It did not take engineers long to realize the benefits of this 
mode of propulsion. The relative compactness and versatility of direct-acting engines led to 
widespread use in warships particularly, and a number of different designs were adopted. In 
1858, an Admiralty R.N. Committee reported: 
…that of all the variety of engines that have been purchased by Government for our screw ships 
of war, the following are so superior to all others, that no engines of an older make should ever 
again be put on board. The engines to which they now refer are: 
 
(1) The single piston-rod engine, with the connecting-rod attached direct to the crankshaft, and 
with a single flat guide. 
(2) The engine commonly known as the trunk engine, and patented by Messrs. Penn and Sons. 
(3) The double piston-rod engine. (Smith 1937:146-147) 
 
The “single” and “double piston-rod” engines have already been mentioned, the latter more 
usually described as the back-acting or return piston rod type. The trunk engine, meanwhile, was 
a recent British invention widely adopted in ships of the Royal Navy, but not commonly used in 
the United States. The vertical inverted, horizontal, inclined, and “vibrating lever” engine types 
were the most common in the United States by the 1860s. Like the paddlewheel types before 
them, all of these engines had important advantages coupled with a few serious drawbacks. 
By the 1860s, one of the most common types of engine was the single-cylinder, inverted, 
direct-acting variety. This engine was simple, reliable, and often quite compact, leading to its 
widespread utilization onboard small merchant vessels and tugboats. While originally designed 
for turning paddlewheels, it was found that the inverted engine was even better for turning a 
propeller shaft. In this arrangement, the cylinder was placed over the shaft with sufficient room 
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for the piston and connecting rods to turn the cranks. The resulting system was simple, open, and 
allowed for easy maintenance (Foster 1986:70). Its basic components did not change for many 
decades.  A vast majority of the screw tugs of the Civil War period utilized this engine, and it 
found its way onboard a number of Confederate ironclads. An example, from an early 20th 
century New Orleans tugboat, is shown in Figure III.13. 
 
FIGURE III.13. Early 1900s single-cylinder, vertical inverted direct-acting screw-propelled 
tugboat engine (Online Library of Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the 
Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
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The vertical direct-acting engine was never widely used by propeller driven vessels due 
to the cylinder’s awkward placement in the hull, underneath the shafting. This arrangement was 
ideal for paddlewheels, with the main shaft placed high up in the hull athwartships, but did not 
lend itself to propeller shafting placed low in the hull. Consequently, it was not used onboard any 
Civil War naval vessels. Likewise, the steeple engine, also developed for paddlewheel 
propulsion, was not ideal for naval vessels or turning screws. The steeple engine’s exposed 
arrangement and bulk led to the gradual disappearance of the type after the 1840s, although it 
had been well-developed in a horizontal form for warships by the British. One of USS 
Merrimack’s sisters, Wabash, was powered by horizontal steeples, but no Civil War ironclad 
employed this engine type (Silverstone 2001:4-12,16,151-157). 
Oscillating engines, the epitome of paddlewheel power plants, were also sometimes 
adapted to propeller-driven vessels. This was done by placing the engines above the shafts at an 
inclined angle. Oscillating engines were “…often used in multiples at right angles similar to a V-
8 automobile engine” (Foster 1986:70). Despite the relative simplicity of this arrangement, the 
oscillating engine still encountered the same problems of steam leakage and cost of maintenance.  
Like most of the other engine types, it was gradually displaced by the vertical or horizontal 
direct-acting types. 
The most popular engine for screw warships during the Civil War period was the 
horizontal direct-acting form. This arrangement offered low clearance for beneath-the-waterline 
protection, while at the same time retaining an open, simple, and easily-accessible layout. Its 
inherent disadvantages lay in the extremely short stroke and lack of athwartships space in the 
bottom of a vessel’s hull. This disadvantage was exacerbated in deep-bottomed seagoing vessels. 
Shallow-draft, flat-bottomed warships such as the Confederate ironclads were much better suited 
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to this engine type. Indeed, the horizontal direct-acting engine was the most common purpose-
built engine used by the Confederate Navy. Figure III.14 shows the only known preserved 
example of this engine type in the United States: the twin engines of the wooden gunboat CSS 
Chattahoochee. About 30 feet of the scuttled gunboat’s stern, including the machinery, was 
raised from Georgia’s Chattahoochee River in 1964. The engines are now at the Port Columbus 
Civil War Naval Museum, a rare surviving example of Civil War steam technology. (Foster 
1986:70; Lambert 1992:172) 
 
FIGURE III.14. The two horizontal direct-acting engines of CSS Chattahoochee.  Each engine 
turned one screw on the opposite side of the hull from the cylinder head. (Online Library of 
Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
An important development of the horizontal direct-acting engine was the trunk engine, 
patented in Great Britain by John Penn. It was first employed by the Royal Navy in the mid-
1840s and became quite popular for use on warships, the most famous example of the type being 
used onboard the ironclad HMS Warrior. In this arrangement, the problems inherent with a short 
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stroke and short piston rod were solved by a clever method of accommodating a long connecting 
rod. “A circular trunk fitted to the piston allowed for movement of the connecting rod, that trunk 
being like a hollow piston rod which projected through the covers at both ends of the cylinder” 
(Lambert 1992:173). Figure III.15 shows an example of this layout. While it proved to be 
powerful and reliable, Penn’s trunk engine did have some problems. The large head glands of the 
enlarged cylinders often leaked, the engines were costly to maintain, and access to the moving 
parts was difficult. Trunk engines were not widely employed outside of Britain, although they 
long remained a favorite of the Royal Navy. 
 
FIGURE III.15. Typical trunk engine (Smith 1937:146) 
 
A unique derivative of the trunk engine was the vibrating lever, or “half trunk” engine 
patented by Swedish inventor and the “father of monitors” John Ericsson. In order to save space 
in the cramped confines of USS Monitor’s below-deck spaces, Ericsson developed an engine that 
worked on similar principles to the trunk engine, but saved even more room. Two cylinders were 
placed facing each other above a central crankshaft, which was turned by a series of connecting 
rods and levers (Figure III.16). This resulted in a unique and compact motion, but Ericsson’s 
engine was never used outside of the United States and his native Sweden. The vibrating lever 
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type was used almost exclusively for powering the Federal monitors during the Civil War, and 
did not see use onboard any Confederate vessel. 
 
FIGURE III.16. Ericsson’s vibrating lever-type engine as built for the 1863 monitor USS 
Monadnock (Hutton 1897:53) 
 
Return connecting rod engines, yet another outgrowth of the horizontal direct-acting type, 
were also fairly common during the Civil War. This engine type was also originally used for 
turning paddlewheels, but its arrangement lent itself quite readily to turning screws. The return 
connecting rod engine, like the trunk engine, was an attempt at a horizontal layout without the 
problems suffered from short connecting rods. It appears that Maudslay was the originator of this 
design, beginning in the 1840s. Although the return connecting rod engine benefitted from a long 
stroke, it still “…took up a considerable amount of space and was relatively complex, additional 
components also being required” (Lambert 1992:173). Even with these deficiencies, this engine 
was used onboard a number of large warships, and was quite popular by the 1860s. Perhaps the 
most famous example of this engine type is the power plant provided for the first United States 
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steam frigate, USS Merrimack, in 1854. This vessel would later make history as the ironclad 
CSS Virginia, still utilizing the return connecting rod engines of its first incarnation.        
The final screw propeller engine type discussed here is the inverted, inclined direct- 
acting form. This engine was used onboard paddlewheel driven vessels, but like many others was 
adapted and refined to drive propellers. This layout was not common onboard propeller-driven 
U.S. naval vessels, but was useful in small vessels with multiple screws, such as large tugboats 
and icebreakers. Figure III.17 shows an example of this arrangement. The most famous example 
of this engine type in America during the Civil War era is probably the twin-screw towboat / 
icebreaker Enoch Train, built in Massachusetts in 1855. In 1861, this small but powerful vessel 
was converted into the first North American ironclad, CSS Manassas (Campbell 2006:48).  
 
FIGURE III.17. Inclined inverted direct-acting engines of the 1863 screw frigate HMS 
Constance. Although this particular example is a British compound, its layout is representative 
of regular inclined engines as installed on CSS Manassas, ex-Enoch Train. (Lambert 1992:174) 
 
Screw propulsion, although it was still in contention with paddlewheel drive during the 
Civil War, ultimately superseded all other forms of powering a ship. The myriad engine designs, 
both those originally developed for paddlewheels and those invented for propellers, faded away 
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into a few dominant types. By the post-Civil War era, the horizontal and vertical inverted direct- 
acting engines had superseded almost all other forms, and the latter soon evolved into the prime 
mover of world shipping during the late 19th and early 20th centuries: the vertical triple-
expansion engine. By that point, almost all of the defects encountered in powering a vessel with 
screws had been overcome. Therefore, the widespread experimentation with and utilization of 
widely varying propeller engine types during the 1850s and 1860s contributed significantly to 
the realization of the modern screw-propelled steel-hulled warship. 
Boilers 
Boilers, the heart of the steam engine system, grew in size, efficiency, and complexity 
during the period between 1800 and 1860. There were never as many types of boilers as engines, 
but a number of different designs were experimented with and utilized for widely-differing 
activities. For instance, one type of boiler was ideally suited for powering steam locomotives, 
and another seemed best used for sawmills or other industrial machinery. Boilers for oceangoing 
vessels were different in design than those used onboard riverboats. Each boiler type had distinct 
qualities for its form of service. Despite these differences, boilers during the first half of the 19th 
century required the same care and quality components. 
As Roper (1897:350) notes, “The three most important objects to be attained in the 
design, construction, and use of steam-boilers are, ‘safety,’ ‘durability,’ and ‘economy’”. These 
factors determined design and quality of construction, which remained quite important as 
improperly-built or badly-cared-for boilers could explode. Indeed, the early history of steam 
navigation, particularly on the Western rivers, is marked by hundreds of fatal explosions (Bates 
1996:10-11). Unfortunate incidents such as these helped push the development of safer and more 
efficient boiler designs in merchant vessels. Naval vessels always had higher-quality steam 
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generators, at least on paper, and accidents relating to boiler explosion in warships seem to have 
been considerably rarer. This had as much to do with quality construction and care as type of 
boiler employed. 
By the time of the Civil War, there were three main types of boiler in use, both onboard 
ships and on land. All burned coal or wood. Plain cylinder, flue, and tubular boilers were 
developed in that order, but the most common by 1860 was the flue boiler. The tubular boiler 
had begun to come into its own during this time, especially in Great Britain, while the plain 
cylinder boiler remained in use in small manufacturing establishments due mainly to its 
simplicity. All three had their adherents and detractors, but as Roper (1897:350) points out: 
…experience has shown, in all individual cases, that the durability of a steam-boiler depends on 
the quality of the material and the character of the workmanship used in its construction, the 
facilities afforded for cleaning, repairing, and renewal of any of its parts, and also the care and 
management after being put in use. 
 
A brief listing of the three boilers’ attributes reveals their ideal uses. Plain cylinder 
boilers had the advantages of simplicity, ease of maintenance, and suitability for rolling mill and 
blast furnace operations, but were handicapped by extreme length and wastefulness of fuel. They 
were not used on steam-driven vessels. Flue boilers were smaller, required less fuel, and had a 
larger heating surface. They were very common for shipping interests, especially riverboats. 
Unfortunately, flue boilers weighed more, and were more difficult to clean or repair. This type of 
boiler also required more care “…on account of the liability of the flues to become overheated 
and collapse in case the regular supply of water should be neglected” (Roper 1897:352). Tubular 
boilers, meanwhile, possessed many advantages, but were more complex, making them more 
expensive to build and maintain. This last form of boiler occupied less space, required less fuel, 
and was not liable to collapse. By the end of the 19th century, the tubular type superseded all 
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other forms in oceangoing vessels, but this important transition did not begin to occur until after 
the Civil War. In the meantime, several variations of these three basic types were utilized. 
The majority of the early history of steam navigation outside of the Western rivers was 
dominated by the low-pressure system, employing both flue and, later, tubular boilers. There was 
a strict adherence to generating power at or only slightly above atmospheric levels, even as 
engines and boilers increased greatly in size, power, and efficiency. Even the introduction of 
tubular boilers and direct-acting engines did not lead to an immediate change from low-pressure 
steam, saltwater feed, and jet condensers (Smith 1937:125). Most of the early boilers, such as 
those used onboard HMS Comet of 1828, were large, boxlike, and contained a mazelike series of 
flues leading from internal furnaces (Figure III.18). Consequently, these took up a great deal of 
room and were difficult to clean. The common use of saltwater only added to the problem, but by 
the 1850s this boiler form was still in use onboard many merchant vessels.   
 
FIGURE III.18. 1828 rectangular flue boiler of HMS Comet (Smith 1937:127; courtesy of 
Birmingham Reference Library, Birmingham, UK.) 
 
Tubular boilers were quickly adopted by navies once they had been sufficiently proved.  
This type of boiler took two forms: firetube, in which the many small tubes acted as miniature 
flues, and watertube, in which the combustion gases surrounded small water-filled tubes. There 
were both horizontal and vertical forms. The compact horizontal “Scotch” form was the most 
commonly used (Figure III.19). The vertical design was often employed in small auxiliary 
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systems, but was also found onboard some major warships, including USS Merrimack of 1854 
(Figure III.20). Average size was about 10 feet in diameter by 15 feet long. All forms of the 
tubular boiler were more efficient at transmitting heat to the contained water, but were not as 
good for perfect combustion as flue boilers (Atherton 1851:40-41). Like many oceangoing 
systems, they were commonly low-pressure. 
 
FIGURE III.19. Low pressure “Scotch” marine horizontal firetube boiler, used onboard several 
Confederate ironclads (Still 1987:58; courtesy of A. Robert Holcombe, Jr.) 
 
Some explanation of the terms “high-pressure” and “low-pressure” must be given before 
discussion of Western rivers steamboat machinery. Low-pressure systems are generally those 
operating at or slightly above atmospheric pressure. For most of the 19th century, oceangoing 
vessels, both merchant and naval, operated on low-pressure. The terms relating to pressure were 
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liable to change, as better-quality construction, understanding of physical principles, and 
improved designs were incorporated into marine boilers. As Smith 1937:133 states: 
…in marine engineering, the term high-pressure was applied to steam at even 15 lb. per square 
inch. It may be taken that in the [eighteen] ‘thirties ordinary steam pressure in marine boilers was 
5 lb., the ‘forties, 10 lb.; and in the ‘fifties, 20 lb.; and vessels using steam at any pressures in 
excess of these would be considered as using high-pressure steam. 
 
These “high” pressures paled in comparison to the 100 or more pounds per square inch being 
employed onboard Western river steamboats, but professional engineers, especially naval ones, 
tended to be cautious. This sensible and careful approach to rapidly changing technology stood 
in stark contrast to the no-nonsense attitude of steamboat engineers and the nearly headlong rush 
into high-pressure systems.     
 
FIGURE III.20. Martin vertical watertube marine boiler of CSS Virginia, ex-USS Merrimack 
(Bathe 1951: Plate II; from Isherwood 1863) 
 
Western river steamboat boilers were a marvel of practicality and power generation. 
These were of the flue type, but evolved in such a way that they must be considered separately 
from oceangoing designs. The Western rivers design almost always employed the double-flued 
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boiler contained in a battery of two or more or, in at least one case, sixteen (Bates 1996:10). The 
average size of these boilers was about 36 inches in diameter and 28 feet long. The length helped 
to spread the weight evenly over a riverboat’s flexible hull, while the low profile was useful for 
saving vertical space. The majority of the Western riverboats burned wood, although coal was 
used when it could be obtained. Maintenance was always a necessity, as this boiler was more 
prone to explosion than any other type. This was due to the use of steam at pressures exceeding 
100 pounds per square inch, and the difficulty in constantly cleaning flue boilers. Figure III.21 
shows this boiler type’s layout. Besides the “Scotch” marine tubular boiler, the Western rivers-
style boiler was probably the most common form employed onboard Confederate ironclads 
during the Civil War. 
 
FIGURE III.21. Typical return flue boiler layout of Western rivers steamboats (Bates 1996:8) 
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A final type of boiler sometimes used onboard steamships was the locomotive, or firebox, 
style. In at least one case, that of CSS Neuse, a locomotive boiler was adapted to power an 
ironclad. This form was a derivative of the watertube type, and its size could vary widely 
depending on the locomotive. It could not compete with the double-flue boiler of the Western 
rivers for simplicity, although it was employed on steamboats occasionally. The main issue, 
according to Bates (1996:11), is that: “While locomotive…boilers are more compact..., they are 
difficult to clean and the hundreds of staybolts gave trouble”. The locomotive boiler is not 
known to have been used on any American naval vessel other than Neuse. Figure III.22 shows an 
example of this type. 
 
FIGURE III.22. Typical locomotive or firebox boiler (Bates 1996:11) 
 
The majority of the Confederate ironclads were powered by the marine tubular boiler or 
the Western rivers double-flue boiler. These differing systems were more often than not taken 
from previous vessels, but all-in-all the boilers of Confederate ironclads proved less troublesome 
than the engines. Boiler technology development had stabilized somewhat by the Civil War, and 
engineers, both naval and merchant, were plenty familiar with the three main types. Although 
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there was no consensus on what boiler type was best, 1860s-era boilers were nearing an ideal 
level of efficiency, reliability, and power generation. 
Conclusions 
 The development of steam machinery and all its components in the first half of the 19th 
century followed an explosive pattern. Many new ideas were tried, both in Great Britain and the 
United States, but only a few proved worthy in the long run. By the Civil War, significant 
advances had been made in providing reliable power to both merchant and naval vessels. While 
Great Britain remained the leader in maritime technology until near the end of the 1800s, 
American engineers and inventors made important advances of their own. They built the world’s 
first steam-powered warship in 1814, and by the 1860s the paddlewheel-driven river steamboat 
had conquered the American West. This spirit of innovation led to what was probably the 
world’s second- or third-largest shipbuilding industry by the Civil War. During that conflict, the 
Confederacy produced a number of its own steam engines for use onboard warships, but these 
proved a far cry from those built in the Union and Great Britain. 
Many of the engines discussed in this chapter were never utilized by American naval 
vessels, or were rarely used, but they represent the differing ideas on both sides of the Atlantic 
regarding maritime machinery. American designs tended to be simpler and more rugged than 
British ones. As a rule, the steam machinery used in the Confederate ironclads reflected standard 
American practice, but was often even simpler than machinery employed onboard Union vessels.  
While this certainly did not assure reliability, it was ideal for warships built by a nation with little 
experience in marine machinery manufacture. 
The majority of Confederate ironclad power plants were removed from other vessels, 
almost always tugboats or river steamboats. The preferred types were variations of the direct- 
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acting layout—these systems were practical and simple. Too often, though, they were 
underpowered for driving a heavily-armored warship. Even the ironclads utilizing powerful 
engines such as those onboard CSS Manassas often had problems with maintaining steerageway 
or maneuverability. Even the best early-war power plants, purpose-built or otherwise, were 
handicapped by excessive weight. This problem was gradually overcome, for the course of the 
war saw great progress in the advancement of steam engine technology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: MANUFACTURERS AND OTHER SOURCES 
The Confederacy lacked the industrial infrastructure of the Union, but it did have several 
facilities that came to be of great importance to the wartime production of marine steam 
machinery. Foremost among these were the great Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia, 
and the Confederate Naval Iron Works in Columbus, Georgia. These two facilities and their 
contracts with smaller local establishments accounted for the majority of new ironclad machinery 
construction in the South.   
Machinery for steam-driven warships was also by necessity obtained from many other 
sources. The exact number of facilities capable of producing effective marine engines in the 
Confederacy is difficult to determine (Still 1965:287-288), but the manufacturers involved with 
ironclad construction are better known. Unfortunately for the historian, many Confederate 
ironclads received their machinery from river steamers with unrecorded or unknown construction 
histories. Lack of manufacturing and prevalence of generic river vessel types on the South’s 
inland waterways led to this stopgap measure. 
Aside from high-pressure steamboat machinery and purpose-built engines, a number of 
Confederate ironclads received their power plants from more unusual sources. These included a 
lightship engine for Richmond, tugboat engines for Chicora, Palmetto State, and North Carolina, 
and probably locomotive engines for Neuse (Still 1997:66-67). Exact provenance for much of 
this machinery remains a mystery, but future archaeological investigations of existing wrecks 
could provide more definitive answers.  
    In order to better understand the characteristics and defects in both the construction 
process and actual use of ironclad power plants, a discussion of the facilities that supplied marine 
machinery is necessary. Therefore, the history of each establishment will be discussed briefly 
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here in conjunction with the particular products it supplied to the Confederate ironclad program. 
This discussion will begin with the Tredegar Iron Works, the greatest manufacturing center in 
the South. 
Tredegar Iron Works 
The mighty establishment that was the Tredegar Iron Works during the Civil War had 
humble beginnings dating back approximately 30 years. A Virginia blast furnace operator, 
Francis Deane, Jr., laid plans in 1836 to construct a new iron foundry. On a narrow plot of land 
in Richmond between the James River and Kanawha Canal, an engineer from the town of 
Tredegar in Wales designed the new facility. The new foundry, rolling mill, and forge were 
accordingly named Tredegar in his honor. Railroad iron was the main product of the new 
company, but it quickly fell on hard times following the 1837 economic crisis. Tredegar limped 
along until 1841, when it was sold to young and ambitious Joseph Reid Anderson, a West Point 
graduate (Dew 1966:3-5). This man’s incredible organizational and leadership abilities would 
result in an industrial complex rivaled only by those in the North. 
The new owner of the iron works quickly began to implement changes and improvements 
that lasted through the 1840s and 1850s. By 1861, Tredegar had become a “…superb heavy 
industrial complex, capable of turning out large quantities of ordnance, munitions, armor plate, 
and a host of desperately needed iron products [including steam engines]” (Dew 1966:2). 
Multiple blast furnaces, rolling mills, forges, and machine shops now fueled the Confederate war 
effort. Anderson’s facilities were the largest and most important industrial center in the South 
until shut down in April 1865, when the photograph shown in Figure IV.1 was taken. 
While it is certain that Tredegar produced steam machinery during the Civil War, it is 
uncertain if it built all the engine components for ironclads. Anderson had contracted with the 
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government to provide the plates, spikes, engines, shafts, and armament for ironclads built in 
Richmond (Dew 1966:265). Three vessels, Fredericksburg, Virginia II, and Texas, seem to have 
been fitted out by Tredegar, but Fredericksburg and Virginia II’s power plants may have been 
built by the Confederate Naval Works (formerly the Shockoe Foundry) under contract to 
Tredegar. Texas’ engines were never installed, but as they apparently came from a wrecked 
British blockade runner, that ironclad will not be further discussed. 
FIGURE IV.1. Tredegar Iron Works photographed in 1865 at war’s end (Civil War Trust 2011) 
 
CSS Mississippi, the largest war vessel constructed by the Confederacy, had to have its 
giant center propeller shaft forged by Tredegar. No foundry in New Orleans, where the ship was 
being built, could produce the 50-foot long wrought iron piece called for (Merrill 1962:90-91). In 
response to this dilemma, Asa and Nelson Tift, Mississippi’s builders, and Secretary Mallory 
contracted with Tredegar to forge the shaft from the burnt-out steamer Glen Cove. The piece was 
painstakingly removed from the wreck, but no steam hammer in the Confederacy was capable of 
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working such a large shaft, which had been built in the North. Tredegar therefore had to resort to 
reworking it by hand (Luraghi 1996:123). Two roughly 20-foot long sections were eventually 
completed with some difficulty. Fifty men labored night and day for two months to complete the 
work, and a special railroad car needed to be built to transport the immense piece of iron to New 
Orleans. The shaft and center screw had just been installed when Mississippi was burned to 
prevent capture on 24 April 1862. (Confederate States of America [CSA] 1863:128) 
Steam machinery for ironclads other than those in Richmond possibly built by Tredegar 
includes the power plants for the North Carolina vessels Raleigh and Albemarle. At least some of 
the components were definitely supplied by the Richmond firm, and probably many of the 
auxiliary components and even boilers were furnished there. As with all iron manufacture in the 
Confederacy, the production and supply system was divided inefficiently between whatever 
establishments could produce necessary parts.   
Comparatively little is known about the engines of Raleigh and Albemarle. The former 
was a Richmond-class vessel built in Wilmington, North Carolina from 1862 to 1864. The first 
attempt to power the vessel was initiated by obtaining the engines of the wrecked blockade 
runner Modern Greece, but the salvage effort failed. Archaeological investigations in 1994 
revealed the engines as installed were the single-cylinder direct-acting horizontal type, but the 
builder’s plate was not found (Peebles 1996:35,99). The vessel’s motive power as finished was 
considered above average during its short career. It appears that this power plant was 
manufactured in Richmond, as the Tredegar Iron Works produced the armor and possibly fittings 
for several North Carolina ironclads (Still 1969:35). A direct reference to Raleigh’s engines as 
manufactured new from Richmond was made by a contraband named William Robins, who had 
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apparently been involved with construction (Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Navies in the War of the Rebellion 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 8]:89).  
There exists another significant possibility that Raleigh’s engines came from an 
unfinished wooden gunboat built at Washington, North Carolina. This boat and two others were 
under construction in 1861 by Gilbert Elliott, later the builder of CSS Albemarle, and were 
approximately 150 feet long with a 25-foot beam (William Francis Martin Papers 1787-
1884:493). All were destroyed before completion when Union forces began to move into coastal 
North Carolina. 
The Washington gunboats and others like them required engines of similar size to 
Raleigh’s. Although there is no direct evidence that these engines ended up on the ironclad, there 
is other circumstantial data. It is known that the engines for the 150-foot gunboats built (none 
were ever completed) in North Carolina and Florida were to be provided by Talbott & Brothers 
of Richmond, more commonly known as the Shockoe Foundry, with the Florida boats’ engines 
of 26-inch cylinder diameter and 24-inch stroke (National Archives RG 365 [Confederate 
Treasury Department Records]:Entry 59). These measurements only roughly approximate those 
found on Raleigh. If the ironclad’s engines came from a Washington gunboat, it is safe to assume 
that they were altered during construction. In contract work, the Confederate Navy seems to have 
given builders considerable leeway in interpreting specifications (A. Robert Holcombe, Jr. 2011, 
elec. comm.). Nothing can be stated with any certainty to date. Further investigation of Raleigh’s 
well-preserved wreck in the Cape Fear River will likely be able to determine if Tredegar 
manufactured its engines or Talbott & Brothers built them for a wooden gunboat. 
The source of Raleigh’s boilers and auxiliary equipment seems clearer. Thomas E. 
Roberts established the Clarendon Iron Works of Wilmington early in the war, and manufactured 
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many iron components for ship construction. Roberts’s firm was accordingly involved in 
wartime naval construction in Wilmington, although it did not have the capability for heavy 
forging. The Clarendon Works also “…cast a substantial quantity of boiler parts, including boiler 
iron, grate bars, flues, and fronts, suggesting that it built the boilers for the Raleigh…” (Combs 
1993:63). Despite this ability to construct boilers, building marine steam engines was another 
task entirely for small foundries like Clarendon. The construction of engines often had to be 
outsourced. Most of the current confusion over machinery sources arises from this wartime 
necessity. Contradictory accounts only add to the problem, as with  CSS Albemarle.   
Several conflicting accounts of where Albemarle’s machinery came from exist. Robert 
Elliott (2005:141-142), author of the definitive Ironclad of the Roanoke, perhaps describes the 
conundrum best: 
The former Commander of the Neuse, Benjamin F. Loyall, remarked on January 19, 
1897, at the occasion of Robert E. Lee’s birthday dinner in Norfolk that, ‘the engine of a 
large saw mill was altered and made to serve for her [Albemarle’s] propelling power.’  
 
A publication circa 1897, Ironclads in Action, mentioned in passing, ‘The engines 
procured from the Tredegar Works, at Richmond, were two, each driving one screw, and 
had a nominal horsepower of 100 apiece.’ 
 
In addition, former Confederate officer (and author of the first complete history of the C.S. 
Navy) J. Thomas Scharf included a quote from one of Albemarle’s former commanders, John N. 
Maffitt: “The engine was adapted from incongruous material, ingeniously dovetailed and put 
together with a determined will…” (Scharf 1887:404). It seems unlikely that Albemarle’s 
machinery was built totally from scratch because the builders had difficulty finding even simple 
railroad rails for armor, let alone engine parts. The sawmill hypothesis is reasonable, but the 
mention of Tredegar throws all into doubt. Either way, the case is the same as that of Raleigh: 
the Tredegar works certainly had the ability to produce Albemarle’s engines and is known to 
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have provided the armor for the vessel. Unfortunately, the provenance of this famous ironclad’s 
machinery will likely remain uncertain: Albemarle was broken up in 1867.   
As previously stated, Tredegar had contracted to supply the machinery for the ironclads 
built in Richmond. The engine of the first warship to be completed there, CSS Richmond, was 
taken from the C.S. Receiving Ship Arctic (formerly a lightship) and was supplied and installed 
by Tredegar. The iron works also may have built the engines for Virginia II and Fredericksburg, 
but as the contract called only for supplying the engines construction may very well have been 
outsourced, particularly to the Confederate Naval Works.  
Further confusion arises because at least one account suggests Virginia II may have had 
British machinery of unknown origin (Still 1994:67). In a 25 April 1865 survey of captured 
steam machinery, Commander William Radford, USN, listed “One pair of double engines, 30-
inch cylinder and 28-inch stroke, high pressure and similar to those used on Ram Virginia [II]” 
(National Archives RG 45 [PN File]:Roll 42). Since Great Britain was the primary manufacturer 
of “double” or twin-cylinder engines by the 1860s, it appears likely that if Virginia II did indeed 
have two twin-cylinder engines, they were British-made.    
So much uncertainty exists because many documents relating to naval construction were 
destroyed in the evacuation of Richmond on 2-3 April 1865. There remains little doubt that even 
if it did not construct whole engines, Joseph Anderson’s Tredegar Iron Works contributed 
significantly to the installation of steam machinery in the Virginia and North Carolina ironclads, 
as it did to virtually every other wartime industry. 
Columbus Naval Iron Works 
The facilities for engine and shipbuilding in Columbus, Georgia, came to represent the 
second-greatest concentration of industry in the Confederacy. Skillfully managed and well-
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furnished with necessary equipment, the Columbus Naval Iron Works manufactured complete 
sets of machinery for at least five ironclads and also refurbished old machinery for installation in 
new vessels. The Columbus works became the single most important Confederate source for 
purpose-built engines during the war, and was only exceeded in industrial output by Tredegar.  
Ironclads known to have received Columbus-built machinery are Savannah, Columbia, 
Jackson, Milledgeville, and Wilmington. It is also possible that Huntsville, the sister ship of the 
Selma ironclad Tuscaloosa, received purpose-built machinery. Like Tuscaloosa it is far more 
likely that riverboat engines were scavenged and modified by the iron works for installation. Out 
of the vessels receiving purpose-built machinery from Columbus, only Savannah and Columbia 
were completed. The latter represented one of the South’s finest engineering accomplishments, 
but was wrecked in Charleston Harbor soon after commissioning (Turner 1999:223). It would 
seem that the Columbus works failed almost completely to deliver on its promising potential, but 
these failures were the result of late-war circumstances and the usual labor problems. The 
Columbus Naval Iron Works in fact made great strides in advancing the marine steam 
engineering field in the Confederacy. 
Columbus was located at the head of navigation on the Chattahoochee River and ideally 
suited for industrial development. Cotton and other agricultural products were shipped along the 
rivers, and a thriving steamboat building industry combined with cotton and wool mills turned 
the city into the most industrialized in the South behind Richmond (Turner 1999:9). It was there 
that a gentleman named William R. Brown established a small foundry, the Columbus Iron 
Works, on the lower town riverbank in 1848 (Standard 1954:40). This small establishment 
constructed steamboat engines, boilers, and fittings using only one rolling mill and forge. 
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Brown’s works remained minor but accomplished until 1861 and the coming of war began to 
change everything. 
By July 1861, Brown had begun turning out small cannon and accepted contracts from 
the Confederate Ordnance Department. In January 1862, the Columbus works successfully 
produced several types of weapon, including mortars and rifled cannon (Standard 1954:40-41).  
Noting the foundry’s ideal site on the Chattahoochee riverbank, the Navy Department leased 
Brown’s facility beginning in September 1862 (Turner 1999:149). Now the Columbus Naval 
Iron Works, the firm grew into a large naval industrial complex sending “…ships’ machinery, 
ordnance, and engineering expertise throughout the Confederacy” (Turner 1999:154). The two 
men tasked with managing this operation were Lieutenant Augustus McLaughlin, CSN, who 
proved to be an able administrator and superintendent, and Chief Engineer James Warner, 
probably the Confederacy’s most skilled engineer. Warner was put in charge of the machine 
shops in Columbus, and oversaw the manufacture and refurbishing of a large number of steam 
engines. His skill and unwavering work ethic led to the exponential growth of the Naval Iron 
Works during the war. 
By 1865, the Columbus works had grown to become one of the largest in the 
Confederacy (Figure IV.2). The armory contained a small rolling mill, a nearly-complete large 
rolling mill, and one large steam hammer from Mobile. The machine shop contained: “three 
small and two large planers, sixteen iron lathes, one large lathe, three drill presses, …[and] thirty 
vises…with anvils” (Turner 1999:236). Also present on the site were: a blacksmith shop with 10 
forges, a foundry, a boiler shop, a copper shop, and a pattern shop. Entire sets of machinery were 
turned out along with a number of rebuilt engines. All of this was run by a force of over 300 
men, with auxiliary facilities in Prattville and Eufaula, Alabama. Personnel from Columbus were 
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sent all over the Confederacy, and maintained offices in Charleston, Savannah, Selma, and 
Mobile, among others. These local outlets were often in charge of assembling and installing the 
batches of ironclad machinery sent from Columbus. For example, A.N. Miller’s foundry in 
Savannah, discussed later in connection with CSS Georgia, was in charge of assembling and 
installing the machinery for the Savannah ironclads, including Milledgeville (Still 1989:9). 
FIGURE IV.2. This 1910 postcard shows the exterior of the Columbus Iron Works and its ideal 
location next to the Chattahoochee River and steamboat landing. (Columbus Museum 2012; 
courtesy of Kenneth F. Murrah) 
 
Columbus-built machinery for the Richmond-class ironclad Savannah, launched in 1863 
in its namesake city, appears to have been originally intended for a 150-foot gunboat constructed 
by F.G. Howard at Milton, Florida. When the wooden gunboat program was superseded by 
ironclad construction, some engines were refitted for ironclads. Regarding the unfinished Florida 
gunboat, Secretary Mallory wrote to Warner on 10 April 1862: 
You will take charge of this work at once, and are authorized to make such alterations 
and additions to the engines as will adapt it to one of the iron clad gun boats to be 
constructed by Mr. Willink [Savannah’s builder]. (National Archives RG 45 [Area 8 
File]:Frame 0258) 
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The vessel to which Mallory referred could only have been Savannah, since the other 
ironclad built by Willink, CSS Milledgeville, was not laid down until much later. Regardless, the 
machinery provided for Savannah reflected some of the early quality-control problems endemic 
to the steam engineering business, despite the skill of the Columbus establishment. While on a 
trial run, one of Savannah’s cylinders was broken by a rivet left in the steam passage (Turner 
1999:165). This incident involving pure “human error” caused Engineer Warner considerable 
embarrassment, but the other purpose-built machinery supplied for Columbia, Jackson, 
Milledgeville, and Wilmington reflected the highest quality possible within the Confederacy. 
Columbia was the only one finished, as the machinery for the others was only partially 
assembled prior to their destruction at war’s end.   
Warranting brief discussion here are the ironclads Jackson, Tuscaloosa, and Huntsville.  
The former was originally constructed as a paddlewheeler, but had to be redesigned to 
accommodate twin-screw propulsion due to weight issues. Jackson’s original machinery was 
taken from the steamboat Time, but the new engines were manufactured in Columbus. 
Tuscaloosa’s engines were taken from the steamboat Chewala and reworked at Prattville, while 
almost nothing is known about Huntsville’s machinery other than that it was supplied by 
Columbus (Turner 1999:162). It appears likely that this ironclad’s engines, which performed just 
as poorly as those on Tuscaloosa, were taken from a river steamer and reworked either at 
Columbus or Prattville. The 165-ton 1859 sidewheeler John C. Calhoun is a possible source of 
Huntsville’s machinery. This West Brownsville, Pennsylvania-built vessel exploded with loss of 
life near Bainbridge, Georgia, on 28 April 1862 (Way 1983:250; Mueller 1990:102). The 
machinery was salvaged and the Naval Iron Works made a breech-loading cannon from one of 
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Calhoun’s shafts. The engines were also supposedly the same size as those from Chewala 
installed on Tuscaloosa (Daniel and Gunter 1977:34; Ripley 1984:181). 
The Columbus Naval Iron Works enjoyed considerable success in procuring and building 
steam engines during the Civil War. It gathered and contributed a considerable amount of 
expertise in marine engineering in the South during that time. The Columbus works and its 
satellites in Prattville and Eufaula succeeded in providing power to a number of ironclads and 
wooden gunboats as well as manufacturing naval ordnance. For the most part, these vessels met 
with little success. Several were never completed due to Union captures of their home ports. 
Columbus itself was not captured until 16-17 April 1865, over a week after Appomattox. The 
Confederacy’s second-largest industrial site continued with production up until the very end. In 
doing so it made a huge positive impact on the Confederate war effort. (Turner 1999:261-264)             
Shockoe Foundry / Confederate Naval Works 
The Shockoe Foundry in Richmond (formally called Talbott & Brothers) was closely tied 
to the Tredegar Iron Works in the manufacture of marine steam machinery. This facility 
produced small steam engines and sawmills before the war and was “…considered very good 
here [Richmond] for what they purchase, and in all our [Tredegar Iron Works] transactions with 
them they have been very prompt” (Bruce 1968:296). This large establishment was important in 
the manufacture of steam machinery in the Confederate capital, but little is known of its true 
output due to the destruction of its records at war’s end. 
By 1862 the Shockoe Foundry was over a full city block in size. It was located at 17th 
and Cary streets in Richmond. The large establishment consisted of a fitting shop, turning shop, 
smith’s shop, foundry, drying oven, boiler room, and flash room (Coski 2005:72). By that time it 
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was only surpassed in size and output by neighboring Tredegar, which Shockoe often supplied 
with parts and materials. 
First founded in 1839 as the Shockoe Manufacturing Company by former manager of the 
Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad Charles Talbott, the foundry remained prosperous through the 
1850s with the growth of Virginia’s railroads. The firm even began producing its own 
locomotives in 1855 (Bruce 1968:296-297). By 1862, the Talbott brother’s excellent 
establishment earned the Shockoe Foundry a government contract to build engines for wooden 
gunboats. When this program fell through, power plants for ironclads were manufactured, but the 
extent of this new production is unknown. 
In February 1862, the Confederate government stepped in and leased the Talbott’s 
establishment in the name of the Navy as the Confederate Naval Works. Under the supervision 
of Thomas W. Smith, the foundry turned out wartime products for the rate of $5,000 per month 
(Coski 2005:282-283). It is thought that these works produced several engines for ironclads, but 
the dearth of records has led to confusion over whether the Naval Works or Tredegar produced 
the machinery. It is possible that Tredegar, which was tasked with providing all the iron 
components of the James River ironclads, contracted with the Naval Works to build the engines.  
These establishments had worked closely together before, and the capability to produce 
excellent-quality parts of all types was certainly there. 
Current research holds that the ironclads Fredericksburg, Virginia II, Albemarle, Raleigh, 
and several of the small wooden gunboats on the James River may have received all or part of 
their machinery from the Naval Works (Still 1994:68). In any event, it is clear that the former 
Shockoe Foundry played an important role in steam machinery construction in the Confederacy.  
Hopefully, this role can be more fully defined by future research. 
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Charlotte Navy Yard 
The naval yard established inland at Charlotte, North Carolina, was an unlikely source of 
much of the machinery produced for the Confederate Navy. Founded in 1862 by wartime 
necessity, Charlotte ultimately produced the majority of the shafting used by propeller-driven 
ironclads. It also manufactured ordnance and other naval supplies, having an industrial capacity 
not easily matched by most other Southern military facilities. This was due to its close ties to 
Norfolk before that navy yard was re-captured by the Union. (Still 1997:76-79) 
Donnelly (1959:73) states: “In the spring of 1862 it became apparent that the 
Confederacy stood a fair chance of losing the Norfolk area and, with it, the Gosport Navy Yard”. 
The hotly-contested base where USS Merrimack had been transformed into CSS Virginia was 
the largest such facility in the South, and the Union was keen on recapturing it. As the pressure 
around Norfolk tightened, brother of Robert E. Lee and yard commandant Captain Sidney Smith 
Lee was secretly ordered by Secretary Mallory to begin packing and preparing for transport all 
the valuable machinery and goods not immediately needed. Beginning in early May 1862, 
several trainloads of supplies were sent from Norfolk while others were shipped up the James 
River to Richmond (Donnelly 1959:73). Captain Richard L. Page, CSN, was simultaneously 
directed by Secretary Mallory to find a safe place in North Carolina for a new facility.   
Charlotte was chosen as the ideal location of a new navy yard because it was deep in the 
interior but still had good railroad connections with the coastal cities. It came to pass that the 
Charlotte Navy Yard experienced less disruption by the enemy during the course of the war than 
any other naval works. The tools and materials shipped from Norfolk were quickly put to use, 
among them a small steam hammer. A new ordnance works was constructed along with various 
large structures for the shops, coke ovens, and foundry. The size and output of these facilities 
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increased continually during the war years. By summer 1862 a hoisting crane was in operation 
along with another steam hammer. This new hammer was quite large and had been saved from 
the Pensacola Navy Yard in Florida. The tracks of the North Carolina Central Railroad and the 
South Carolina Railroad passed close by the navy yard, allowing for simplified loading and 
unloading of new materials. Overseeing all of this was a force of over 1,000 men led by Captain 
George N. Hollins. He was replaced by Lieutenant Catesby ap Roger Jones of CSS Virginia 
fame, and he in turn by Chief Engineer H. Ashton Ramsay. All of these men performed their 
duties valiantly, but it was Ramsay who was in charge the longest and who saw the greatest 
expansion of the navy yard’s facilities. (Donnelly 1959:74) 
In 1863 the Charlotte yard was further enlarged and improved through the extending and 
strengthening of its buildings and the addition of new machinery. New pattern shops, a 
coppersmith shop, a new furnace, and a facility for inspecting projectiles were added at this time. 
In addition, the foundry was enlarged to accommodate a new steam hammer built at the yard—
the largest in the South. This piece of equipment was capable of forging the heavy shafting and 
large anchors required by the ironclads then building elsewhere in the Confederacy. Along with 
all of the new developments in manufacturing iron components, the yard also continued to turn 
out gun carriages, blocks, and large amounts of ammunition. Many of these products were 
destined for service onboard ironclads as well. (Donnelly 1959:77) 
Despite the tremendous capabilities of his establishment, Chief Engineer Ramsay 
encountered a lack of skilled labor for his workforce. This severely limited production. The great 
forges and planers of the Charlotte station were too often idle and many of the heavy forgings 
intended for new warships took too long to finish. All of these symptoms of a small labor pool 
were encountered by facilities elsewhere in the Confederacy. Attempts by Ramsay to recruit 
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skilled workers from Great Britain failed, and he spent much of the war on a minimum basis of 
production (Donnelly 1959:77).   
By war’s end, the Charlotte Navy Yard had nevertheless achieved some notable 
successes. One of the workers from Norfolk had invented a machine for turning a perfect sphere, 
“…a process particularly applicable in making cannon balls or shells” (Donnelly 1959:77). It 
was first used at Charlotte and was probably the first machine of its kind anywhere. Large sheds 
were built for storage of Confederate naval goods and a variety of large iron shafting for 
steamers was completed. The ironclads that received their shafting from the Charlotte works 
were Virginia II, Albemarle, Tennessee, and several others unspecified (Donnelly 1959:78). 
Heavy iron components were also provided for several wooden gunboats and a large amount of 
ammunition continued to be produced into the war’s very last days. 
Ultimately, the Charlotte Navy Yard was one of the very last Confederate military 
establishments to close down in 1865. After the evacuation of Richmond in April, the specie 
from the Confederate Treasury was sent first to Charlotte for a guard company to take it into the 
Trans-Mississippi Department. The yard was abandoned and burned not long after, marking the 
end of Confederate naval administration (Donnelly 1959:79). Sadly, the majority of the yard’s 
records and many of those of the Navy Department itself were burned as well. American history 
lost a valuable collection of information in this hasty decision. 
New Orleans Manufacturers 
New Orleans contained the greatest manufacturing capability of any city in the South 
outside of Richmond prior to its capture in April 1862. The manufacture of steam machinery, 
particularly for riverboats, was a thriving business by the 1860s because the city was uniquely 
situated on the Mississippi to function both as a river and ocean port. New Orleans had many 
110 
 
private businesses devoted to the manufacture of steam engines. Foremost were “…the foundries 
of Leeds, Clark, Bennett & Lurgis, Shakespeare, Gretna, John Armstrong, and Kirk” (Merrill 
1962:87). Abundant resources for shipbuilding existed in the area in addition to these 
establishments, and across the river in Algiers were eight drydocks. It appeared that ironclads 
constructed in the Crescent City could be built well and quickly. 
The two ironclads actually laid down and constructed in New Orleans were the largest 
war machines built from the keel up in the Confederacy. Louisiana and Mississippi were laid 
down side by side at new shipyard sites just north of New Orleans at Jefferson City. During the 
course of their construction, materials for engines often came from the same sources. The 
builders of Louisiana and Mississippi turned to the largest and most respectable firms in the area: 
Leeds & Company and Patterson Iron Works (Merrill 1970:72). 
Although the Leeds and Patterson works were nearly the same size, Leeds far exceeded 
any other New Orleans company in output and experience. Leeds & Company was founded in 
the 1820s and was the world’s largest maker of steel cotton bale presses by the time of the Civil 
War. The establishment also had experience in casting, forging, and finishing iron components 
for sugar and cotton equipment and steam engines, employing a force of over 400 workers. 
During the war, production was shifted to manufacturing arms for the Confederate Army 
(Groundspeak, Inc. 2012). Leeds also agreed to make the shafts of two propeller-driven ironclads 
being built in Memphis, Tennessee, one of which was CSS Arkansas. The firm quickly became 
too busy to aid much in the vital work being carried out on the two large ironclads intended for 
the defense of New Orleans.        
E.C. Murray’s CSS Louisiana was the first to be laid down. The massive vessel was 
propelled by two central paddlewheels mounted one ahead of the other and two small propellers 
111 
 
under the stern. Two riverboat and two propeller engines needed to be procured. According to 
Murray’s 20 February 1863 testimony during the 1862-1863 investigation of the Navy 
Department:  
I bought the steamer Ingomar, and transferred her machinery to the Louisiana.  
I…contracted with Kirk to build me two propellers and two propeller engines. Not being 
able to get them anywhere else, I applied to Leeds to construct them, but he would not 
touch them. They [Kirk] were engaged in removing the machinery from the Ingomar to 
the Louisiana about two months, and about the same time building her propeller 
machinery (CSA 1863:372). 
 
The large riverboat Ingomar was built in 1854 at Louisville, Kentucky, for the Memphis & New 
Orleans Packet Company (Way 1983:224). Unlike many Western river steamboats, the name of 
who furnished its machinery is known: the Louisville firm of Roach & Long (CSA 1863:378). 
That  establishment was founded in the 1840s and built many steamboat and stationary engines 
before turning exclusively to the manufacture of water and gas main pipes after 1860 (Kleber 
2001:422).  
The small engines and shafts required for the propellers had to be purpose-built in New 
Orleans. Leeds was too loaded down with wartime contracts to build any of Louisiana’s 
machinery. Kirk & Company, a smaller establishment, ultimately agreed to furnish Murray his 
propeller engines and shafts. The history of this firm unfortunately remains obscure. Such is the 
case with most of those in New Orleans during the war. 
It is worth noting that Louisiana’s wrought iron shafts as finished did not fit properly. 
Murray had to persuade Kirk to construct a tilt hammer, “by which means he succeeded in 
drawing them out and adapting them to my purpose. The only difficulty I had was to get him to 
get along with the work” (CSA 1863:378). Despite the firm’s slowness in turning out materials, 
it seems they had the machinery and capability to do the job. Kirk also made the small propeller 
engines but almost nothing is known about them. Little has been found on the company itself. 
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Patterson Iron Works (formally known as Jackson & Co.) agreed to furnish engines and 
boilers for Asa and Nelson Tift’s giant triple-screw Mississippi. This was only after consultation 
with Leeds failed, as that company was occupied in manufacturing the shafting for Arkansas and 
the never-finished Tennessee in Memphis (CSA 1863:381). Leeds’s asking price for constructing 
the engines of $65,000 plus a build time of no less than four months was too steep for a short 
construction time. The Patterson works in turn offered to construct the machinery for $45,000 
plus a bonus if the work was finished in 90 days. A contract was signed and construction began. 
The Tifts discovered they had miscalculated the power needed to propel Mississippi not far into 
the process. Consultation with naval engineers and other experts revealed that more boilers were 
required. Patterson added $20,000 in price for building the engines and $8,000 for the boilers 
(Merrill 1962:90). Despite these difficulties, the greatest problems were encountered in the 
building of the ironclad’s three propeller shafts. 
Finding no complete shafts in the New Orleans area and “…no parties [there] 
…competent to make it” (i.e. no one had a tilt hammer or other shaft making equipment), the 
Tifts contracted with Ward & Company of Nashville, Tennessee, to make the two wing shafts 
(CSA 1863:112). Mississippi’s massive center shaft was to be forged by Tredegar out of the 
destroyed steamer Glen Cove’s in Richmond. Negotiations with Ward about proper furnace and 
hammer equipment along with haggling over prices continued for some time but came to 
nothing. The Tifts next turned to Clark & Company of New Orleans, which agreed to do the 
work. Clark then constructed a large steam hammer and furnaces in a new building for the 
purpose (CSA 1863:112). Further negotiations with Leeds resulted in an agreement to finish the 
shafts once they had been forged and progress was finally made. All came to naught when New 
Orleans fell and Mississippi was burned.  
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Overall, it appears that the machinery manufactured by the various New Orleans firms for 
Louisiana and Mississippi was satisfactory but delayed severely by shortages of workers and 
materials. While this fact holds true for virtually every other manufacturing center in the 
Confederacy, New Orleans was affected catastrophically by its capture at the end of the first year 
of war. As Secretary Mallory had realized, there was great manufacturing potential in the South’s 
largest port, but it took too long to build up to full wartime production. Louisiana was delayed 
too long for the defects in its propulsion system to be realized in time and Mississippi was 
destroyed in a nearly-complete state. This failure on the part of the New Orleans firms resulted in 
the premature loss of that city and the South’s two most powerful ironclads. (Merrill 1962:93; 
Still 1997:30-31) 
Other Sources  
A number of vessels were fitted with scavenged engines taken from riverboats or 
manufactured by small local foundries due to the limited availability of suitable steam machinery 
for ironclads throughout the Civil War. Most of the history of these engine sources has been lost.  
Future archaeological investigation has the potential to uncover a great deal of information 
because many of these  vessels were sunk. 
Ironclad vessels known to have used riverboat machinery were Tennessee, Nashville, 
Tuscaloosa, Missouri, and Jackson. This was a measure of necessity despite the obvious 
disadvantages of using old or decrepit power plants or, in the case of Tennessee and Tuscaloosa, 
adapting high-pressure riverboat machinery to turn screws. It was intended that these vessels be 
fitted with better purpose-built engines once they became available but this optimistic plan was 
never fulfilled. The ironclads designed from the outset to be paddlewheelers fared somewhat 
better in engine performance but both Nashville and Jackson encountered severe weight 
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problems. The result was that Jackson was completely rebuilt as a twin-screw vessel and 
Nashville was so structurally weak that it could only carry three guns and very little armor. (Still 
1987:38; Still 1994:66-67)          
The power plants of these vessels were simple and rugged like the river steamboats they 
came from, but their construction history has largely been forgotten. In most cases, the names 
and locations are known but not the manufacturer. The Civil War came during the heyday of the 
steamboat era, when thousands of boats plied the Western waters and hundreds of local firms 
supplied their machinery. Often a boat was built in one place (Figure IV.3) then taken to another 
for fitting out and installation of machinery, making specific firms difficult to trace (Way 1983: 
Terms, Abbreviations, and Discussion). Discussion of the above-listed ironclad machinery is 
brief because of this. 
 
FIGURE IV.3. Four “City-class” Union ironclad gunboats being constructed at St. Louis, 
Missouri prior to October 1861. They will be launched sideways into the river. The construction 
process for these ironclads was similar to that used for regular steamboats. (Online Library of 
Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
Most famous of the ironclads of this group is CSS Tennessee, constructed in Selma, 
Alabama. This vessel was designed to be powered by a single screw but serviceable engines 
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were lacking. Riverboat engines were installed and geared to the propeller shaft in a complicated 
manner that actually worked comparatively well in service (Still 1994:67). Often cited as the 
source of these engines and possibly the boilers is the steamer Alonzo Child, built in 1857 at 
Jeffersonville, Indiana and captured by the Confederates on the Yazoo River (Way 1983:16). 
The engines were later removed and installed in Tennessee according to a Union survey report 
(Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 21]:547-550). 
Confusion arises because the dimensions of Alonzo Child’s engines do not match those 
given for Tennessee and the time of their removal does not coincide with installation of 
Tennessee’s power plant. It appears likely that the engines instead came from the steamer 
Vicksburg, built at New Albany, Indiana, in 1857. Vicksburg was taken into Confederate service 
as a troop transport but was rammed and sunk by USS Queen of the West on 2 February 1863. 
The Confederates managed to salvage the machinery. The dimensions given for Vicksburg’s 
engines and the time during which they were salvaged appear to show that they were used on 
Tennessee (Way 1983:468; Still 1985:191-192). It is also stated in a letter from a J.J. Brown to 
Union Secretary of War E.M. Stanton that the ironclad Nashville, building at the same time as 
Tennessee, was receiving its machinery from Vicksburg (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, 
Vol. 20]:735). This is an obvious mistake because the dimensions of Vicksburg’s engines do not 
match those of Nashville. In fact, Tennessee and Nashville were confused for one another in 
several Union reports. In any case, the identity of the manufacturers of both vessels’ power 
plants is missing from the historical record. 
CSS Nashville was one of the largest ironclads constructed in the South and the only one 
built from the keel up driven by sidewheels. The ship was built in Montgomery, Alabama, and 
finished in Mobile. The giant paddlewheels were greatly exposed to combat damage but 
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“Apparently the Navy Department believed that the ease with which high pressure, long stroke 
engines could be installed with few, if any, modifications outweighed the disadvantages…” 
(Holcombe 1993:82-83). Nashville never saw combat but its engines were apparently able to 
move the vessel effectively. The machinery reportedly came from a sunken steamer in 
Mississippi’s Yazoo River (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 25]:653). This report 
confuses Nashville with Tennessee but it is clear from the details presented that the former 
received its engines from a riverboat. Magenta, a large sidewheeler built at New Albany, 
Indiana, in 1861 appears to be a likely source of Nashville’s machinery. This boat was taken up 
the Yazoo and burned on 14 July 1863, and the dimensions of both its boilers and engines 
closely match those reported on Nashville (Way 1983:302). The company that constructed 
Magenta’s machinery is not known.  
Another possible candidate for the source of Nashville’s machinery is the steamer 
Capitol. This sidewheel packet was built at Jeffersonville, Indiana, in 1854 (Way 1983:71). 
Capitol gained fame for its speed and for aiding in the completion of CSS Arkansas at Yazoo 
City, Mississippi (Figure IV.4). Way (1983:71) mentions that “Her machinery was said to have 
been used in completing the ram, and her hoisting engines were made over into drilling 
machines, etc.”. The boat was burned to prevent capture at Liverpool, Mississippi, on 28 June 
1862 and its machinery was successfully removed by the Confederates (Warner 1864:229; 
National Archives RG 45 [AC File]:Roll 6). Capitol’s machinery dimensions also match those of 
Nashville. The provenance is unknown. 
Very little is known about CSS Tuscaloosa, one of a pair of diamond hull ironclads built 
in Selma, Alabama. The engines of this twin-screw vessel were adapted from the riverboat 
Chewala and modified by William Penny & Co., of Prattville, Alabama. This company was a 
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branch of the Columbus Naval Iron Works. Not much is known about William Penny & Co., but 
it seems to have been “…an outgrowth of Penny & Chadwick of Milton, Florida. When that area 
came under Union control in 1862, Penny apparently moved his works to Prattville, where it 
came under Confederate navy control” (Continental Eagle Corporation 2007). This facility 
presumably had a fair level of capability to operate as a Naval Works auxiliary. 
 
FIGURE IV.4. Construction of Arkansas at Yazoo City, Mississippi, in summer 1862. Capitol is 
shown alongside using its hoisting equipment to swing a gun onboard the ironclad. (Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War 1991 [Vol. 3, Part 2]:573) 
 
The manufacturer of Chewala’s machinery has not been found. This vessel was a 
sternwheeler built in Brownsville, Pennsylvania, in 1852. It served on the Apalachicola River 
before passing to Confederate control in 1861 (Neville 1961:38). The boat’s machinery was later 
sold to the Columbus Naval Iron Works by that facility’s former owner for $2,000 (Turner 
1999:162). This included Chewala’s boilers. The machinery formerly driving the sternwheel was 
installed using a geared layout to drive the twin screws of Tuscaloosa (Holcombe 1993:94).   
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CSS Missouri was the first of only two paddlewheel ironclads constructed from the keel 
up in the Confederacy. It was also the only centerwheel ironclad completed. This vessel was 
built in Shreveport, Louisiana, on the Red River to a similar design as the “City class” ironclad 
gunboats operated by the Union. Construction on the Western frontier was quite a challenge, but 
Missouri was furnished with fairly effective armor and motive power as reported by Union 
surveyors at war’s end. (Still 1985:101-102; Holcombe 1993:105-109) 
 There are two candidates for the source of Missouri’s power plant—both were river 
steamboats. The first is Grand Era, originally built at Louisville, Kentucky, as R.W. McRea in 
1853. The vessel was rebuilt and renamed Grand Era after sale to the Red River Packet Co. in 
December 1860 (Way 1983:196,386). The second candidate is the sidewheeler T.W. Roberts, 
built in 1860 at New Albany, Indiana (Way 1983:443). Unfortunately, there are contradictory 
accounts regarding these two boats, both of which were operating around Shreveport at the time 
of Missouri’s construction (Way 1983:196,443; Silverstone 1989:247). Even though Way 
(1983:196) states that Missouri’s engines came from Grand Era, it is also suggested that Grand 
Era was operating from Shreveport to New Orleans after Missouri’s completion in late 1863. In 
addition, Jeter (1996:37) states (mistakenly?) that T.W. Roberts was renamed New Era based on 
correspondence suggesting that New Era be used to tow Missouri downriver for completion. 
Further contemporary correspondence in Jeter (1996:6) shows that the boat purchased for 
Missouri’s machinery was owned by Russell B. Roberts. The only steamboat that may fit the 
time and place for this is T.W. Roberts (A. Robert Holcombe, Jr. 2012, elec. comm.).  
It is certain that in 1863, the naval officer in charge of Missouri’s construction, 
Lieutenant Jonathan H. Carter, purchased a boat’s engines and boilers for $65,000 and an 
engineer was sent by the Navy Department to refurbish them. Missouri never saw battle and was 
119 
 
eventually captured, resulting in the aforementioned Union report. This report offers some of the 
most detailed machinery data on any Confederate ironclad, but the provenance of the power 
plant will remain unknown unless more conclusive information is found on the history and 
machinery of Grand Era and T.W. Roberts. (Still 1994:105) 
The last Confederate ironclad definitely known to have used acquired riverboat 
machinery was Jackson (also commonly called Muscogee). This vessel was built in Columbus, 
Georgia, and was originally intended to be a centerwheel ironclad like Missouri. Realization of 
excessive weight and draft, along with a failed launch attempt, resulted in Jackson’s rebuilding 
into a twin-screw vessel (Holcombe 1993:109). The original steam propulsion machinery 
intended for Jackson came from the Chattahoochee River steamer Time, which was built in 1860 
at Louisville, Kentucky. This steamboat was the last to enter service on the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee river system before the Civil War. It later came under Confederate control and 
may have had its name changed to Bradford (Pearce 2000:117). Conflicting accounts of Time / 
Bradford’s activities render a timeline difficult to establish. There is even evidence that Time and 
Bradford were separate boats but as late as March 1862 at least one of them was still operating 
(National Archives RG 109 [Microfilm Publication M909]:Roll 29). 
At some point, Time was dismantled and its machinery appropriated for the ironclad 
building at Columbus. Everything was actually placed in Jackson and mostly put together before 
the need for a rebuild became apparent (Turner 1999:176). The provenance of Time’s power 
plant remains unknown, as is its fate after removal to make way for the Columbus-built propeller 
engines of Jackson’s second incarnation.                 
At least four other ironclads were completed using machinery from local machine shops 
with obscure or unknown histories. Arkansas, Georgia, Charleston, and Neuse were all 
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propeller-driven vessels (twin-screw except Charleston) but data on their machinery is lacking.  
Arkansas is perhaps the best-documented of this group due to its fame in running through a 
combined Union fleet to Vicksburg, Mississippi, on 15 July 1862. (Holcombe 1993:57,60,77-79; 
Bright et al. 1981:11-12,153)   
The machinery for this vessel designed with both riverboat and seagoing elements was 
purpose-built in Memphis by a firm on Adams Street. Unfortunately there is some confusion as 
to the identity of the company. An 1860 Memphis city directory lists the Union Foundry & 
Machine Shop, but at least one other source lists Arkansas’s engines as coming from the foundry 
of S.M. Coates (Smith 2011:45). Almost nothing is known about these facilities; they may even 
just be different names of the same firm. More research must be done to clear up this mystery.   
In addition to the engines and boilers produced in Memphis, Arkansas’s propeller shafts 
were forged and turned by Leeds in New Orleans. Arkansas’s power plant ultimately proved to 
be its greatest weakness despite the apparent superiority of its purpose-built independently 
operating engines. They directly caused the ironclad’s loss through breakdown and scuttling in 
August 1862 (McClinton 1948:333). As with many other ironclads discussed, future 
archaeological investigation of the buried wreck has great potential to reveal new data. 
CSS Georgia, a self-powered floating battery constructed in Savannah, remains to this 
day one of the most enigmatic Confederate ironclads despite extensive surveys of its wreck by 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. It appears that the vessel was built to a simplified hull design 
with makeshift propulsion. According to Holcombe (1993:50), “The design of Georgia is 
attributed to A.N. Miller, a local foundryman with little practical experience in naval 
architecture”. The floating battery may have been powered by machinery built or supplied by 
Miller due to its construction location next to Miller’s foundry and machine shop. In a 2003 
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report, Mark Swanson and Robert Holcombe suggested that the engines came from the sidewheel 
steamer William Jenkins. This hypothesis has now been rendered invalid: “...recent 
archaeological evidence indicates the engines do not represent a beam engine, as was present on 
the William Jenkins” (Panamerican Consultants, Inc. [PCI] and Tidewater Atlantic Research 
[TAR] 2007:24). The engines are actually of the standard horizontal type, suggesting they may 
have been purpose-built. Miller’s foundry certainly had the capability of producing these engines 
because he cast cylinders for a steam locomotive in the 1850s and manufactured at least one 
heavy weapon during the Civil War (PCI and  TAR 2007:64). Apparently the foundry even 
operated as a local outlet for the Columbus Naval Iron Works (Still 1989:9). Another cited 
possibility is the machinery of the steamer Emma; unfortunately, no substantial information on 
this ship has been found (PCI and TAR 2007:64). 
The third ironclad built at Charleston, South Carolina, was named in honor of that city.  
Almost nothing has been found relating to Charleston’s machinery other than that the ship was 
driven by a single screw at a top speed of about six knots (Silverstone 2001:155). It seems likely 
that James M. Eason & Brother, the firm in charge of building Charleston, manufactured the 
power plant (Figure IV.5). This establishment certainly had the experience and capability. 
The Eason foundry and machine shop was one of the oldest and largest industrial works 
in Charleston by the Civil War. It was founded sometime around 1819 as  
…an outgrowth of a partnership between Thomas Dotterer and one Connor…  A few 
years later Robert Eason entered the partnership, and by 1847 his two sons, James M. and 
Thomas D., were in control of the firm. (Lander 1960:333) 
 
The foundry quickly grew into one of the most competent in Charleston and manufactured the 
first steam locomotive in South Carolina, the October 1830 “Best Friend of Charleston” as well 
as at least 10 others (Lander 1960:333-334). The establishment was manufacturing sawmill 
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engines and dredging Charleston Harbor with a specially-built dredge boat by the 1850s. Under 
the direction of the Eason brothers, the foundry had expanded to include “…cupola furnaces, 
forges, lathes, cranes, vises, drills, and saws. One of their special machines was a $6,000 lathe 
made to order in Scotland and claimed to be the most powerful in the South. It could turn and 
finish a flywheel up to twelve feet in diameter” (Lander 1960:334). If this establishment, which 
was in charge of building every other part of the powerful Charleston, was not capable of 
producing its machinery, none other in South Carolina was. Nothing conclusive can be stated 
until more information comes to light. 
 
FIGURE IV.5. Advertisement for J.M. Eason & Brother, Charleston’s largest Civil War iron 
works and builder of CSS Charleston (VintageMachinery.org 2012) 
 
CSS Neuse was a sister ship of the famous Albemarle. It is included as the last vessel in 
this section because of the extremely makeshift nature of its power plant. The one 15-foot boiler 
that powered the ironclad was taken from a “mud digger” steam locomotive owned by the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad: No. 34 “Gladiator” (Figure IV.6). The exact provenance of the 
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engines is uncertain because several sources have been listed. Among these are Pugh’s Mill 
(presumably a sawmill) located in New Bern, North Carolina (Bright et al. 1981:12). Other 
possible sources are the Confederate Naval Works in Richmond and the cylinders of a steam 
locomotive (Still 1994:67-68). It seems likely that Neuse’s machinery reflected a combination of 
these sources. Since the vessel’s boiler came from a steam locomotive, it stands to reason that 
other useful parts such as the cylinders would have been scavenged as well. Perhaps auxiliary 
equipment was furnished from Richmond. 
 
FIGURE IV.6. Baltimore & Ohio No. 37, a sister locomotive to No. 34, from which the boiler 
and probably cylinders were taken for CSS Neuse (Bright et al. 1981:11; courtesy of 
Smithsonian Institution) 
 
Neuse spent its wartime career bottled up near Kinston, North Carolina, and was 
eventually scuttled. The machinery seems have been removed after the war by New Bern 
treasury representative William Heaton. He was able to auction Neuse’s machinery to the New 
York firm of Satterlee & Lyon for $3,500 (Campbell 2009:58). The auction advertisement in the 
3 October 1865 edition of The North Carolina Gazette listed two engines, one donkey engine, 
and a boiler (Campbell 2009:58). 
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Another story concerning the removal of machinery from the wreck states that it was 
taken by a Captain Joseph M. White for use in his Kinston sawmill. Supposedly, White received 
government permission for the salvage and later sold the machinery to O’Berry Manufacturing 
Company in Kinston (Bright et al. 1981:153). No positive documentation concerning this turn of 
events has been found to date. 
Northern-Built 
A number of Confederate ironclads received at least part of their power plants from 
Northern manufacturers. Three of these vessels, Manassas, Virginia, and Baltic, were converted 
into armored warships from Northern-built hulls and machinery. Four of the purpose-built 
Richmond-class ironclads had to make do with engines removed from Northern vessels, while 
local firms supplied their boilers and other machinery. It would seem that power plants 
manufactured by the great engine works of the North would have been quite successful. In truth 
the utilization of these systems was for the most part unsatisfactory.   
CSS Manassas was the first ironclad to be completed in the South. This small warship 
was converted from the powerful twin-screw towboat Enoch Train which had been built at 
Medford, Massachusetts, in 1855. Loring’s large City Point Works of Boston furnished the 
machinery while the hull itself was constructed by famed clipper ship builder J.O. Curtis 
(Silverstone 2001:152). This facility had achieved a national reputation for excellence in steam 
machinery by the time of the Civil War.  
City Point’s founder, Harrison Loring, had established a machine and boiler shop in 
South Boston in 1847. The business grew and prospered. Ten years later Loring purchased land 
along the waterfront for a combined shipyard-machinery firm (Figure IV.7). This became the 
City Point Works, “…one of the first shipyards in the United States devoted to the construction 
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of iron steamships, engines, and boilers” (Mystic Seaport Manuscript Collection Registers 2012).  
Loring’s skilled establishment turned out several merchant ships before the Civil War and 
produced machinery for a number of others, including Enoch Train. During the war, two 
monitors and three sloops of war were constructed there. Admiral David G. Farragut’s famous 
flagship USS Hartford also received its machinery from these works.  
 
FIGURE IV.7. Advertisement for Loring’s City Point Works of South Boston, one of the largest 
iron shipbuilders in the United States by the 1860s (Courtesy of John Pike 2011) 
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The machinery built by City Point was highly praised (Bishop 1864:664-665). This was 
actually a major reason for Enoch Train’s conversion into an ironclad. The powerful towboat had 
independent twin-screw propulsion and, it was thought, more than enough power to function as a 
ram. This was true for the wooden Enoch Train but as Manassas the vessel suffered from the 
same defect of most ironclads: lack of power caused by the mounting of heavy armor and guns. 
The original Virginia (ex-USS Merrimack) was the second Confederate ironclad 
completed and by far the most famous. This massive vessel had started its career as the first U.S. 
steam frigate, built at the Boston Navy Yard in 1854-1855. Merrimack’s massive engines were 
designed primarily “…to provide auxiliary power for the sails and to simplify maneuvering in 
and out of ports” (Park 2007:48). The power plant was built by the West Point Foundry of Cold 
Springs, New York, a highly-qualified government contractor. 
The West Point Iron and Cannon Factory was founded in 1818 by the first graduate of 
West Point Military Academy, General Joseph Swift, with financial backing from a group of 
New York businessmen. It was supervised beginning in 1829 by the inventor of the Parrott rifle, 
Robert P. Parrott, and soon came to specialize in producing steam engines. By 1851 over 400 
men worked there and an iron foundry, brass foundry, pattern shop, smith’s shop, machine shop, 
and boiler shop comprised the sprawling complex (Figure IV.8). All of the equipment necessary 
for producing steam machinery was present: 3 furnaces, one 7-ton trip hammer, 2 tilt hammers, 
28 turning lathes, and 3 planing machines. This was the source of Merrimack’s propeller and 
shaft, four upright boilers, and steam engines. The boilers were of the vertical watertube type 
designed by U.S. Navy Engineer-in-Chief Daniel B. Martin while the huge steam engines were 
designed by West Point superintendent Parrott himself. Such an impressive collection of quality 
machinery and talent seemed to guarantee excellence, but the U.S. maritime steam engine 
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industry was still in its infancy in the 1850s. The engines of Merrimack were weak and 
unreliable even into the ship’s last days as the world-famous CSS Virginia. West Point itself had 
far more success during the war in crafting artillery pieces and shells. The foundry even received 
a congratulatory visit from President Lincoln in 1862. (Bathe 1951:4; Hillery 1961:1) 
 
FIGURE IV.8. West Point Foundry, manufacturer of steam engines, boilers, and the Parrott rifle 
(Hillery 1961) 
 
One of the most obscure Confederate ironclads is the converted sidewheel towboat CSS 
Baltic of Mobile, Alabama. This leaky and underpowered ironclad was originally built for the 
Southern Steamship Company in 1854 at Philadelphia. Very little is known of its construction 
specifications or construction history. Data on the manufacturer of Baltic’s engines is entirely 
lacking, but the power plant was typical for a paddlewheel-driven ship. Unfortunately, it was not 
capable of moving Baltic at more than a man’s walking pace after conversion (Official Records, 
Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 19]:198-200).  
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Several of the Richmond-class ironclads received their power plants from other vessels.  
Although these ironclads were purpose-built and designed by Confederate Chief Naval 
Constructor John L. Porter, a lack of suitable engines led to scavenged machinery for four of 
them. The first ironclad in this class was CSS Richmond, laid down at the Gosport Navy Yard in 
Norfolk and finished at Richmond in 1862. Richmond’s design was a significant improvement 
over the monstrous Virginia but its steam machinery was weak and reportedly removed from a 
former lightship, USS Arctic (Holcombe 1978:17).   
The history of Arctic is somewhat murky. This is largely due to an error in the records 
unaccountably confusing Arctic with the paddlewheeler Thomas G. Haight (Heyl [4] 1953:14).  
What is known is that this vessel was built at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in 1855 and worked for 
a time as a Coast Survey ship exploring northern waters and along the Eastern Seaboard. Arctic 
was propelled by a single screw but the manufacturer of the machinery is unknown. A drawing 
of this vessel is shown in Figure IV.9. By the time of the Civil War, Arctic was serving at Frying 
Pan Shoals as Lightship No. 8. It had served in this station since 1859. Reportedly, the vessel’s 
original machinery was removed for this duty, leading to more confusion about the source of 
Richmond’s engine. Arctic itself was overhauled in April 1861 at Wilmington, North Carolina, 
and served in that station throughout the Civil War as a receiving ship and ironclad floating 
battery (Combs 1996:3). During this time it may have received a new power plant or had its 
original one reinstalled. 
Currently, the provenance of the machinery used for Richmond is unknown—it came 
from Arctic but may not have been original to that vessel. Its engine, whether original or not, was 
apparently obtained at the Gosport (Norfolk) Navy Yard after its capture by the Confederates (A. 
Robert Holcombe, Jr. 2012, elec. comm.). It was probably the single-cylinder vertical type 
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commonly used in small steamers. Richmond’s boilers were brand new and built at either the 
Tredegar Iron Works or Shockoe Foundry (Confederate Naval Works). Tredegar was in charge 
of installing them, but little could be done to increase the power plant’s efficiency. This 
machinery proved too weak to efficiently propel Richmond. 
 
FIGURE IV.9.  USS Arctic as drawn by Erik Heyl, representing its appearance as a coast survey 
vessel. (Heyl [4] 1953:13) 
 
CSS Chicora was the next ironclad of the class to be completed. It was constructed and 
finished at Charleston, South Carolina, in 1862. Its engine was taken from the steam tug Aid 
(also listed as Concord, possibly a yard name). The boilers and other auxiliary equipment were 
furnished by James M. Eason & Brother, Chicora’s builder. Aid’s engine served Chicora well 
when it was installed in late 1862, but like almost all ironclad engines it was underpowered for 
the size of the ship. Chicora could not make over seven knots in the most favorable 
circumstances. (Mariners’ Museum MS102 [Folder 4]:94; Campbell 2005:54-55) 
Fortunately, a document presenting Aid’s hull and machinery dimensions has been 
preserved at The Mariners’ Museum at Newport News, Virginia. Most importantly, its engine is 
listed as the typical vertical single-cylinder design of most tugs. This system was durable and 
simple like the vessels it served. Aid itself was apparently launched in August 1852 at 
Kensington, Pennsylvania and taken to Philadelphia for machinery installation. The builder of 
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the machinery was Reaney, Neafie & Co., one of the largest iron ship manufacturers in the 
United States. (Mariners’ Museum MS102 [Folder 4]:94; Lytle and Holdcamper 1975:4) 
 
FIGURE IV.10. Advertisement for Reaney, Neafie & Co.’s Penn Steam Engine and Boiler 
Works in Philadelphia circa 1854, the largest builder of propeller-driven ships in the United 
States by the time of the Civil War (ExplorePAhistory.com 2011; courtesy of the Library 
Company of Philadelphia) 
 
The giant establishment commonly known as the “Penn Works” was started in 1838 by 
Jacob G. Neafie on the corner of Germantown Road and Second Street in Philadelphia. 
Gradually, Neafie’s small collection of wooden sheds and small shops grew into one of the 
largest shipbuilding and machinery manufacturers in the North. Extensive works covering nearly 
10 acres contained nearly every type of equipment necessary for building engines, boilers, and 
iron vessels (Figure IV.10). Engines were completed for many merchant vessels and warships of 
all types, including the frigate USS Lancaster and several gunboats. During the Civil War, 
“…the engines for about one hundred and twenty vessels, of all classes, were built here, some of 
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them among the largest in the service” (Bishop 1868:68-69). A large part of this success was due 
to the company’s extensive experience in forging propellers (Duffield 1896:5-6). By 1856, 
Reaney & Neafie had built more propeller engines than any other manufacturer in the United 
States, and even had the patent rights for the “curved propeller.” This was the originator of most 
modern propeller designs (Freedley 1856:295).    
The Charleston-built ironclad Palmetto State also had single-cylinder tugboat machinery 
like its sister Chicora, but was equipped with two horizontal engines. These were taken from the 
small gunboat Lady Davis, formerly the Richmond iron-hulled tug James Gray (Figure IV.11). 
This single-screw vessel, also known by the possible yard name Tompkins, was built in 1857 at 
Philadelphia (Mariners’ Museum MS102 [Folder 5]:211). Again, the builder of this ship and its 
engines was Reaney, Neafie & Company. Palmetto State was like Chicora: reliable but 
underpowered. Its twin single-cylinder engines were certainly a more powerful system than that 
on Chicora, but were still too weak to speedily propel a heavy 175-foot long ironclad. The rest of 
Palmetto State’s machinery was manufactured and installed by Cameron & Co., a large 
Charleston foundry exceeded in size and output only by the Eason establishment. 
 
FIGURE IV.11. Confederate gunboat CSS Lady Davis, formerly James Gray, an iron-hulled tug 
built in Philadelphia (Son of the South 2008; from Harper’s Weekly 1861) 
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Cameron & Co. was widely known as the Phoenix Iron Works after a major rebuild 
following a fire in 1850. Its origins actually dated back to John Johnson’s “air furnace” of 1802. 
By 1860, the Phoenix works consisted of a two-furnace foundry and carpenter, pattern, boiler 
making, finishing, and machine shops fitted with all the latest equipment (Lander 1960:332). 
When Archibald Cameron acquired control of the company early in the war, the iron works 
could boast of having manufactured steam engines, drydock components, and contracted work 
with the Charleston and Savannah Railroad (Wexler 2008:14). 
The final ironclad known to have received its engine from a Northern-built ship was CSS 
North Carolina. It was a Richmond-class ironclad built from 1862 to 1863 at Wilmington, North 
Carolina. The engine for this poorly-constructed vessel was taken from the former Lake Erie 
tugboat Uncle Ben, which was used as a small gunboat on the Cape Fear River. Uncle Ben was 
earlier chartered in New York for a diplomatic expedition to Charleston on 9 April 1861. 
Unaware of the events at Fort Sumter on 12-13 April, the small tug had to put into Wilmington 
for repairs and was captured by Confederate forces (Combs 1996:1-2). 
Uncle Ben was built in 1858 by the firm of Bidwell and Banta of Buffalo, New York. 
This shipyard was established in 1808 by Nathan Bidwell, but was burned by the British during 
the War of 1812. Bidwell quickly rebuilt, turning out the first steamship on the upper Great 
Lakes in 1818. In 1836, he partnered with J.W. Banta and the yard grew to include a marine 
railway and the first stationary dry dock on the Great Lakes. By the 1850s, the facility was one of 
the largest on the Lakes, turning out “…lavish ‘palace steamers’ and literally dozens of 
schooners and other steamboats…” (SS Canandiana 2012). Uncle Ben was one of these vessels, 
built to serve the yard and the city of Buffalo in general. 
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North Carolina’s boilers, shafting, and auxiliary machinery were manufactured and 
installed by the Hart & Bailey Iron Works of Wilmington. This large facility had first opened 
under the name of Polley & Hart in 1840 as a manufacturer of copper stills for the Cape Fear 
area’s turpentine industry (Combs 1993:61). The company was joined in 1857 by machinist John 
C. Bailey after expanding through the 1850s and branching into iron work. By 1860, production 
had further shifted away from copper and Hart & Bailey supplied Wilmington with much of its 
ironwork along with repairing machinery and building pump engines. The works included 
several machine, pattern, and copper shops along with a foundry. 
Throughout the Civil War, Hart & Bailey was heavily involved with ship construction. 
Everything from bolts and machinery parts to complete boilers was produced (Combs 1993:62). 
This Wilmington establishment was one of the few works in the Confederacy capable of heavy 
forging and was accordingly able to rework components from Uncle Ben into what appeared to 
be a sufficient propulsion system for North Carolina. Ultimately, the ironclad proved to be the 
worst of the Richmond-class and indeed the most poorly-constructed in the Confederacy. This 
was due in no small part to the worn-out engine taken from Uncle Ben. Because of its extremely 
weak motive power, North Carolina could make no more than two or three knots and 
consequently became an easy target for shipworms. This last example of a Confederate ironclad 
with a Northern-built engine emphasizes best of all the unsatisfactory nature of scavenged power 
plants, no matter how well-constructed they may have been. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the sheer variety of ironclad power plant sources can be readily seen. 
Attempts at effectively powering Southern ironclads were unsuccessful for the most part. There 
were some noted instances of effective propulsion but these largely came late in the war from the 
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Columbus Naval Iron Works. Virtually all the other power plants procured that were not 
purpose-built had serious weaknesses. In the end, the assortment of machinery used for the 
ironclads represented a fairly complete cross-section of American marine steam engine industry.   
Many manufacturers have mostly faded from the historical record, especially those in the 
river steamboat industry. Others, such as the great Northern shipyards, made huge impacts on the 
development of modern American shipbuilding. Northern-built engines usually were insufficient 
to power heavily-armored vessels due to their secondhand or worn-out nature, despite their often 
higher quality. None of the ironclads with Northern engines had very effective motive power, 
except perhaps Manassas. The Confederacy had greater success in making purpose-built engines 
for such vessels as Columbia and Savannah. Many of these never had the chance to be proven. 
Southern engine makers such as Tredegar and the Columbus works were kept busy during the 
Civil War but they met with limited success due to unavailability of materials, labor, and 
experience. Despite the rapid gain of such experience during the course of the conflict, it reached 
a competent level too late to make an appreciable difference for the South. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: IRONCLAD ENGINES IN PRACTICE—FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS 
Some of the most important facets of studying Confederate marine steam engines are the 
firsthand accounts of engineers, but it seems that this source of information has never been 
significantly utilized. The various accounts of the engineers and commanders of Confederate 
ironclads in service offer a perspective on the actual performance of steam engines in battle or 
general service, making an interesting comparison of theory versus practice. The operation of 
various engines can be observed in this manner, such as secondhand power plants versus 
purpose-built ones. A glimpse into the daily lives of an ironclad’s crew members can also be 
achieved. The extraordinary circumstances these men commonly found themselves working in 
often lend their words great weight. This historical perspective puts a human face on the 
Confederate ironclad program and brings the momentous events of the 1860s closer to home. 
Memoirs and histories subsequently published by various Union and Confederate 
commanders after the war rarely mention any machinery details, but accounts by engineers and 
others are common enough for a meaningful story to be told. These documents or articles are not 
as rare as commonly thought, although by no means are all Confederate ironclads discussed 
equally. Consequently, only a few vessels are represented, while many others are not at all.  
In presenting these accounts, some context is needed. Therefore, the recounting here will 
offer brief explanations in addition to raw quotes, putting them in proper perspective. The 
relevant ironclads and events will be presented in chronological order. Detailed technical data 
not offered by these accounts will be presented in the following chapter. 
Regarding CSS Manassas 
There was one armored vessel which came before Virginia: the small twin-screw 
Manassas, converted into an armored privateer from the Massachusetts towboat Enoch Train. 
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The conversion was led by Captain John A. Stevenson at Algiers, Louisiana, and begun in May 
1861 (Campbell 2006:48). The completed ship was seized in September 1861 by Confederate 
Navy forces in an attempt to bolster the defenses of New Orleans. The captain of the now-
Confederate States Ship Manassas was Lieutenant Alexander F. Warley. He was displeased with 
his new command: he described Manassas as a “…bug-bear…no power, no speed, no strength of 
resistance and no armament” (Campbell 2006:49). In reality, the little ship was armed with one 
forward-firing gun, but its primary weapon was a ram. Unfortunately, Manassas’s speed for 
ramming was severely limited by its heavy armor and conditions in the machinery space were 
nearly intolerable—temperatures were reported at over 130° Fahrenheit. This problem was 
encountered onboard many other ironclads as well. 
Warley was forced to take his new charge into action almost immediately, at the Head of 
the Passes on 12 October 1861. No firsthand engineering accounts of this battle are known to 
exist. Manassas’s master wrote instead on the second and final of his ship’s fights, the Battle of 
Forts Jackson and St. Philip on 24 April 1862. 
The account of Lieutenant Warley, published in Volume 1, Part 2 of Battles and Leaders 
of the Civil War, is brief but informative. It relates not just Manassas’s maneuvers and problems 
during the battle, but offers a glimpse into what it must have been like to serve on such a warship 
during the Union’s climactic bid to approach and take New Orleans. Regarding the performance 
of Manassas during one of its ramming runs during the battle, Warley wrote: 
The Manassas was driven at her [USS Brooklyn] with everything open, resin being piled 
into the furnaces. The gun was discharged when close on board. We struck her fairly 
amidship; the gun recoiled and turned over and remained there, the boiler started, slightly 
jamming the Chief Engineer, Dearning, but settled back as the vessel backed off. (Battles 
and Leaders 1991 [Vol. 2, Part 1]:90) 
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By this point in the fight, Manassas’s machinery was literally coming off its bedplates 
from the shock of heavy ramming. The ironclad had already hit USS Mississippi on the way 
down to meet the rest of the Union fleet. Unfortunately for the Confederates, neither ramming 
event did enough damage to sink the target vessel. 
Following the nearly-disastrous encounter with Brooklyn, Warley took his battered ship 
back upstream, witnessing the utter defeat of the Confederate fleet on the way. He wrote: 
Steaming slowly up the river—very slow was our best… The Manassas was helpless. 
She had nothing to fight with, and no speed to run with. I ordered her to be run into the 
bank on the Fort St. Philip side, her delivery-pipes to be cut, and the crew to be sent into 
the swamp through the elongated port forward, through which the gun had been used. 
(Battles and Leaders 1991 [Vol. 2, Part 1]:91) 
 
After the abandonment, Federal sailors reached the stricken hulk and set fire to it. The burning 
wreck dislodged from the bank and drifted downriver as several Union ships poured broadsides 
into the thin iron shield (Campbell 2006:52). Finally, the battered, burned, and punctured little 
ship (Figure V.1) blew up and sank. So ended the first ironclad completed in North America. 
 
FIGURE V.1. The final moments of CSS Manassas; the text below the image reads: “The Ram 
as she appeared in passing the ‘Harriet Lane’ after the ‘Mississippi’ had got through with her.” 
(Online Library of Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 
Washington, DC, 2012) 
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Regarding CSS Virginia 
The most famous Confederate ironclad was of course CSS Virginia (ex-USS Merrimack). 
Although the small ram Manassas was technically the first North American ironclad to be 
completed, it did not make the kind of lasting impressions on Confederate ironclad design as 
Virginia. Due to the fame and significance of Virginia’s battles, there exist a number of sources 
relating to the construction process and life onboard that vessel. 
It is well-known that prior to its conversion to the prototype Confederate ironclad, 
Virginia had served as the first United States steam frigate, Merrimack, since 1855. During its 
service life, its engines were unable to propel the vessel at speeds of over eight knots. They were 
also inefficient and too lightly-built to turn the massive screw without trouble (Bathe 1951:5). 
The design problems and overall unsuitability of the engines were widely known prior to the 
destruction of Merrimack in spring 1861. Benjamin F. Isherwood, Engineer-in-Chief of the U.S. 
Navy from 1861 to 1869, stated in an 1863 report that: 
The enormous cylinder capacity [72-inch diameter by 36-inch piston stroke] caused the 
steam to have a low average pressure on the pistons throughout the stroke, and the 
vacuum, owing to air leaks, was very poor. The arrangement and proportions of the air-
pumps were faulty and productive of the same results. (Bathe 1951:5) 
 
This expert assessment was corroborated by the Confederates who served onboard the vessel 
after it became an ironclad. 
When the Gosport (Norfolk) Navy Yard was evacuated in April 1861 in the face of an 
approaching Confederate force, the Federals hastily set fire to everything that could not be 
removed, including USS Merrimack. The ship was unable to leave because the engines were 
disconnected and parts missing in the first steps of a major machinery overhaul (Figure V.2). The 
frigate sank at its moorings before the fire reached the levels below the berth deck, preserving 
the boilers and engines. 
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FIGURE V.2. The burning of USS Merrimack and the Gosport Navy Yard, 20 April 1861 
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 1991 [Vol. 1, Part 2]:693) 
 
During the planning process in June 1861 for building an ironclad, Secretary Mallory 
summoned Naval Constructor John L. Porter, Lieutenant J.M. Brooke, and Engineer-in-Chief 
William P. Williamson to Richmond to draw up plans. According to Brooke: 
…I went with Williamson to the Tredegar works, where we learned that there were no 
suitable engines in the South. Williamson then said he thought the engines of the 
Merrimac [sic] could be used, but that the vessel would necessarily draw as much water 
as the Merrimac, and it would not be worthwhile to build a new hull, as enough of the old 
hull remained to carry out the plan. Mr. Porter and I thought the draught too great, but 
that we could not do better. We so reported to the secretary, who concurred. (Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War 1991 [Vol.1, Part 2]:716) 
 
An official report to Mallory, dated 25 June 1861, soon followed: 
SIR: In obedience to your order, we have carefully examined and considered the various 
plans and propositions for constructing a shot-proof steam-battery, and respectfully report 
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that in our opinion the steam-frigate Merrimac, which is in such condition from the effect 
of fire as to be useless for any other purpose without incurring a very heavy expense in 
her rebuilding, can be made an efficient vessel of that character, mounting 10 heavy guns, 
…and from the further consideration that we cannot procure a suitable engine and boilers 
for any other vessel without building them… The bottom of the hull, boilers, and heavy 
and costly parts of the engine being but little injured, reduce the cost of construction to 
about one-third of the amount which would be required to construct such a vessel anew. 
(Battles and Leaders 1991 [Vol. 1, Part 2]:716-717) 
 
Thus the burned-out hulk of Merrimack became the prototype Confederate ironclad, and its 
machinery was once again called on to move a ship too large for the amount of power generated. 
During its brief but active life as CSS Virginia, the new ironclad encountered continuing 
problems with its engines. Nobody trusted them to last very long. Colonel John Taylor Wood, 
CSA, who served as a lieutenant on the ship during its first engagements, stated: 
The motive power was the same that had always been in the ship. Both of the engines and 
boilers had been condemned on her return from her last cruise, and were radically 
defective. Of course, the fire and sinking had not improved them. We could not depend 
on them for more than six hours at a time. (Battles and Leaders 1991 [Vol. 1, Part 2]:694) 
 
In his turn, Chief Engineer H. Ashton Ramsay reported extensively on the machinery’s 
layout and gradually worsening state over the course of Virginia’s brief career. Appropriately, he 
provided the most complete descriptions of the boiler and engine layout and also his experiences 
in the engine room during battle. His testimony is quite valuable: 
Her engines were radically defective [this descriptor was used quite frequently by 
Ramsay and other contemporary sources] in their condensing apparatus, the average 
vacum [sic] maintained being about one-half that it should be after the engines had 
worked a short time. The links, machanism [sic] for operating the valves and reversing 
the engines were also defective. The arrangement of steam chests for main and expansion 
valves was not well designed, involving as it did a large loss of steam. In other respects 
the machinery was good. The main parts [of the] shafting, propeller, cylinders, bed plates, 
and c., all [were] strong and of good material; the boilers, four in number, were then 
known as the martin type, economical in fuel but very slow [in] combustion, and sluggish 
in draught. The engines were of a type known as horizontal back-acting, with two 
cylinders, each 72” diameter and three feet stroke of piston, and as 18 pounds [per square 
inch] was the average pressure of steam the whole power the engine was capable of 
developing was only 1,000 horse… The engines were all arranged for a warship, 
occupying very little space vertically so the highest part of them was well under the water 
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line. With the boilers, however, the case was different. They stood very high, coming 
close under the berthdeck now to be the gundeck. (National Archives RG 45 [HA File]: 
Roll 13) 
 
Ramsay then went on to describe fitting out the new ironclad, and he included interesting 
information regarding trials of the machinery and his interactions with the ship’s commander, 
Franklin Buchanan. This account is significant because it presents the commander of a 
Confederate ironclad dealing directly with matters in the engine room: 
Steam was raised and the machinery operated with the vessel tied to the wharf, a few 
days previous to the memorable 8th of March, when early in the morning, Captain 
Buchanan summoned me on deck. He questioned me closely in regard to the machinery, 
and as to the precautions taken to prevent the engines and boilers moving forward and the 
rupture of steam and other pipes in the event of a collision, possibly at full speed. After 
explaining in detail the methods adopted for bracing the machinery, the provision of 
telescopic or expansion joints to the pipes, and c., which I thought would prevent trouble 
to the parts referred to, he then asked if, with my knowledge of the machinery, I would be 
satisfied to make an attack on the fleet in Hampton Roads, without first making a trial. 
(National Archives RG 45 [HA File]: Roll 13) 
 
Ramsay replied in the affirmative, and later provided stirring firsthand testimony of the scene in 
his department during the battle of 8 March 1862 and against USS Monitor the next day: 
The scene in the engine and boiler rooms during the action beggared all description. 
Dante’s Pandemonium alone approaches the weird and fiery sight here presented. The 
sixteen furnaces of the boilers were belching out fire and smoke, the firemen standing in 
front of them like so many gladiators, tugged away with devil’s claw and slice bar 
[stoking tools], inducing by their exertions more and more intence [sic] heat and 
combustion; the noise of the crackling, roaring fires, escaping steam, and the loud and 
labored pulsations of the engines, made up a scene and sound that could be compared to 
the poet’s picture of the lower regions. Then the bursting shell; several burst in the smoke 
stack just above the steam drum, the fragments falling on the iron fire room floor 
beneath. Two of the furnaces were arranged to heat shot, and out of these were being 
rolled those huge balls of fire, and passed up to the guns in iron cages, but 
notwithstanding the cannon’s roar, bursting bombs, and suffocating heat and smoke, not a 
man quailed… One shot from the enemy came near inflicting a serious injury to the 
machinery; it was on the second day’s fight, and we supposed [it was] a solid shot or bolt 
from the Monitar [sic]. It struck us on the knuckle immediately over the outboard 
delivery valves of the after engine on the starboard side. The effect of the shot was to 
crush through the outer course of iron, and bend down the lower course into the wood 
backing, crush a beam down to within an inch of the stern of the outboard delivery valve 
of the after engine, a little further and it would have been shut up. A splinter was thrown 
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off the beam and hurled across the engine-room with such force and velocity that it took 
my breath away as it passed my ear in its flight and buried itself in the iron bulkhead on 
the port side of the vessel. I was standing at the time with my hand on the starting valve 
of the after engine. (National Archives RG 45 [HA File]: Roll 13) 
 
Virginia’s chief engineer then made further note of the battle with Monitor but only 
provided small details about raising steam during a brief period aground: “…but finally, after 
stopping the engines for an interval, lashing down the safety valves [a very dangerous but very 
common practice for milking more power out of the boilers], and forcing the fires to an unusual 
degree, we started up again with a heavy pressure of steam…” (National Archives RG 45 [HA 
File]: Roll 13). Ramsay also debunked rumors of Virginia’s sinking condition after the battle: 
…I should mention, twice before he [Lieutenant Catesby ap R. Jones] had sent for me in 
regard to a report that had been made to him by the carpenter of the vessel, that she was 
leaking forward. I told him on each occasion that it was impossible she could be making 
much water as the skin of the vessel was plainly visible in the crankpits, the lowest part 
of the ship, and that I had the means to keep her free, even if she had a ten-inch shot in 
her hull, as there were two large Worthington pumps and the bilge injections of the 
engines which could be set to work at once in case of any such emergency. (National 
Archives RG 45 [HA File]: Roll 13) 
 
In the aftermath of these actions, Ramsay more than perhaps anyone else could see that 
Virginia’s old engines had been pushed nearly to the breaking point. Little work was done on 
them despite his concerns. He later made a detailed report on this issue to Virginia’s second and 
final commander, Commodore Josiah Tattnall, on 5 April 1862: 
From my past and present experience with the engines of this vessel, I am of the opinion 
that they cannot be relied upon. During a cruise of two years whilst I was attached to this 
ship in the United States service they were continually breaking down, at times when 
least expected, and the ship had to be sailed under canvas during the greater part of the 
cruise. When she returned, the chief engineer reported that experiments to improve their 
working and reliability had failed, and, as the defects were radical, embracing the entire 
engines, recommended that they should be removed from the vessel, and such was the 
intention of the U.S. Government before she fell into our hands. The engines gave out 
yesterday, as I had occasion to report to you, after running only a few hours, and as I can 
not insure their working any length of time consecutively I deem it my duty to make this 
report. At the time I was ordered to the vessel I was informed that it was not the intention 
to take the ship where a delay, occasioned by a derangement of the machinery, would 
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endanger her safety, and that she would always be accessible to the navy yard for repairs; 
this is the reason why I have deferred making this report until this time; and I also was 
under the impression that the Navy Department was aware of the defective nature of the 
machinery, and [that] her movements would be directed with a reference to this. Each 
time that we have gone down [into Hampton Roads] I have had to make repairs which 
could not have been done aboard ship very well, or, if done at all, would have required a 
great deal of time. (Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of 
the Rebellion 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 7]:758-759) 
 
He reported further on the unsuitable nature of the steam line connections and continuing repair 
work over the course of the next few days: 
The engines of this ship are not disconnected, and one cannot be worked alone. As long 
as the vacuum of the forward engine holds good, the engines might be run by working the 
after-engine high pressure; but the vacuum of either engine is at all times precarious, and 
if the vacuum of the forward engine should fail, the engines would stop. Using one 
engine high pressure would also require a great deal of steam, which the boilers cannot 
generate for any length of time. The air-pump valves are now being overhauled… 
(Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 7]:759) 
 
The problems with permanently connected engines and underpowered boilers were a problem 
that ultimately plagued several other Confederate ironclads. 
Another valuable testimony regarding the functioning of Virginia’s engines in active 
service comes from Third Assistant Engineer E.A. Jack. He recorded several interesting details 
of serving in the engine and fire rooms during his ship’s battles. He first described his 
impressions of the machinery, which corroborate Ramsay’s: 
Her motor power was two horizontal condensing engines, which were supplied with 
steam from four Marlin [Martin] boilers containing three furnaces each. The engines 
operated by link-gear which was shifted by the arc and pinion movement and were quite 
difficult to manage, and required at least two men at each reversing gear. For one of the 
furnaces, a frame of wrought iron was made upon which shot for smooth bore guns could 
be placed and heated and tool and trivets were supplied to handle and carry them to the 
guns. There were two auxiliary steam pumps of the Worthington type, with about six-
inch cylinders. These pumps could be used either to supply the boilers with water or to 
pump water from the bilge. (Flanders and Westfall 1998:10) 
 
Jack also wrote regarding the fight of 8 March against the wooden Union blockading 
vessels in Hampton Roads: 
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The preparation for the fight now began on our ship and all hands were called to quarters, 
and I sought my station down in the fire-room twenty feet under water mark… The 
suspense was awful, but it was relieved occasionally, by some information through the 
ash chute that my comrade White [3rd Assistant Engineer E.V. White] would 
communicate. (Flanders and Westfall 1998:15) 
 
In this manner, Jack and the other men in the fire room were apprised of the situation outside and 
learned of Virginia’s incredible victory over the blockading fleet that day.  
Virginia’s monumental battle with USS Monitor on 9 March, shown in Figure V.3, was 
recorded in some detail by Jack, but he had relatively little to say about operations in the 
machinery spaces. Like Ramsay, he briefly related the shell hit near the waterline: 
One shot struck directly over the outboard delivery, and because that was a weak spot 
broke the backing of the shield and sent a splinter into the engine room with about 
enough force to carry it halfway across the ship. (Flanders and Westfall 1998:16) 
 
 
FIGURE V.3. The world’s two most famous ironclads, USS Monitor and CSS Virginia, slug it 
out at short range on 9 March 1862. (Battles and Leaders 1991 [Vol. 1, Part 2]:708) 
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Jack, also like Ramsay, made note of the rumors after the battle that Virginia had been 
forced to retire due to bad leakage from ramming Cumberland the previous day and attempting 
to do the same to Monitor in turn: 
As I was in the fire-room within sight of the steam bilge pumps at all times, in fact sitting 
by them often, I know that they were not required to do any extraordinary duty and that 
no alarm about the sinking or leaky condition of the ship was felt in that section… 
(Flanders and Westfall 1998:17) 
 
This testimony offers another rare glimpse into actual battle conditions in the engine room and 
stokeholds of a Confederate ironclad warship. Unfortunately, there appear to be no similar 
accounts of Virginia’s operations after the battle with Monitor. 
Regarding CSS Baltic 
Little information exists concerning one of the Confederacy’s first ironclads and the only 
armored vessel to serve on Mobile Bay for over a year: CSS Baltic. Fortunately, some details do 
exist regarding the machinery, mostly due to a Union survey of the captured vessel at war’s end. 
Not many records concerning Alabama’s first ironclad have been found and Confederate 
documents relating to the vessel are almost nonexistent (Holcombe 1993:25). 
Baltic was originally a sidewheel towboat serving as a cotton lighter on Mobile Bay. It 
was bought for a sum of $40,000 cash in December 1861 by a commission specially charged 
with selecting a vessel for conversion to an ironclad. Conversion began quickly on 21 December 
1861 and was finished the next May (Wilson 1938:2-3). It appears that as a casemate ironclad 
ram mounting four guns Baltic was extremely slow and began to suffer from rottenness. The 
boilers were also described as being out of repair. The few Confederate accounts clearly reveal 
that service on the ironclad was uncomfortable at best and no one had any real faith in its 
abilities. 
On 20 March 1864, Baltic’s commander, Lieutenant Charles Simms, wrote: 
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Porter, the naval constructor, has made a very unfavorable report of the condition of the 
ship and recommended that the iron be taken from her… the Baltic is as rotten as punk, 
and is about as fit to go into action as a mud scow. (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, 
Vol. 21]:886). 
 
Towards the end of the war, Flag Officer Randolph Tucker wrote a report concerning the unsafe 
condition of the boilers: “The boilers of the steam ram Baltic were pronounced by the engineers 
as unsafe, and were being patched and strengthened…” (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, 
Vol. 18]:660). This was after the deteriorating vessel’s armor had been removed (both for safety 
purposes and supplying another ironclad, CSS Nashville, with much-needed iron plate). Not long 
afterwards Baltic was decommissioned. At war’s end, it was sent up the Tombigbee River with 
several other Confederate vessels and subsequently surrendered to Federal authorities. A Union 
survey of the ship in June 1865 reported, among other things: 
…The Baltic is built like all other river steamers, but was strengthened when she was 
constructed into a ram. Her hull is in good condition below the load line, but above the 
load line her hull and upper works are rather rotten in some places. Her main deck is in a 
very bad condition and rather rotten. Her cylinder timbers are affected with the dry rot in 
some places, and not very well secured. …  
These engines are in good condition and repair, with the exception of the 
timberwork… This ship is not safe to run in consequence of the bad condition of the 
boilers. (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 22]:226-227) 
 
According the full survey report, repairs were planned initially but nothing came of it and the 
worn-out vessel was broken up sometime after December 1865 (Naval Historical Center 2012).  
Regarding CSS Louisiana 
The giant ironclad Louisiana was one of the first vessels constructed as part of Secretary 
Mallory’s ironclad policy. It and the other early ironclads were large and strong with the 
intention of combined harbor and open water service. In reality, most had serious weaknesses. 
Louisiana’s were perhaps the greatest among these. 
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What became one of the South’s largest ironclads was begun on 15 October 1861 at 
Jefferson City, Louisiana. The builder was E.C. Murray, an early proponent of ironclads and an 
experienced constructor of riverboats. Louisiana was designed as a flat-bottomed craft with 
straight sides supporting a massive 45 degree-angled casemate (Holcombe 1993:47). The 
vessel’s machinery arrangement of two center-mounted paddlewheels and two propellers was not 
just unusual, but extremely troublesome. Louisiana’s lack of motive power caused by problems 
with the machinery layout and installation plagued it throughout its short career, and contributed 
to its loss. 
Most contemporary accounts regarding Louisiana come from the 1863 Report of 
Evidence Taken before a Joint Special Committee of Both Houses of the Confederate Congress, 
To Investigate the Affairs of the Navy Department which investigated the spectacular loss of New 
Orleans along with two of the South’s largest ironclads (CSS Mississippi in addition to 
Louisiana). These testimonies describe the efforts to install Louisiana’s machinery, most of 
which came from the river steamer Ingomar (Still 1985:45). The ironclad was still incomplete 
due to delays in construction when ordered 60 miles downriver to Fort St. Philip to prepare for 
defense against Flag Officer Farragut’s approaching fleet. Commander John K. Mitchell, in 
charge of the Confederate naval defenses below New Orleans, testified: 
To have prepared her fully for a fight, it would have taken at least six weeks, if not two 
months longer. In work of that kind there are many causes of delay. For instance, we 
were a long time waiting for the propellers. The engineers were promising every day that 
they would be ready, but they failed to come up to their promise, though I am satisfied it 
was made in good faith. The work was much more arduous and difficult than they 
apprehended. (Confederate States of America [CSA] 1863:29) 
 
Louisiana’s motive power was only partially assembled when the deployment order came. The 
giant ironclad was incapable of stemming the Mississippi current with just paddlewheels. 
According to the ship’s third lieutenant, William C. Whittle: 
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She had two propellers aft, which we never had an opportunity of testing. … The vessel 
left New Orleans on the 20th of April, I think. The work on the propellers was 
incomplete, the machinists and mechanics being still on board… The center wheels were 
started, but were entirely inefficient… (Battles and Leaders 1991 [Vol. 2, Part 1]:48) 
 
Louisiana had to be towed down to a mooring adjacent to Fort St. Philip (Figure V.4). 
 
FIGURE V.4. CSS Louisiana being towed downstream from New Orleans to Fort St. Philip. 
Several tugs were required to assist the unwieldy 2,700-ton ironclad. (Battles and Leaders 1991 
[Vol. 2, Part 1]:48) 
 
Workers continued to feverishly assemble Louisiana’s propeller engines and shafts, but 
the Union attack came before their completion. On 24 April 1862, Farragut’s fleet stormed past 
the forts and proceeded upriver to take New Orleans. Most of the Confederate fleet was 
destroyed, but Louisiana had resisted the heaviest Union guns without damage and remained tied 
to the bank. By 28 April, the work was finally done but Louisiana would not move even with full 
steam pressure and both wheels and propellers operating (Holcombe 1993:49). The huge 
ironclad was subsequently destroyed to prevent capture when the nearby forts surrendered. 
Chief Engineer Wilson Youngblood, reporting to Commander Mitchell while a prisoner 
in August 1862, had a final word on the failure of one of the Confederacy’s strongest ironclads: 
SIR: I respectfully report the machinery of C.S.S. Louisiana all in good working order on 
the morning of April 28, 1862, just before it became necessary to destroy the vessel. 
But I do not think it would have been able to handle the vessel, the wheels being put in 
the middle of the vessel, one right abaft the other, so that the after wheel could do no 
good whatever. 
And again, when the wheels were working, they would force the water out under the 
stern so that it would form an eddy around the rudder so that she would not steer, and if 
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we tried [to] steer her with the propellers, she could not stem the current. Consequently 
she was unmanageable in the Mississippi River. (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, 
Vol. 18]:318) 
 
Regarding CSS Arkansas 
Only one other Confederate ironclad approaches CSS Virginia in level of fame. CSS 
Arkansas, one of the first-generation ironclad designs of Mallory’s initial 1861 program, was a 
product of Memphis, Tennessee. It was intended to defend the Confederacy on the upper 
Mississippi River. During its brief service life, Arkansas garnered more glory than any other 
Southern ironclad. Fortunately, abundant information regarding the exploits of this remarkable 
vessel has been preserved in the accounts of its equally remarkable master and officers. 
Arkansas was begun at Memphis, but after the fall of New Orleans and the approach of a 
Federal gunboat fleet, the senior naval officer quickly ordered the removal of Arkansas’s 
incomplete hull to a safe location in the swamp. Simultaneously, he ordered the destruction of a 
sister ship, to have been named Tennessee, still on the stocks (Still 1985:62). By this turn of 
events, Arkansas was preserved and eventually moved to Yazoo City, Mississippi, far up the 
Yazoo River. There, construction lagged for want of materials, skilled workers, and 
pusillanimous leadership. All that changed when Lieutenant Isaac Newton Brown was ordered to 
take over command of the vessel. He arrived on 29 May 1862 and promptly got things moving 
(Still 1985:64). 
The ironclad’s engines, built in Memphis, were onboard but not connected when Brown 
took command. In fact, the whole ship was a cluttered mess. Brown wrote: 
Her condition was not encouraging. The vessel was a mere hull, without armor; the 
engines were apart; guns without carriages were lying about the deck; a portion of the 
railroad iron intended as armor was at the bottom of the river, and the other and far 
greater part was to be sought for in the interior of the country. (Battles and Leaders 1991 
[Vol. 3, Part 2]:572) 
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With a herculean effort of will and organizational skill, Brown succeeded in speedily 
finishing Arkansas. He recognized the vessel’s deficiencies, especially the engines which were 
new and purpose-built. In the end, these proved to be the ship’s greatest weakness: 
Our engines’ twin screws, one under each quarter, worked up to eight miles an hour in 
still water, which promised about half that speed when turned against the current of the 
main river. We had at first some trust in these, not having discovered the way they soon 
showed of stopping on the center at wrong times and places; and as they never both 
stopped of themselves at the same time, the effect was, when one did so, to turn the 
vessel round, despite the rudder. Once, in the presence of the enemy, we made a circle, 
while trying to make the automatic stopper keep time with its sister-screw. (Battles and 
Leaders 1991 [Vol. 3, Part 2]:572) 
 
E.A. Jack, assigned to the engineering staff of Arkansas in the aftermath of Virginia’s 
destruction, provided a description of the equally discouraging conditions in the engine room: 
The quarters were cramped, hot, and badly ventilated. In the engine room, which was 
petitioned from the ward-room access only by a rough board fencing about four or five 
feet high, the thermometer indicated over 100. Such a temperature when the engines were 
at rest and the fires low gave promise of trying and exhausting duty when underway or in 
action… (Flanders and Westfall 1998:23) 
 
Jack was soon to find that his first impressions were only too accurate. Commander Brown was 
soon ready to take the fight to the enemy after hurriedly finishing the ironclad and scrounging 
together a crew. He had heard of the Union fleet massing near Vicksburg and on the morning of 
14 July 1862, Arkansas departed for battle. 
Before the new ironclad had gone very far, the hasty construction of the ship’s steam 
plant became apparent to all. Brown continued his account: 
Fifteen miles below [Satartia, Mississippi], at the mouth of the Sunflower River, we 
found that the steam from our imperfect engines and boilers had penetrated our forward 
magazine and wet our powder so to render it unfit for use. (Battles and Leaders 1991 
[Vol. 3, Part 2]:573) 
 
The crew was able to dry the powder by laying it in the sun but valuable time had been lost. 
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Nothing happened despite Lieutenant Brown’s worries until dawn the next day, 15 July, 
as Arkansas approach the junction of the Yazoo River with the Mississippi. The ironclad 
encountered three enemy vessels there: the ironclad USS Carondelet, the wooden gunboat Tyler, 
and the ram Queen of the West. The Confederates gave chase and exchanged fire in a sharp battle 
as the Union vessels retreated towards the Mississippi. While Arkansas incurred some damage, 
the Federals received the worst of it. Carondelet was disabled and run aground and Tyler only 
managed to escape with severe damage. Brown continued: 
On gaining the Mississippi, we saw no vessels but the two we had driven before us. 
While following these in the direction of Vicksburg I had the opportunity of inspecting 
engine and fire rooms, where I found engineers and firemen had been suffering under a 
temperature of 120° to 130°. The executive officer, while attending to every other duty 
during the recent firing, had organized a relief party from the men at the guns, who went 
down into the fire-room every fifteen minutes, the others coming up or being, in many 
instances, hauled up, exhausted in that time; in this way, by great care, steam was kept to 
service gauge, but in the conflict below the fire department broke down. The connection 
between furnaces and smoke-stack (technically called the breechings) were in this second 
conflict shot away, destroying the draught and letting flames come out into the shield, 
raising the temperature there to 120°, while it had already risen to 130° in the fire-room. 
(Battles and Leaders 1991 [Vol. 3, Part 2]:575) 
 
The “second conflict” that Brown referred to was the arrival of Arkansas at Vicksburg and the 
engagement between that vessel and no less than the combined fleets of Union admirals Farragut 
and Porter. In the meantime, Third Assistant Engineer Jack corroborated Brown’s account of 
conditions in the engine and boiler rooms during the battle: 
…the heat in the engine room was almost unbearable and in the fire-room the glowing 
red furnace doors shot out such heat that the men had to be frequently relieved and would 
gladly take a turn to rest on the quarterdeck where shot were flying around in preference 
to staying below where they were better protected. I do not remember the temperatures 
then, but do not think it extravagant to say that it was above 130. (Flanders and Westfall 
1998:23) 
 
CSS Arkansas’s moment of glory came when Lieutenant Brown led the already-battered 
ironclad through the combined Union fleet off Vicksburg, singlehandedly engaging over 50 
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enemy vessels (Figure V.5). The Confederates inflicted great damage and confusion but barely 
made it to safety under the guns of Vicksburg itself: 
It has been asked why the Arkansas was not used as a ram. The want of speed and of 
confidence in the engines answers the question. We went into action in Old River with 
120 pounds of steam, and though every effort was made to keep it up, we came out with 
but 20 pounds, hardly enough to turn the engines. (Battles and Leaders 1991 [Vol. 3, Part 
2]:575) 
 
Second Lieutenant George W. Gift further described the scene onboard during the great battle: 
…But still the ship was not disabled; seven guns [out of 10] were still hammering away, 
and the engines were intact. But steam was down to a terribly low ebb. The party who 
had fitted up the boilers had neglected to line the fire front with non-conducting material; 
the consequence was that when a heavy fire of coal was put in the whole mass of iron 
about the boilers became red-hot and nearly roasted the firemen, who had also got a tub 
of ice-water, of which they drank freely. (Gosnell 1949:121) 
 
The battered Arkansas finally reached the wharves of Vicksburg, having scored one of the most 
dramatic victories of any Southern ironclad. 
 
FIGURE V.5. CSS Arkansas runs the gauntlet through the Union fleets above Vicksburg on 15 
July 1862. The ship’s sides were actually vertical rather than angled as shown here. Arkansas 
was the only Confederate ironclad so designed. (Battles and Leaders 1991 [Vol. 3, Part 2]:556) 
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Arkansas sat at Vicksburg for a week effecting repairs but constantly under the 
bombardment of the Union fleet. Farragut’s forces steamed to a point below the batteries at 
Vicksburg during the night of 15 July and hammered at the Confederate ironclad as they passed. 
Serious damage was inflicted in the engine room. Gift wrote: 
An eleven-inch shot pierced our sides a few inches above the water-line, and passed 
through the engine-room, killing two men outright (cutting them both in two) and 
wounding six or eight others. The medicines of the ship were dashed into the engine-
room, and the debris from the bulkheads and splinters from the side enveloped the 
machinery. (Gosnell 1949:125) 
 
This shot may have partly accounted for the increasingly temperamental state of Arkansas’s 
power plant on its final voyage. It apparently did significant damage to one of the engines. In the 
meantime, further conflicts with the Union ironclad Essex continued to hamper repair efforts. 
Finally the Union fleets retired to the south after a week of ineffectual attempts to destroy 
Arkansas, and Vicksburg was temporarily left in peace. 
Arkansas’s final voyage came in August when it was ordered south to aid in an attempt to 
retake Baton Rouge. On 3 August Brown was away on sick leave, leaving the ship in charge of 
the executive officer, First Lieutenant Henry K. Stevens (Still 1985:75). Consequently, Arkansas 
left Vicksburg for battle without its captain or chief engineer. Many problems soon developed, as 
Gift explained: 
…we left Vicksburg thirty hours before General Breckinridge [the Confederate 
commander at Baton Rouge] had arranged to make his attacks. The short time allowed to 
arrive at the rendezvous made it imperative that the vessel should be driven up to her best 
speed. This resulted in the frequent disarrangements of the machinery and consequent 
stoppages to key up and make repairs. Every delay required more speed thereafter in 
order to meet our appointment. Another matter operated against us. We had been 
compelled to leave behind, in the hospital, our chief engineer, George W. City, who was 
worn out and broken down by excessive watching and anxiety. His care and nursing had 
kept the machinery in order up to the time of leaving. We soon began to feel his loss. The 
engineer in charge, a volunteer from the army, had recently joined us, and though a 
young man of pluck and gallantry, and possessed of great will and determination to make 
the engines work, yet he was unequal to the task. He had never had anything to do with a 
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screw vessel or short-stroke engines, and, being zealous for the good repute of his 
department, drove the machinery beyond its powers of endurance. (Gosnell 1949:132) 
 
Engineer Jack was in the engine room and provided firsthand testimony of these 
problems. His detailed account suggests that it was unnecessary adjustments made to the 
engines, not necessarily faulty manufacture or hard use, which ultimately ruined them: 
Indeed the engines were good as they were, and as capable of carrying the vessel through 
an attack on the enemy as they had ever been. This new Chief...wanted to make 
alterations in the lap of the steam valve... I had just examined the set of it and was closing 
the steam chest when I became aware of the presence of a stranger who was looking on. 
“I want to look at that valve,” he said. I regretted that he had not come aboard sooner as it 
was too much trouble to open the chest again and I was very busy. But he replied, “I have 
come on board by Capt. Brown’s order to take charge of these engines”. I did not know 
whether I was talking with a lunatic or not, but Mr. Stevens, coming up at this time, 
confirmed the newcomer’s rank and I proceeded to obey orders. I took off the cover and 
disconnected the valve and took it from the chest. Then it was that he sagely remarked, “I 
do not wonder that this thing does not work: it is an inch too long on both ends. I will 
make it shorter”. I cannot express my surprise when he said this, for I knew that if he did 
it, the valve would be ruined and the vessel delayed until a new one could be gotten. How 
long that would have been I cannot say, but I doubt if one could be gotten short of 
Richmond. The old valve might have been repaired, but that too would have taken some 
time. I could not help telling this new and experienced officer that he would ruin the 
valve if he altered it as he contemplated, but he smiled knowingly, and, as if it was 
presumption in a youngster to differ with him, turned away. I protested then to Lieut. 
Stevens, but he said, “This officer is more experienced than you and I suspect he knows 
what he is talking about”. I then asked that [sic] he would speak to Mr. City. Mr. City 
tells me that he did, and that he told Mr. Stevens that I was right and the man was a fool. 
But he was kept although the alterations were not made in the valve. (Flanders and 
Westfall 1998:25) 
 
It would seem that Jack had helped prevent a serious problem in this regard, but 
ultimately the engines were tampered with during what should have been routine maintenance. 
Jack’s continuing detailed account of these blunders makes abundantly clear that he believed 
they were the cause of Arkansas’s downfall: 
Lieuts. Stevens and Gift have both written that it was due to a breakdown of the engines. 
The loss of the vessel was indisputably due to that, but what led to that breakdown has 
never been written. It might reasonably be asked why the engines that had brought this 
ship through the fleet off the Yazoo River, fighting every inch of the way, and which had 
been so successfully handled when the two attacks were made upon her at Vicksburg, had 
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become so inefficient at this critical time. A practical man would suspect that they had 
been badly managed, indeed tampered with, and would not be very far from the truth. 
Our trip was one of accidents and delay from the beginning to the end. The first stop 
because of the machinery was unavoidable. It was caused by a loose key in the rock-shaft 
arm. An examination disclosed that the key-way was very much worn, and it was thought 
advisable to true up the way and fit a new key. The link was disconnected, the repairs 
made, and the machinery coupled up again. This latter duty was carefully performed 
under the supervision of the experienced chief engineer Fauntleroy, and I did the work on 
the rock-shaft, and when that was finished, took a rest which we deserved. The others our 
relief connected up. In fact I am quite certain that they disconnected the link. At any rate, 
no marks were made by which a proper length of the eccentric rods might be preserved, 
and in putting them up again one was left longer than normal and when the engine was 
moved it drove the steam valve against the end of the chest and broke the pin in the 
rocker-arm which had just been secured. Our work held, but the pin gave way. A new pin 
was forged, and Fauntleroy fitted that and gave it to an assistant named Gettis to secure, 
but he took it and heated it red hot to make it easier to rivet in place, and tried to drive it 
into place hot. Of course it would not fit as it had expanded from the red heat it had, but 
he up [sic] with sledge and tried to drive it home. In this he failed, but he succeeded in 
spoiling the pin which had to be fitted again. (Flanders and Westfall 1998:25-26) 
  
Jack and the others became more exasperated as the voyage continued. The engines grew more 
temperamental as Arkansas hurried south. Lieutenant Stevens began to be worried about taking 
his ship into action and whether he would even be able to make it to Baton Rouge. Gift 
continued his account of Arkansas’s last voyage: 
 …At or near the mouth of Red River, the engines had grown so contrary and required to 
be hammered so much that Stevens deemed it was his duty to call a council of war to 
determine whether it was proper to proceed or return. The engineer was summoned and 
gave it as his opinion that the machinery would hold out, and upon that statement we 
determined to go ahead. A few miles below Port Hudson he demanded a stoppage to key 
up and make all things secure before going into action. (Gosnell 1949:132) 
 
Arkansas continued with good speed toward Baton Rouge after this last repair but by the time the 
ironclad reached the city, the land battle was all but over.  
E.A. Jack had a final say about the culpability of the civilian engineering specialists and 
the frantic work below decks before the final battle: 
When I went on watch I was his [civilian assistant Gettis] relief, and going around with 
him to examine into the condition of the department, I saw a machine I was not familiar 
with. I knew it to be a Giffard’s [Gifford’s] injector, but [did] not know how to operate it. 
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So I asked him to show me how it started. Much to my surprise he declined to do so, and 
told me to learn to operate it as he had. I had the authority to compel him to show me, but 
my professional pride was touched, so throwing aside our official relations, I determined 
to show him that I could do as he had so uncivilly advised. And when he had gone, after a 
few trials, I succeeded in manipulating the machine successfully. Well, after the new pin 
[referred to previously] was fastened in place and the eccentrics adjusted, another start 
down the river was made. But next the coal supply was found to be insufficient and 
another landing was made at a plantation to replenish the bunkers. Whether this was an 
oversight, or there were no coals in Vicksburg I don’t remember. While the coaling was 
going on, the starboard cylinder was opened and the packing in the piston was set out. 
This engine worked the port wheel, which you will learn hereafter became inoperative 
and caused the loss of the vessel. This tinkering with the engine was altogether 
unnecessary. The civilian engineer was, in my opinion, culpable in permitting it, and 
guilty as well of negligence in not seeing that the packing was properly adjusted, instead 
of entrusting such an important matter to an assistant who was not familiar with it… Day 
came before we had finished coaling, and when it was quite light we cast off our lines 
and started down river once more. (Flanders and Westfall 1998:26)   
 
At a clear area above Baton Rouge, the crew learned that the USS Essex and other Union 
vessels were still present. The Confederates accordingly decided to attack them. Gift wrote: 
Stevens assented to the proposal [to ram Essex] and had just remarked that we had better 
go to our stations, for we were in a hundred yards of the turn [in the river], when the 
starboard engine stopped suddenly, and, before the man at the wheel could meet her with 
the helm, the ship ran hard and fast aground, jamming herself on to some old cypress 
stumps that were submerged. … On investigation it was found that the engine was so 
badly out of order that several hours must be consumed before we could again expect to 
move. There lay the enemy in plain view, and we as helpless as a shear-hulk. (Gosnell 
1949:134) 
 
Commander Stevens saved a copy of the engineering report submitted to him at this time. 
Its main point was: “From my examination of all the defects in the…engines, it will be 
impossible for me to put them in fit condition to render efficient aid to propel the ship into 
action…” (Still 1985:76). Arkansas now appeared to be in dire straits. It is best to let George Gift 
end the story here in his own words: 
…Stevens was not the man to give up. A quantity of railroad iron, which had been laid on 
deck loose, was thrown overboard, and in a few hours we were afloat. The engineers had 
pulled the engine to pieces and with files and chisels were as busy as bees, though they 
had been up constantly then for the greater parts of the two preceding nights. At dark [on 
5 August] it was reported to the commanding officer that the vessel could be moved. In 
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the meantime some coal had been secured (our supply was getting short), and it was 
determined to run up stream a few hundred yards and take it in during the night, and be 
ready for hot work in the morning. Therefore we started to move, but had not gone a 
hundred yards before the same engine broke down again; the crank pin (called a ‘wrist’ 
by Western engineers) of the rock-shaft broke in two. Fortunately one of the engineers 
was a blacksmith, so the forge was set up and another pin forged. But this with our 
improvised facilities used up the whole night. Meantime the enemy became aware of our 
crippled condition, and at daylight moved up to the attack. The Essex led, and came up 
very slowly, at a rate not to exceed two miles an hour. She had opened on us before the 
last touch had been given to the pin, but it was finished and the parts thrown together. … 
The pleasant sensation of again being afloat and in possession of the power of locomotion 
was hardly experienced before our last and final disaster came. The port engine this time 
gave way, broke down and would not move. The engineer was now in despair; he could 
do nothing, and so reported. The Essex was coming up astern and firing upon us. We had 
run ashore and were a hopeless, immovable mass. (Gosnell 1949:134-135) 
  
Also describing the situation in those final moments, Jack’s account adds further 
harrowing detail: 
Immediately after our guns opened fire [on Essex], one of our engines stopped. My 
impression then was that the shot that had struck so close astern of us had struck our 
propellor [sic], for its fall, the discharge of our guns, and the stoppage of our engine came 
very close together. I rushed down from the casemate and passed below through the hatch 
in the overhang aft, and just as I had gotten below, another of our after guns was fired. I 
found them trying to move the starboard engine, which was somehow jammed and the 
engine room full of steam that was escaping from the overstrained joints. I felt sure then 
that our shaft had been bent by the shot which had struck astern of us, for I did not know 
that the packing had been set out in that engine as I was ashore when it was done, 
attending to the coaling. (I learned this afterwards from Asst. Engineer Fauntleroy who 
saw it done.) If I had known it, there would have been no doubt in my mind as to the 
cause of the engine stoppage. All efforts to start the disabled engine failed. The port 
engine was kept at work and in a short time the ship was run ashore on the west side of 
the river, and abandoned and fired. … The excitement in the engine room because of the 
disabled engine and the pell-mell way in which both officers and men abandoned the 
ship…completely unnerved me for a while. (Flanders and Westfall 1998:26-27) 
  
In the face of enemy fire and risking capture by Union troops moving up the bank, Commander 
Stevens made the decision to destroy his vessel. Accordingly, the crew abandoned ship into the 
swamp and the South’s most gallant ironclad burned and blew up. In the fitting words of H. 
Allen Gosnell 1949:135, “Her career lasted only twenty-three days, but what a career! It included 
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so much action that there probably never was another vessel that averaged anything like as much 
fighting per day as did the Arkansas”. 
Regarding CSS Richmond 
The prototype for the largest single class of ironclads completed by the Confederacy was 
the Norfolk-built Richmond. Construction on this vessel was based on Chief Naval Constructor 
John L. Porter’s 1846 ironclad design and had begun at the Gosport Navy Yard prior to its 
abandonment by Southern forces in May 1862 (Still 1985:94). Consequently, the unfinished 
single-screw ironclad was towed to Richmond and completed there.  
While Richmond incorporated many design improvements over Virginia, it still suffered 
from a deep draft and a weak single-cylinder engine taken from a former lightship (Coski 
2005:80). Many criticized both the length of time required to finish the vessel and its secondhand 
machinery. Lieutenant John Taylor Wood, CSA, wrote: 
I doubt very much if she goes below the barrier [Confederate obstructions placed across 
the James River near Drewry’s Bluff], for with her weak engine (80 horse) she would be 
mobbed and forced out of the channel. She will not steam more than 5 knots, if that. 
(Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 2, Vol. 2]:256) 
 
In his turn, George Weber, a sailor on the Confederate Navy school ship Patrick Henry, 
echoed similar sentiments: “…the worst thing…is that she carries bad engines” (Coski 2005:80). 
Nevertheless, Richmond became by far the strongest naval defender of the Confederate capital 
upon completion in November 1862. The other ironclads of the nascent James River Squadron 
would not be completed for another 16 months (Coski 2005:91). 
Richmond was kept busy as flagship until the completion of the other James River 
ironclads but only saw one actual battle toward the end of its career. Worry over the “defective” 
engine persisted, especially when considerations were afoot to send the ship on the offensive 
below the river obstructions. Army engineer Alfred Rives noted: “…it would certainly seem of 
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doubtful policy to send below an ironclad vessel with [an] inferior single-acting engine…” 
(Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 8]:841-842). Perhaps there was upper-level 
realization of this “doubtful policy,” for Richmond was never called on for such a risky venture 
while operating by itself. 
A bit of information concerning typical conditions encountered in the machinery spaces 
of Richmond has come down in the accounts of Chief Engineer Henry X. Wright. His reports 
reveal that the usual size of the engine and fire room crew was 10 men, and that weekly 
inspections were held by him, the chief engineer of the squadron (Wright 1863: Folders 13,14). 
In a report to Flag Officer John K. Mitchell (the same Mitchell who had earlier served at New 
Orleans) dated 21 October 1864, Wright stated: 
In regard to the engineers, I would state that she should have another assistant… Besides, 
the engine is a very unhandy, hard-working one, and the engine room very hot and 
uncomfortable. I would state that the temperature has been as high as 150° Fahrenheit 
during last summer, and is considered to be one of the hottest engine rooms in the 
Confederacy. (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 10]:792) 
 
The “unhandy” single-cylinder engine appears to have given remarkably little trouble 
despite the difficulty of working in such conditions and the constant duty experienced by 
Richmond during its career. It apparently functioned well even during the Battle of Trent’s Reach 
on 24 January 1865, which was the only significant engagement fought by the James River 
ironclads (Figure V.6). Not long afterwards on 3 April 1865 they were all destroyed to prevent 
capture after the abandonment of the Confederate capital. 
Regarding CSS Chicora and Palmetto State 
The first two ironclads built for the defense of strategically-important Charleston Harbor 
were both of the same design as Richmond. These vessels, Chicora and Palmetto State, operated 
together for their entire career and were considered among the best-maintained ironclads in the 
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Confederacy (Still 1985:115). Unfortunately, like so many other Southern ironclads they lacked 
satisfactory steam machinery. 
 
FIGURE V.6. The Battle of Trent’s Reach, 23 January 1865. The ironclad at right, with two pilot 
houses, is CSS Fredericksburg—CSS Richmond is one of the more obscure vessels in the 
background. (Online Library of Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the 
Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
Both vessels were laid down in March 1862, but Chicora was completed in August with 
Palmetto State following in October (Holcombe 1978:17). The two ships were identical in most 
respects but could be distinguished by Palmetto State’s octagonal casemate (Holcombe 1993:67). 
Both ironclads were painted a pale blue-gray like that of the blockade runners and both had 
engines taken from tugboats.  
The engines of Chicora and Palmetto State seem to have given fairly good service 
despite being underpowered for the size of the ships. James H. Tomb, Third Assistant Engineer 
onboard Chicora, recorded his first impressions: 
The engine was single acting and was taken from a tug. While the engine was lacking in 
power, she was a good ship, after so many tinder boxes and cook shops we had had. She 
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was thought to be able to make eight knots without forced draft, but when completed, 
could not under the most favorable circumstances make over seven. (Campbell 2005:54-
55). 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Lieutenant William H. Parker of Palmetto State: “Her 
engines always worked well, and under favorable circumstances she would go seven knots per 
hour, though her average speed was about six” (Parker 1883:288). He continued further 
regarding the operations and cleanliness of the two ironclads: 
…they were  fine specimens of men-of-war and would have done credit to any navy. 
They were well officered and manned. … They were the cleanest iron-clads, I believe, 
that ever floated, and the men took great pride in keeping them so. (Parker 1883:288-289) 
 
The weak engines, although mostly reliable, did get Chicora and Palmetto State into 
trouble occasionally. In particular, as part of their duties, the ironclads acted as pickets near the 
harbor entrance. They commonly encountered strong tides there. Chicora was forced to cast 
anchor in the face of a two mile-per-hour ebb tide on at least one occasion. Even with the engine 
at full power, the ship continued to drag (Still 1985:115). In addition, during their one major 
battle on 31 January 1863, concerns over lack of power prevented Chicora from attempting to 
ram (Figure V.7). James Tomb related the story: 
…it was decided to make an attack on the blockading fleet off Charleston. January 30, 
1863, we all had steam up, and about midnight proceeded over the bar… We made about 
seven knots and I think the Palmetto State made about eight. About daylight on the 31st, 
we started for the blockading fleet. The intention was for both ships to ram, as it was felt 
we could hope to do nothing with them [enemy ships] if they had a chance to get away. 
… The Chicora…headed for a ship and we in the engine room were waiting for the 
signal to back full speed, …[but] we were told we would not ram. … They feared the 
Chicora would not have power to back clear again. (Campbell 2005:58-59) 
 
Consequently, no enemy ships were captured or sunk and neither ironclad received noticeable 
damage, although the blockading fleet was driven off. The “raising” of the blockade was only 
temporary because the Union ships returned to station after the departure of the Confederates. 
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FIGURE V.7. Chicora and Palmetto State attack Union blockaders on 31 January 1863. (Still 
1997:222; from Illustrated London News 1863) 
 
Neither Chicora nor Palmetto State ventured from Charleston Harbor again. They 
continued to perform picket and general guard duties, all the while in increasingly worse repair. 
By 1864 the power plants of both were unreliable and nearly worn out. It was reported on 8 
January 1864 that Chicora “…wants a new boiler” and on 7 September 1864 that “The Palmetto 
State’s boilers are out of order. She goes very slowly” (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, 
Vol. 15]:230,678). Both ironclads lingered on in this manner until the evacuation of Charleston 
in February 1865, when they were destroyed to prevent capture. 
Regarding CSS North Carolina 
The next Richmond-class ironclad to be completed and the first finished in North 
Carolina was built in Wilmington. North Carolina followed the standard Porter design of 
Richmond, Chicora, and Palmetto State but suffered throughout its career from poor construction 
and a weak engine. Because of this, North Carolina was invariably described as one of the most 
decrepit vessels in the Confederacy (Still 1985:165). 
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Perhaps North Carolina’s greatest problem was its engine, taken from the tug Uncle Ben 
and not capable of moving the ship at more than two or three knots. This was coupled with a lack 
of copper bottom sheathing. As a result, teredo worms rapidly attacked the ship’s bottom as it sat 
in a defensive position at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. North Carolina would spend its 
entire career in this manner. It was limited from going to sea by deep draft and could only  be 
towed back upriver occasionally in an attempt to kill the marine growth on its hull. Wilmington’s 
first ironclad accordingly served uneventfully as a floating defense (Watts 1999:9). 
  North Carolina was assigned as part of its crew Third Assistant Engineer Charles S. 
Peek after its completion in June 1863. He dutifully recorded his experiences on the poorly-built 
ironclad. Peek’s accounts provide a fascinating glimpse of service onboard a particularly 
unpleasant craft. Serving on such a vessel, he had much to write about, but this retelling will 
present only the engineering parts. On 1 July 1863, he wrote describing an accidental grounding: 
We even got aground on yesterday [sic] on account of the tide being so low and we 
drawing so much water. After we got aground I bank[ed] my fires and Mr. Freeman took 
the first watch… We [later, after the tide came in] raised steam and got off. After 
travelling about two hours we anchored off Smithville, the name of a little town at the 
mouth of Cape Fear River. We lay all night with our fire bank[ed] and this morning we 
[illegible] fires and blew off steam. … When I came out of the engine room last night I 
was ringing [sic] wet with presperation [sic]. (Peek 1863: Letter 4) 
 
At the end of the same month, Peek described the drinking occasioned by boredom onboard 
North Carolina: “The two 2nd asst. Engineers on this steamer are very fond of whiskey; they sat 
up last night until two o’clock drinking…” (Peek 1863: Letter 7). On 12 August: “We expect to 
go up the river today to rill the worms and barnicles [sic] that have accumulated on our bottom 
line since we have been in salt water. One of our Engineers was suspended the other day for 
getting drunk while on duty” (Peek 1863: Letter 8). 
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Peek’s letters do not mention significant details regarding North Carolina’s machinery 
again until 6 July 1864, well after the ship had begun to sag and leak noticeably: 
We left Wilmington on the 2nd of July and anchored off Smithville for the night of the 
3rd. We got a log in our propeller as we were crossing the shoals and had to anchor. 
When the tide fell we were about 5 ft. out of water, that is we draw about 13 ft., and there 
was not but 8 ft. on the shoals. I thought that the weight on the shield would crush in and 
I pack[ed] up my cloths [sic] ready for a start but the old ship stood it well. We were 
towed off next evening by two tug boats and are now safely at anchor off Smithville. …I 
am getting tired of this old ship. I want to get on some ship that can get along without 
[being] towed everywhere she goes… (Peek 1864: Letter 31) 
 
Two days later on 8 July he wrote: “We have to keep up steam to pump the ship out, it is very 
hard; we have to keep watch and it also makes the ship very warm” (Peek 1864: Letter 32). 
Things were to continue like this for another two months. 
Late July 1864 was the beginning of the end for Peek’s “old ship.” His letter of 24 July 
described North Carolina’s sad condition: 
Our old ship has nearly played out. We have her moured [sic] head and stern in shoal 
water that is at low water. She is about 12 inches from the bottom, and she leaks so badly 
that we have to keep steam up all the time. There is no discipline on her now… (Peek 
1864: Letter 33) 
 
A little over a month later in early September 1864, North Carolina sank at its moorings off 
Smithville (Watts 1999:14). Engineer Peek was detached shortly afterward and the Confederates 
stripped everything valuable from the wreck. The spectacularly unsuccessful career of 
Wilmington’s first ironclad was over. 
Regarding CSS Savannah 
The last Richmond-class ironclad to be completed during the Civil War was constructed 
in Savannah, Georgia, and named for that city. CSS Savannah was probably the best-built of any 
ship in its class. It was launched on 4 February 1863 and served as flagship of the local naval 
forces (Holcombe 1978:18). Savannah’s machinery was furnished by the Columbus Naval Iron 
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Works but was originally built for a wooden gunboat. It appears by all accounts this power plant 
performed reliably. 
A few different accounts of Savannah’s machinery exist as well as two valuable detailed 
blueprint drawings of the engines and boilers. Some of the most important firsthand details come 
from official Savannah Squadron correspondence papers now housed at the Manuscript, 
Archives, and Rare Book Library at Emory University in Atlanta. All the documents generally 
praise the ironclad’s performance, although during trials in July 1863 some troubles were 
encountered. Much data was gathered and reported during Savannah’s trials. They were initiated 
when Secretary Mallory wrote on 18 July to Flag Officer W.W. Hunter, commander of the 
Savannah Squadron: 
You are requested to have the “Savannah” occasionally run up and down the river, not 
only to perfect a test of the machinery, but to exercise the Engineers and Firemen and 
perfect an organization; and you will direct a report to be made thereon. (Savannah 
Squadron Papers 1863: Box 1, Folder 10)  
 
That same day a report was given listing some of the new ship’s design problems. It is 
particularly interesting because it relates to troubles with the vessel’s auxiliary steam systems. 
The pipe from the steam pump does not lead sufficiently far aft—as when it “sucks” it 
leaves 6 ½ inches water in the ship, while with her flat floor endangers the stores aft. The 
pipe should be extended aft to the pump well and then it will free the ship. (Savannah 
Squadron Papers 1863: Box 1, Folder 10) 
 
Presumably efforts were made to correct the pump defects before or during trials for they are not 
mentioned again. Reports were made of Savannah’s first successful run before long. Still 
1989:16 presented one such account: 
A Confederate marine wrote, “Today we took the Savannah down river [on a trial trip] to 
test her engines. She started off beautifully and glided downstream as smoothly as if she 
were some waterfowl. It was a strange sight to see that huge mass of iron, shooting from 
the water like the roof of a house, steaming along so like a thing of life”. 
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Teething troubles were soon encountered and unfortunately proved to be serious. Robert 
F. Pinckney, Savannah’s commander, wrote to Flag Officer Hunter on 3 August 1863: 
While this vessel was returning from the [torpedo] barrier, whither I had run her, in 
obedience to your order, to try her machinery, the starboard engine became disabled from 
the breaking of the piston. By subsequent investigation, it has been discovered that the 
steam-cylinder is also broken. (Savannah Squadron Papers 1863: Box 1, Folder 12) 
 
Hunter accordingly wrote an order the next day for a thorough investigation to be done on the 
broken engine by the senior engineers of the Savannah Squadron. Recommendations on repairs 
were also requested. Acting Chief Engineer J.M. Tynan, who had earlier in the war served 
onboard CSS Virginia, made his report to Flag Officer Hunter at the end of 4 August: 
SIR: In accordance with your order herewith appended, we have held a strict and careful 
survey on the engines of the C.S. Steamer Savannah and most respectfully submit the 
following report of their condition for service, of the damage done to the starboard 
engine, etc.  
We are of the opinion that the ship can be worked by the port engine as it is, by careful 
management. But as there will be some difficulty in starting the engine, in consequence 
of the liability to stop in the centers, we consider it necessary to have a steamer in 
attendance to render any assistance that may be required; and for further security, we 
respectfully recommend that a trial be made at the wharf which will determine whether 
by some slight alteration of the valve, the working of the engine may not be considerably 
improved. Other than this we would not advise the engine to be used except in case of 
great emergency. 
The damage done to the starboard engine is as follows, viz: the cylinder, piston head, 
follower and rings are irreparably broken, outboard cylinder head cracked and piston rod 
bent. From the appearance of the broken parts of the piston, we are satisfied that—with 
the exception of about two square inches—it was broken entirely through the middle 
before being used on this vessel, and are of the opinion that it was done in keying it on 
the rod before it left the shop. We were shown a rivet 5/8-inch diameter and about 2 ½ 
inches long with a head of about 1-inch diameter which according to the statement of the 
engineers in charge was taken from the inside of the cylinder amidst the fragments of the 
piston. This rivet in our opinion was the immediate cause of the accident; we suppose it 
to have been left through the carelessness of some of the workmen in the steam passage 
of the cylinder, and by the rush of steam or some jar was carried down into the cylinder, 
and as there was only from 1/4 to 3/8 of an inch clearance between the piston and 
cylinder head a breakdown was inevitable. Had the piston been perfectly good before 
steaming, the presence of this rivet in the cylinder would in all probability have caused 
the same amount of injury to the engine. 
The breaking of the cylinder was evidently caused by the parts of the piston broken off 
being acted on by that part still attached to the rod as the engines according to the 
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statement of the “engineer of the watch” made two or three revolutions after the 
occurrence of the accident. 
The following repairs are necessary to put the machinery in good working order. Viz: 
A new cylinder, new piston with follower, rings, etc., a new cylinder head and the piston 
rod to be straightened. 
We think the most expeditious manner of repairing the engine would be by having it 
done at the “Naval Iron Works” Columbus, GA, where the engines were built. The time 
necessary to make the repairs will in our judgment be about one month. (Savannah 
Squadron Papers 1863: Box 1, Folder 12) 
 
This report represents one of the most detailed accounts regarding the functioning of a typical 
ironclad engine and also reveals the kind of quality-control problems encountered by the 
Confederacy’s nascent marine engine industry. It was quickly agreed to by both Flag Officer 
Hunter and Secretary Mallory and the broken engine parts were sent to Columbus. 
The repairs presumably went well and Savannah was successfully re-powered. There are 
no further reports regarding the ship’s performance under steam. Among the last accounts 
relating to Savannah’s machinery are entries in the journal of Robert Watson, who served 
onboard Savannah after his transfer from the army. On 1 May 1864, he revealed the severe 
shortage of coal for the navy, although by that time it was casually accepted: “Took some wood 
and got up steam and dropped out into the stream” (Campbell 2002:111). On 21 December 1864 
and at the very end of Savannah’s career Watson reported on the danger of shells entering an 
ironclad’s smokestack: 
…the Yankees opened fire on us from the city. We were not slow in returning the 
compliment but with what effect I cannot say. The Yankees made excellent shots, nearly 
every one struck our sides or smoke stack. One shell went down the smoke stack and 
rested on the grating but did not explode [!] (Campbell 2002:139-140). 
  
The conflict to which Watson refers occurred after the capture of Savannah by Federal 
troops. The city’s namesake ironclad was left to cover the retreat of the Confederate forces and 
the destruction of the other Savannah Squadron vessels. Once the gunnery duel ended and the 
168 
 
retreat was known to have succeeded, CSS Savannah followed in the path of so many other 
ironclads and was fired by its own crew (Figure V.8). 
 
FIGURE V.8. The destruction of CSS Savannah, 21 December 1864. (U.S. Army Corps. of 
Engineers Savannah District 2005) 
 
Regarding CSS Virginia II 
A few bits of firsthand engineering information regarding the Confederacy’s most 
powerful ironclad and flagship of the James River Squadron, Virginia II, have been found. This 
vessel was designed by Naval Constructor William Graves and built in Richmond with eight 
inches of iron on its casemate ends and six on its sides (Holcombe 1993:81). Virginia II was also 
supposedly capable of up to 10 knots with its possibly English-built engines, but they proved 
faulty in the long run (Coski 2005:211). In the end, the new James River Squadron flagship spent 
most of its career idle, often dealing with machinery problems like the other ironclads defending 
the Confederate capital. 
Three very brief but informative statements concerning Virginia II’s steam machinery in 
service can be found in the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of 
the Rebellion. They range over the course of a year, between February 1864 and February 1865. 
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Evidence of the hasty completion of the ship can be seen, but there are no significant details 
regarding the layout of the engines themselves. The only line in this direction is in an informal 
letter written on 26 February 1864: “She has an engine of nearly 500 horses” (Official Records, 
Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 9]:801). 
When Virginia II was finished in May 1864 it underwent the necessary trials. On 21 June 
Flag Officer Mitchell telegraphed Secretary Mallory of a problem eerily similar to that 
encountered by Savannah nearly a year earlier: 
I was about proceeding down the river, near Howlett’s [a Confederate land battery], when 
the piston was discovered to be out of order. The cylinder was removed and a chisel 
found in the cylinder. The engine is now in working order again. (Official Records, 
Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 10]:186) 
 
The problem was apparently not as severe as that onboard Savannah but again showed the 
problems inherent with hasty construction and a general lack of experience many Southern 
workers had with steam machinery. It was fortunate that the James River Squadron instituted 
weekly machinery inspections under its chief engineer, Henry X. Wright. On 7 July 1864, for 
instance, he wrote to Flag Officer Mitchell: 
SIR: I have the honor to report that at general inspection held on board the C.S.S. 
Virginia [II] this day, that after a very careful and thorough examination of the engines, 
boilers, steam pumps, and the appendages, under steam, I found everything in good order 
and condition and in a very high state of efficiency. (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 
1, Vol. 10]:718-719) 
 
Despite its apparent cleanliness and efficiency, the hasty construction of many of 
Virginia II’s iron components caused at least one safety concern. The temporary commander of 
the ship in February 1865, Lieutenant John Dunnington, wrote on the 5th: “On berth deck the 
force pumps, intended to use in case of fire or when the crew could not go outside of shield, have 
never been completed” (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 12]:179). Fortunately, this 
lack of a backup pumping system was never put to the test. 
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Near war’s end a good account of the interior layout of a Confederate ironclad was 
written by an Irishman, Thomas Conolly, who visited Virginia II in late March 1865. This was 
just a week before the evacuation of Richmond on 2-3 April (Coski 2005:180). Conolly’s 
account is revealing in that it makes clear just how modern and well-maintained many Civil War 
ironclads were compared to other vessels despite their engineering and climate control problems. 
Unfortunately, no detail is given on Virginia II’s machinery spaces:  
[We went] thro a small iron port hole where we saw the thickness of her iron-sides lined 
with oak about 4 feet [thick] when inside the great guns one astern of gigantic proportion 
d[itt]o for’ad & 3 [gunports] at either side light & air coming thro thick iron bars at top 
sloping inwards garnished with all the gun requisites tower tier filled with long steel 
soled shot about 12 inches each. Middle supports covered with racks of six & ten shotting 
rifles in fine order men & officers sauntering about quietly—Thence to mens quarters 
down a hatchway for’ad all in order with a cooking stove full of excellent dinner 
surrounded by mess boxes wh[ich] when opened had their tin plates, cups knives salt 
pepper &c in good array with the n[umber] of rations for each mess in middle! All as nice 
as any man of war hammocks all stowed along inside making a pleasant couch to lean 
against—Men all standing round at attention & all neatly clad in confed: grey shirts. 
Then to engine room at other end—Thro wardroom & quarters Ad(mirals) sleeping room 
all dark but bright & clean when lighted up. (Lankford 1988:65-66) 
 
Virginia II ultimately suffered the same fate as most other Confederate ironclads. The strongly-
built and powerful ship was blown up to prevent capture. 
Regarding CSS Columbia 
This vessel was the last ironclad to be completed at Charleston but its career was cut 
drastically short due to human error. Columbia was a radically-altered sister ship of the more 
famous Tennessee, carrying six inches of armor and six guns in an improved layout on 
approximately the same draft (Holcombe 1993:73). Columbia’s completion was severely delayed 
by material and labor shortages like virtually all other late-war ironclads. Laid down in 
December 1862, this powerful ironclad was not launched until 10 March 1864 and not 
commissioned until January 1865 (Holcombe 1993:88-89). During a trial trip to test Columbia’s 
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brand-new machinery from the Columbus Naval Iron Works the ship ran hard aground on a 
sunken wreck and had to be abandoned. Third Assistant Engineer E.A. Jack, formerly assigned 
to both CSS Virginia and Arkansas, recounted the unfortunate incident: 
At last the engines and boilers were ready for the trial, and there was a gathering of 
officers from other vessels of the fleet. Steam was gotten up by the force sent from 
Columbus, Ga. by Chief Engr. Warner, who had constructed the machinery at the Govt. 
works at that place, and his men were at the engines. Mr. [Virginius] Freeman, as Fleet 
Engineer, was the supervising officer, and I a looker on and, to some extent, an assistant 
to him also. There was [sic] some drinkables and eatables on the spread in the wardroom, 
too much of the drinkables I fear. 
Not long after we got underway, a valve was opened by one of the shop hands, which 
came near to causing the loss if not the explosion of one set of the boilers. The fires under 
these had to be hauled, because they were nearly empty of water. After the fires were 
hauled and the boilers were cooled they were refilled and fire started again. When this 
bad piece of engineering occurred, the ship was steaming to reach a shoal near the mouth 
of the stream while there was enough water to pass over. The loss of steam and slow 
consequent speed of the engines caused her to miss the tide, and when on the way back to 
her moorings, she was run upon a sunken vessel, and hanging there, was left by the tide, 
and leaking in her hull, became a wreck. (Flanders and Westfall 1998:35) 
 
It can be readily seen that even the most experienced steam engineers could make 
catastrophic mistakes, especially when supervising machinery they were not familiar with. In this 
case it cost the Confederacy one of its best-built and most powerful ironclads. After the fall of 
Charleston in February 1865 the U.S. Navy made a survey of the wrecked Columbia and 
ultimately succeeded in refloating it. The valuable hull was eventually sold for breaking up. 
Regarding CSS Missouri 
An ironclad was appropriately the last Confederate vessel to surrender in home waters on 
3 June 1865 (Still 1985:226). This vessel, CSS Missouri, was unique in that it was the only 
centerwheel ironclad completed in the South despite a lack of facilities, materials, and labor in 
the trans-Mississippi region where it was built (Holcombe 1993:108). Extensive research by 
Katherine B. Jeter has resulted in two important documents which collate a number of primary 
sources on Missouri. The most important of these for the purposes of this work are the letters of 
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the ironclad’s devoted commander, Lieutenant Jonathan H. Carter. Carter’s notes spanning the 
majority of Missouri’s largely uneventful career reveal much about operating a centerwheel 
ironclad on the Red River in Louisiana toward war’s end (Jeter 1987:263-288). 
Overseeing the gathering of materials and construction of Missouri on the trans-
Mississippi frontier was a challenging task for Carter and he was especially anxious about the 
installation of his ironclad’s machinery. He wrote to Secretary Mallory on 2 February 1863: 
“The contractors have purchased a steamboat [possibly Grand Era, but this matter remains 
unresolved] with suitable machinery. The price paid was sixty five thousand dollars” (Jeter 
1996:6). He continued on 4 April: “The machinery and boilers are on board and will be put in 
position immediately” (Jeter 1996:31). 
Apparently there was some problem causing a significant delay in installation, for on 21 
April Carter wrote: 
I am very anxious to get her machinery in position before she leaves here, as a steamboat 
to aid her will then be unnecessary. The cladding is being put on as rapidly as possible, 
and within three or four weeks I hope to have her machinery in position. (Jeter 1996:39-
40) 
 
He continued to report to Mallory fairly regularly, writing on 29 April: “The boilers are in 
position, and the remainder of the machinery will be put in place as rapidly as possible” (Jeter 
1996:40-41). This was finally done and by June 1863 construction was complete enough for 
Carter to begin to appraise Missouri’s design. On the 15th, he wrote: “As I have stated in a 
former letter, I think the centre wheel plan will prove slow, notwithstanding the power is more 
than sufficient to turn the wheel” (Jeter 1996:49-50). The ship was apparently ready for trials by 
that time. 
On 20 June 1863 the first of many letters from Carter to various Southern naval leaders 
regarding his new ironclad offered testimony of Missouri’s operational characteristics: “On the 
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17th inst., the ‘Missouri’ made a trial trip; the rate of speed obtained was six miles per hour 
upstream” (Jeter 1996:51). On 21 June he wrote a detailed order to two engineers participating in 
Missouri’s completion: 
You will answer the following interrogatories in regard to the engines, boilers, and 
machinery of the C.S. Str. “Missouri,” now being constructed at this place [Shreveport, 
Louisiana] by Messrs. Moore & Smoker. 
Int. 1st. Are the boilers of said vessel sufficiently braced? 
“     2nd. Has she the necessary “mud valves”? 
“     3rd. Should the small engine for working the capstan be over-hauled? 
“     4th. Are there any pumps for pumping out the ship? 
“     5th. Do the “exhaust valves” of the engines require grinding? 
“     6th. Are the steam pipes so short as to require what is termed a “slip” or “expansion”  
joint? 
“     7th. Is the Main Shaft sufficiently strong, and is it as good as could be done here? 
“     8th. Are the joints of the Steam pipes sufficiently tight to prevent leakage? 
“     9th. Do the cocks or pipes for supplying the boilers with water leak badly or is there 
any danger to be apprehended that said pipes will break or burst? 
“     10th. Is the cock or pipe for supplying the deck pump with water necessary, and  
should the water for supplying said pump be furnished by the cocks and pipes that supply  
the boilers? (Jeter 1996:54-55) 
 
These questions reveal a fairly complete picture of a Confederate ironclad’s typical steam 
machinery components, but because Missouri was built using riverboat parts there were 
necessarily differences between it and the harbor ironclads of the coasts. In any case, Carter 
apparently received satisfactory answers, for his ship was in full operation by autumn 1863. 
Letters pertaining to Missouri’s steam plant in actual service began on 19 September 
when Carter wrote to Mallory: “The rate of speed of the ‘Missouri’ is 5 ½ miles per hour 
[without guns]” (Jeter 1996:67). Carter was optimistic that even with the weight of guns, which 
he had had great difficulty in procuring, Missouri would steam better once it was on an even 
keel. He continued to find and fix small problems in the meantime: “The main bilge pumps are 
not as complete as should be for want of pipe” (Jeter 1996:68) and “A small boiler and engine 
has been placed in the fire room which works a steam fan, steam capstan and steam pumps” 
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(Jeter 1996:70-71). Missouri was one of only three Confederate ironclads (Atlanta and Tennessee 
were the others) known to have had forced-draft fans installed in an effort to improve their 
steaming qualities. It appears that Missouri’s speed actually was increased by this addition. 
Carter’s greatest difficulty in operating on the Red River was obtaining fuel. Many of his 
letters to superiors beginning in December 1863 relate to gathering supplies of wood. On 2 
December he wrote: “I would be glad… [to] have a lot of pine knots hauled to the river at some 
point below Alexandria for the use of the ‘Missouri’” (Jeter 1996:78) and explained further in 
another letter that same day: “Coal is not to be had and wood must be used which will be 
supplied by the ‘Cotton’ [a wooden paddlewheeler and Missouri’s tender]” (Jeter 1996:78-79). 
Missouri remained trapped for nearly a year in the upper Red River by obstructions, low 
water, and lack of fuel. It could only steam back and forth occasionally. On 20 September 1864, 
Carter wrote once again concerning his lack of adequate fuel and the important services of the 
steamer Cotton: “The ‘Missouri’ can only carry wood for one day and should it become 
necessary to use her [in battle] the services of the ‘Cotton’ will be indispensable” (Jeter 
1996:150). Unfortunately for its eager commander, Missouri never saw action and waited out the 
waning days of the Civil War near Alexandria, Louisiana. 
In late March 1865, Carter’s last letters pertaining to the functioning of his ship’s 
machinery reveal that despite all the hardships Missouri performed well. Whether this would 
have been the case under the trying circumstances of battle is open to question but it is apparent 
how much Carter attended to the needs of his ship. He especially had to maintain the steam 
pumps, for Missouri leaked excessively because of the green wood used in its construction. On 
24 March 1865, with the Civil War all but over in the East, Carter wrote to one of the engineers 
who had participated in installing Missouri’s machinery: “Will you do me the favor to cast and 
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fit a sliding valve for the steam pump of the ‘Doctor Engine’ on board the Steamer ‘Missouri’?” 
(Jeter 1996:175).  
Despite problems with leaks, Missouri continued to function well until the end. The ship 
was finally forced to surrender in June 1865. With two months of idleness yet to go on 5 April 
1865, Carter had summed up the functioning of his ironclad’s surprisingly reliable power plant: 
“The performance of the ‘Missouri’ exceeded my expectation. Her speed is much greater than I 
expected. She has made as much as ten miles per hour with a current of from two to three miles. 
Her machinery works well” (Jeter 1996:183-184). This last statement was perhaps one of the 
highest compliments that could be given regarding steam engine operations onboard any 
Confederate ironclad. 
Conclusions 
It can readily be seen that existing accounts regarding service in the engineering 
departments of the Confederate ironclads are patchy and scarce, but do offer some fascinating 
glimpses into daily life onboard. Conditions encountered by naval engineers in the early days of 
steam power were hellish, and required nearly herculean levels of strength and endurance by 
today’s standards. In battle, it has been seen that operating conditions were even worse. This 
chapter has conveyed the actual experiences of the engineers who served in those conditions and 
presented them together for perhaps the first time. Firsthand history such as this, and the men 
who fought doggedly in the midst of it, deserve to be remembered in such an unflinching 
manner. Such was the caliber of the service they gave. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: ENGINEERING SPECIFICATIONS OF 27 CONFEDERATE IRONCLADS 
Contrary to popular belief, there is a fair amount of technical data available concerning 
many of the Confederate ironclads. As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, the data is rather scattered 
but a working picture of engineering layouts is obtainable. The goal of this chapter is to list all 
relevant machinery specifications in a concise and comprehensive manner. 
By far the most valuable sources are government works: Records of the Union and 
Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (originally printed 1894-1922) and record groups 
19, 45, 56, and 109 in the National Archives in Washington, DC, and College Park, Maryland. 
Finding specific data in these extensive collections requires some intensive searching but is 
nonetheless revealing. This is particularly true of some of the lesser-known ironclads. 
Another very valuable source of information for much of the data presented in this 
chapter is the collections of the Port Columbus Civil War Naval Museum in Columbus, Georgia. 
Columbus was the most important Confederate location for the manufacture of marine steam 
machinery during the Civil War. This history still shows both in the town itself and the museum 
collections. Among the most valuable items are several detailed engineering drawings of steam 
engines manufactured for ironclads. 
Finally, Port Columbus offers one more item that is essential viewing for the Civil War 
steam engine researcher. The two horizontal single-cylinder direct-acting engines of the wooden 
gunboat CSS Chattahoochee are preserved on the museum grounds. These engines are very 
similar to those put into many ironclads and offer a firsthand glimpse at an actual Civil War 
steam plant. The only other power plant preserved from a Civil War vessel is that of the Union 
ironclad gunboat USS Cairo in Vicksburg, Mississippi. The single-cylinder inclined high-
pressure engines of Cairo were very similar to those used onboard the Confederate centerwheel 
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ironclad CSS Missouri. Therefore, data regarding the extant engines of both Chattahoochee and 
Cairo will be presented in this chapter as each pertains to one or more Confederate ironclads 
discussed in the following pages. 
Each of the 27 Confederate ironclads covered by this thesis; the conversions, early non-
standard types, Richmond-class, Tennessee-class, the Charleston-class ironclads designed by 
William Graves, large sidewheelers, diamond hull types, and the unfinished examples 
(Mississippi, Jackson, Milledgeville, and Wilmington) will be briefly discussed with detail 
regarding machinery specifications. These data include engine number and type, dimensions (in 
diameter and stroke), and notes on unusual arrangements. Similar data will be presented on 
boilers and auxiliary equipment if known. Vessels are presented in their respective groupings and 
arranged chronologically according to launch date. 
CSS Manassas (ex-Enoch Train) 
Manassas was the first armored ship to serve in the Civil War but began its career as the 
Boston Harbor towboat Enoch Train in 1855 (Holcombe 1993:21). The vessel was strongly-built 
with fine lines and completed by the famous clipper ship builder J.O. Curtis at his Medford, 
Massachusetts, yard. The steam machinery came from Harrison Loring’s famous City Point 
Works in South Boston (Silverstone 2001:152). In 1859, Enoch Train was brought to New 
Orleans for towing and dredging work. The ship’s powerful engines driving twin screws made it 
ideal for these operations in the Mississippi and were ultimately what led a group of New 
Orleans businessmen to purchase the vessel for conversion into an ironclad ram in 1861. 
Steamboat captain John A. Stevenson supervised Enoch Train’s conversion at the Algiers, 
Louisiana, shipyard of John Hughes & Co. beginning in May 1861 (Campbell 2006:48). 
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Enoch Train was renamed Manassas for the recent Confederate victory in Virginia. It 
was ultimately razed down to main deck level and given a convex wooden shield covered with 
railroad iron; only one forward-firing gun was placed within it (Holcombe 1993:22). Figure VI.1 
shows a rough sketch of the ironclad’s unusual appearance. The ship’s bow was also restructured 
into a ram. Unfortunately, the addition of the extra weight reduced Manassas’ speed 
considerably; a maximum of eight knots was only obtainable when steaming with the river 
current (Holcombe 1993:22). 
 
FIGURE VI.1. Rough 1861 sketch of Manassas by J.A. Chalaron in 1861. He had visited the 
ship while it was being converted at Algiers, Louisiana. (Online Library of Selected Images, 
Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
A fair amount of detail regarding Manassas’s machinery arrangement and specifications 
exists, although no technical drawings of it are known. The ex-towboat’s powerful and unusual 
(for the 1850s) twin-screw propulsion system drew its share of comments, especially during an 
1883 Supreme Court case involving patent infringement on dredging methods. One of Enoch 
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Train’s former operators provided details on the ship’s machinery during the hearings (U.S. 
Supreme Court 1883:107 US 192, Atlantic Works v. Brady).  
As built, Enoch Train had a registered tonnage of 385, a length between perpendiculars 
of 128 feet, and a maximum beam of 28 feet. As CSS Manassas these measurements were 
increased to 143 feet overall, 33 feet maximum beam, and an estimated 10.5-foot draft 
(Holcombe 1993:21-22). The ship was powered by two single-cylinder inclined direct-acting 
engines, each driving one three-bladed screw. The engines were low-pressure condensing with 
cylinder diameters of 36 inches and stroke of 34 (some sources say 32) inches, while the screws 
were about 9 feet in diameter. Enoch Train also was fitted with one doctor engine of unknown 
size and later, a large wrecking pump for its pre-Civil War dredging work. All the machinery 
was powered by one or two low-pressure boilers of uncertain type and size. (Mariners’ Museum 
MS006 [Folder 49]:1; U.S. Supreme Court 1883:107 US 192, Atlantic Works v. Brady) 
It appears that no modifications were made to Enoch Train’s machinery during 
conversion into Manassas, although it is only possible to speculate on this since no detailed 
records are known to exist. One interesting possibility is that Manassas’s ability to pump high-
pressure steam and scalding water over the top of the shield for repelling boarders was a result of 
modifications to the powerful wrecking pump installed during the 1859 dredging operations. 
Future archaeological excavations of the Mississippi River wreck site may reveal new data. 
CSS Virginia (ex-USS Merrimack) 
The story of CSS Virginia, more commonly known by its original U.S. Navy name 
Merrimack, has been well-told elsewhere. This most famous of Confederate ironclads has been 
the source of exhaustive study and fortunately its machinery systems are accordingly well-
known. The ship was built at the Charlestown Navy Yard in Massachusetts as the first United 
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States steam frigate USS Merrimack from July 1854 to February 1856 and made history as the 
first auxiliary steam-engined propeller-driven frigate in the world (Amadon 1988:9). Its design 
was copied in five sister ships but different engine types were used for each.  
Merrimack was powered by four vertical watertube boilers connected to two horizontal 
single-cylinder return connecting rod, or “back-acting,” engines turning a single screw. This 
machinery was in reality only intended to aid in port maneuvers in an auxiliary role to the 
frigate’s 48,757 feet of canvas. Merrimack could make 10.656 knots underway using both sail 
and engines, but only 6 using just engines (Park 2007:48). 
The massive power plant installed on Merrimack was built by West Point Foundry in 
Cold Springs, New York, one of the largest and most experienced manufacturing facilities in the 
United States before the Civil War. Merrimack’s engines were designed by West Point 
superintendent Robert P. Parrott under inspection of Chief Engineer of the U.S. Navy William H. 
Shock, but reflected the relative youth of steam engine design despite the collaborative efforts of 
some of North America’s foremost steam engineers (Bathe 1951:4). There were serious defects 
that severely hampered Merrimack’s performance during its five-year service prior to being laid 
up for a comprehensive overhaul at Norfolk in February 1860 (Amadon 1988:16). The primary 
sources of trouble appear to have been poor vacuum in the cylinders due to air leaks, poor 
arrangement of the air pumps and condensing portion of the machinery, and excessive vibration 
at speed (Park 2007:49-50). It was also eventually revealed that the engines were quite 
underpowered for the size of the ship (Bathe 1951:5). 
Merrimack’s layup at Norfolk resulted in the burning and scuttling of the vessel as Union 
forces abandoned the shipyard to the Confederates on 20-21 April 1861. Luckily for the 
Southerners, the scuttling preserved the lower half of the hull and prevented the machinery from 
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being destroyed by fire. The inability of the Confederacy to manufacture adequate steam 
machinery at the dawn of the Civil War directly led to the decision to convert Merrimack into the 
ironclad ram CSS Virginia in 1862 despite the ship’s previous lack of effective power and 
reliability. The burned-out hulk was raised and rebuilt into the prototype Confederate casemate 
ironclad and the power plant was repaired as best as possible under the circumstances. 
Considering the inherent machinery defects and traumas suffered from scuttling, it is surprising 
that Virginia performed as well as it did during its brief career. 
As built, Merrimack displaced 3,211 tons fully loaded with an overall length of 275 feet, 
a beam of 56 feet 6 inches, and a draft of about 24 feet (Amadon 1988:9). After conversion to 
CSS Virginia these measurements changed to 3,500 tons; 280 feet 9 inches in overall length; 51 
feet 2 inches in beam; and a depth of hold equal to 21 feet 5 inches resulting in a draft of about 
22 feet (Holcombe 1993:21). The machinery installed in this hull included 4 Martin vertical 
watertube boilers (Figure VI.2) 15 feet high, 14 feet wide, and 12 feet deep weighing 28 tons 
apiece (Amadon 1988:9). Brass watertubes, each 2 inches in diameter, 39 inches long, and 700 in 
number per boiler effectively transferred heat while a strong double-riveted iron shell plate 
0.375-inch thick protected the whole assembly, “…except the tube plates which were 1/2 inch 
thick” (Bathe 1951:6). The boilers operated at a maximum pressure of 16 PSI and had a total 
aggregate heating surface of 12,537 square feet (Bathe 1951:6).  
Each of Merrimack’s boilers was equipped with one feedwater heater under the floor 
plates, mercurial steam pressure gauges, simple lever safety valves, and at least one glass 
pressure gauge. In addition, the ship was fitted with two eight-inch diameter Worthington duplex 
pumps used for supplying boiler feedwater, pumping the bilges, or fighting fires. The 2 massive 
engines were low-pressure horizontal back-acting and jet-condensing with a cylinder diameter of 
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72 inches and a stroke length of 36 inches. Each cylinder was connected to the 14.5-inch 
diameter crankshaft by twin 7-inch diameter piston rods. The air pumps were 42 inches in 
diameter with a 27-inch stroke, while the steam pipes were 18 inches in diameter. The engines 
could not be operated independently. Average operating pressure for Merrimack’s engines was 
25 PSI at about 46 RPM and reverse gearing was accomplished with Stephenson’s link motion. 
Total gross effective horsepower (HP) was estimated at 869 on the propeller shaft with an 
estimated requirement of 103 HP just to turn the engines over. A further 65 HP was reputedly 
lost due to friction on the propeller shaft. Figures VI.3-VI.5 show original drafts of this massive 
iron assembly. (Bathe 1951:4-6) 
 
FIGURE VI.2. Engineering diagram of a Martin vertical watertube boiler like those placed in 
USS Merrimack / CSS Virginia (Bathe 1951: Plate II) 
 
Arrangement of Merrimack’s propulsion system was also unique due to the unusual type 
of propeller employed. The single wrought iron propeller shaft was forged in 2 sections 30 feet 
long and 13.5 inches in diameter which turned a massive 17-foot 4-inch diameter 2-bladed 
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screw. This particular design was patented by the Englishman Robert Griffiths in 1849 and 
featured adjustable blades for aid in sailing quality. It also allowed for removal of the propeller 
while underway (Bathe 1951:7). 
 
FIGURE VI.3. Engineering diagram of Merrimack / Virginia’s horizontal back-acting engines. 
Unfortunately, the connecting rods and links are quite faint. The caption reads: “U.S. Str. 
Merrimack—Front elevation and section through the Cylinder—West Point Foundry—October 
26, 1854—Scale one inch to the foot.” (Amadon 1988:12) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.4. “Steamer Merrimack—Top View—West Point Foundry—October 26, 1854—
Scale one inch to the foot.” The cylinders are at the bottom, with the connections to the single 
propeller shaft and condensers at top. (Amadon 1988:13) 
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FIGURE VI.5. End view of one of the cylinders showing double piston rods and connecting 
rods, with air pump at right and condenser at left. (Amadon 1988:14) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.6. John L. Porter’s plans of Virginia, reconfigured and redrawn by Carl D. Park, 
2005. (Park 2007:74) 
 
CSS Baltic 
Many details of this ship’s prewar service history and conversion remain obscure. A large 
portion of information on Baltic comes from the “Baltic Papers” compiled in 1938 by Clyde E. 
Wilson and held in the Alabama State Archives, but all of the relevant technical detail regarding 
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the steam machinery can be found in Union survey reports after the vessel’s capture. Baltic was 
apparently built in Philadelphia for the Southern Steamship Co. in 1860 but the manufacturer of 
the ship and its machinery is not known (U.S. Navy Department 1963 [Vol. 2]:502). As built, 
Baltic was a sidewheel river towboat 176.5 feet in length, 37.3 feet in beam, and 7.6 feet in depth 
of hold (Holcombe 1993:24). The vessel served as a cotton lighter on Mobile Bay prior to its 
1861 purchase by the Alabama state government (Still 1985:80). 
After Alabama’s secession, the state formed a committee for the purchase of a vessel to 
be converted into an ironclad. By 13 December 1861, the committee had followed the required 
specifications for a suitable vessel and purchased “…the good Steamboat called ‘The Baltic’ her 
boilers, Engines Machinery, tackle, Apparel and furniture” for the sum of $40,000 (Wilson 
1938:2). Conversion of the small lighter into an ironclad commenced quickly but little is known 
of the exact layout other than that it was cottonclad aft (Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion 1987 [Ser. 2, Vol. 1]:248). Figure VI.7 presents 
the only known contemporary depiction of Mobile’s first armored vessel. 
Baltic’s dimensions as converted were increased to 186 feet in overall length, 38 feet in 
beam, a draft of about 7 feet, and a displacement of 624 tons. The ship’s bow was lengthened 
and strengthened into a ram and four heavy guns were equipped. All of this extra weight, 
combined with that of the armor, left Baltic very slow and unmanageable. To compound the 
problem, rottenness set in and the ironclad was relegated to sideline duties only (Official 
Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 22]:226). 
Baltic had had its armor removed and was in an advanced state of disrepair by the time of 
its surrender to the U.S. Navy at Nanna Hubba Bluff on the Tombigbee River on 10 May 1865. 
A Union survey of the ship in June provided relevant data on the condition of the machinery, 
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which was apparently in good condition except the boilers. Baltic was powered by four “very old 
and leaky” horizontal double-flued boilers with flues 15 inches in diameter; each boiler was 24 
feet long and 3 feet in diameter. The furnaces could burn either wood or coal in keeping with 
standard practice of the day and the ship could carry 75 tons of fuel total. Baltic also carried a 
doctor engine for pumping and boiler feedwater purposes. (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 
1, Vol. 22]:226) 
 
FIGURE VI.7. Contemporary engraving of Baltic. The level of accuracy is uncertain due to few 
existing descriptions of the vessel as converted. (Online Library of Selected Images, Naval 
Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
Baltic’s two engines were described as inclined non-condensing, “…of the usual Western 
river type and arrangement.” Cylinder diameter was 22 inches with a 7-foot stroke, each 
independently turning a 29-foot diameter, 8-foot wide paddlewheel. All of this machinery was 
apparently in surprisingly good order considering the overall condition of the ex-ironclad. It was 
initially recommended by the Union surveyors that Baltic would once again make an excellent 
towboat with repairs to the hull, woodwork, and boilers. Nothing ever came of the proposal and 
the worn-out vessel was eventually sold (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 22]:226).  
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CSS Arkansas 
 
This early-war ironclad was one of the first vessels laid down as part of Mallory’s 
shipbuilding program. Arkansas and its never-completed sister ship Tennessee (not to be 
confused with the later, more famous Tennessee of Mobile Bay) were intended from the outset as 
offensive river and seagoing warships (Holcombe 1993:39). As such, Arkansas combined a 
heavy armament and several hybrid design features. These advantages all came to naught in the 
face of Arkansas’s unreliable engines which directly caused its loss. 
Construction on the two ships began in October 1861 at a landing near Fort Pickering 
below the strategically important Mississippi River town of Memphis, Tennessee, under contract 
to steamboat builder John T. Shirley (Still 1985:62). On 24 April 1862, the first of the two, 
christened Arkansas, was launched and hurriedly put in preparation for towing to a safer 
location. Just days later, the sister ship Tennessee was burned on the stocks as Union naval forces 
attacked Memphis. Arkansas was meanwhile towed up the Yazoo River to Greenwood, then 
Yazoo City, Mississippi. It was speedily completed despite a severe lack of materials, labor, and 
the general difficulties associated with remote location. 
Arkansas was 165 feet in length between perpendiculars, 35 feet in molded beam, and 12 
feet in depth of hold. The design was unusual in that the casemate had vertical sides and the fore 
and aft flush decks were equipped with low armored bulwarks (Holcombe 1993:40). Below the 
waterline, the hull was deep and rounded like that of a seagoing vessel; Isaac Newton Brown, 
Arkansas’s commander, wrote that the ship “…appeared as if a small seagoing vessel had been 
cut down to the water’s edge at both ends, leaving a box for guns amidships” (Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War 1991 [Vol. 3, Part 2]:572). Figure VI.8 presents a contemporary sketch. 
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FIGURE VI.8. Contemporary sketch of Arkansas by Acting Master Samuel Milliken, CSN, who 
served onboard. (Online Library of Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the 
Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
The Memphis ironclads were designed to carry 2 propellers, each 6 feet 9 inches in 
diameter and driven independently by 2 horizontal direct-acting non-condensing engines of 30-
inch diameter and 24-inch stroke. Four high-pressure boilers with 4,000 square feet of heating 
surface were provided for powering the engines at a maximum pressure of 75 to 90 PSI and a 
maximum speed of 75 to 80 RPM. Improvements were made during construction to the power 
plant by adding two more boilers for a total of six. The engine stroke was also increased to 30 
inches and the screw diameter to 8 feet. All of the machinery was produced by a local foundry of 
uncertain identity, possibly the Union Foundry & Machine Shop. (Holcombe 1993:39-40,57) 
The engines of Arkansas were ultimately its greatest weakness despite the apparent 
superiority of such a purpose-built propulsion system and the advantages of independently-
operating screws. Repeated breakdowns in the face of the enemy caused the ship to be destroyed 
by its crew. Unfortunately, no machinery plans are known to survive. Future archaeological 
survey of this famous ironclad’s wreck near Baton Rouge, Louisiana, may reveal more details. 
CSS Louisiana 
This vessel was one of strongest and most powerful ironclads built by the Confederacy, 
but rendered a failure by its unique propulsion system. Louisiana had several features that should 
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have given good service for the protection of New Orleans in early 1862, but was ultimately 
hampered by lack of experienced workmen, materials, and suitable machinery. It was designed 
and built by E.C. Murray, an early proponent of ironclads and a veteran of 20 years’ experience 
building sail and steam vessels. Murray’s design called for an extremely simple and barge-like 
shallow-draft hull surmounted by a large armored casemate pierced originally for 22 guns, 
although only 16 were ultimately carried (Holcombe 1993:47). 
Louisiana’s final dimensions upon launching at Jefferson City, Louisiana, on 6 February 
1862 were: 264 feet in overall length, 62 feet in beam, 6 feet in draft, and a displacement of 
2,751 tons (Holcombe 1993:47). The massive ship’s machinery arrangement was as unique as 
the rest of the design and appeared powerful on paper: two centerline paddlewheels and two 
smaller screw propellers under each quarter (Still 1994:53). The primary reason for this setup 
was protection from battle damage for the wheels, with the small screws to aid in maneuvering 
(Still 1994:97). No plans of Louisiana or its machinery layout are known to exist but a rough 
sketch of the ship’s general layout gives a good idea of its appearance (Figure VI.9). 
 
FIGURE VI.9. Rough plan of Louisiana based on a sketch by Commander J.K. Mitchell. (Battles 
and Leaders of the Civil War 1991 [Vol. 2, Part 1]:49) 
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Half of Louisiana’s machinery came from the large river steamer Ingomar which was 
purchased by Murray for that purpose. This vessel was a sidewheeler built at Louisville, 
Kentucky, in 1854. Ingomar displaced 730 tons at 275 feet in length, 40 feet in beam, and a draft 
of 7.5 feet. Its 2 inclined high-pressure engines each had a diameter of 28 inches with a 7-foot 
stroke (Way 1983:224). They were built by Roach & Long of Louisville (Confederate States of 
America [CSA] 1863: 378). On Louisiana each engine turned a 27-foot diameter, 19-foot wide 
paddlewheel (Holcombe 1993:48). The main paddle shafts were 24 feet long and 13 inches in 
diameter (CSA 1863:378). The other 2 engines, of unknown dimensions, were manufactured by 
Kirk & Co. of New Orleans to turn the small 4-foot diameter screws via wrought iron shafts 6.5 
inches in diameter and 18-19 feet long (CSA 1863:372,378). They were not completely installed 
until immediately prior to the ship’s destruction. Providing steam were six horizontal high-
pressure boilers of unknown dimensions taken from Ingomar (Still 1994:53). Archaeological 
investigation of the wreck site in the Mississippi River may uncover more information. 
CSS Georgia 
Like Louisiana, Georgia (sometimes called State of Georgia) was a large early example 
of Confederate ironclad construction hampered by a faulty propulsion system. The ship 
ultimately served out its existence as a floating battery stationed near Fort Jackson below 
Savannah, Georgia, and was scuttled when that city was captured on 20 December 1864. Almost 
nothing is known of Georgia’s hull construction other than that it must have been simple—build 
time was only two months (Holcombe 1993:49-50). This ironclad floating battery remains today 
on the bottom of the Savannah River and archaeological surveys have been done, but nothing 
remains of the lower hull for a totally accurate reconstruction to be made (Panamerican 
Consultants, Inc. [PCI] and Tidewater Atlantic Research [TAR] 2007:65). 
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Georgia was designed by Savannah foundryman A.N. Miller to be a self-powered 
floating battery and was laid down sometime in March 1862, probably at Harding’s Shipyard 
adjacent to Miller’s foundry (PCI and TAR 2007:8). While information on Georgia’s dimensions 
exists, it is contradictory. Stated measurements vary from 150 feet in length and 50 feet in beam 
to 250 feet in length and 60 feet in beam (Holcombe 1993:50). Several contemporary drawings 
of uncertain accuracy depict the above-water portion of the ironclad and there appears to be a 
single weathered photograph still in existence (Figure VI.10) although its current location is 
unknown (PCI and TAR 2007:11). No plans of Georgia are known to survive. 
Little information exists on the ship’s machinery other than that uncovered by 
archaeological surveys. All that was known prior was that Georgia was completed as a twin-
screw vessel with “double engines” (PCI and TAR 2007:14). They were not able to move the 
vessel at any more than two knots even with the current, but did serve the important purpose of 
keeping the pumps running for combating numerous leaks caused by green wood (Still 1985:87). 
 
FIGURE VI.10. The only known photograph of what is thought to be Georgia. Spotted at a yard 
sale, a copy was furnished to the Coastal Heritage Society in Savannah. The current location of 
the original is unknown. (Panamerican Consultants, Inc. [PCI] and Tidewater Atlantic Research 
[TAR] 2007: Title Page) 
 
The exact origin of Georgia’s machinery is not clear. It has been hypothesized that it was 
taken from another vessel but there is currently no proof of this. It also seems possible that the 
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machinery was manufactured by Miller’s foundry since he designed and built the ironclad. It has 
been revealed that Georgia’s steam machinery remains intact to some degree on the bottom of 
the Savannah River. During the course of archaeological investigations, elements of the engines, 
boiler(s), and propulsion were discovered and it is likely that more machinery is present but went 
undetected. All of the findings corroborate the description of a “double engine” given when the 
ironclad was afloat. It appears that Georgia’s 2 engines were the single-cylinder horizontal 
direct-acting type, each with a diameter of 24 inches, a length of 39.5 inches, and a piston rod 
diameter of 3 inches. Figure VI.11 shows a reconstruction of the engine layout. In addition, a 
third cylinder was found which appears to have been a condenser (Figure VI.12). This piece of 
machinery measures 9 feet 4 inches in length and 20 inches in diameter, and has attached piping 
and valve components. (PCI and TAR 2007:42-44) 
A number of disarticulated iron boiler plates, staves, rods, and firebricks were found in 
addition to the engine and condenser cylinders. The layout of these remains suggests a single 
rectangular boiler about 18 feet long, 7.5 feet in width, and very similar in design to the marine 
variant of locomotive boilers commonly used on small craft during the 19th century (Figure 
VI.13). It is unknown whether Georgia had more than one boiler. (PCI and TAR 2007:59) 
One of the propellers and a portion of shafting were also found (Figure VI.14). The 3-
bladed screw is 8 feet in diameter, with an 18-inch diameter hub and 12.5-foot long, 6-inch 
diameter shaft fragment attached. A stuffing gland and bearing are also present, denoting the 
point at which the shaft presumably passed through the hull (PCI and TAR 2007:61). 
Georgia remains one of the most obscure Confederate ironclads despite its presence in 
the archaeological record. Studies on how to best save the remains from future dredging 
operations are ongoing. 
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FIGURE VI.11. Reconstruction of Georgia’s engines based on archaeological and historical 
data. They would likely have been placed in a staggered arrangement within the hull. (PCI and 
TAR 2007:63) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.12. Reconstruction of steam condenser based on archaeological data (PCI and TAR 
2007:64) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.13. Typical mid-19th century horizontal marine firetube boiler, a variant of the 
common locomotive boiler type. (PCI and TAR 2007:60) 
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FIGURE VI.14. Reconstruction of one of Georgia’s propellers and shafting based on 
archaeological data. Note the sternpost attachment bracket, stuffing gland, and bearing. (PCI and 
TAR 2007:43) 
 
CSS Richmond 
The design of this ironclad was based largely off Naval Constructor Porter’s proposed 
1846 Pittsburgh model and ultimately became the most common among armored vessels in the 
Confederacy (Holcombe 1978:16-17). Current research indicates that over 20 vessels eventually 
incorporated Richmond’s design, although only 6 were ever finished and placed in service (Still 
1985:94). Richmond was the first completed and naturally set the trend for all the following 
ships, although there were differences in what has been collectively designated the “Richmond-
class” of Confederate ironclads. 
Richmond itself conformed closely to Porter’s original design with a length between 
perpendiculars of 150 feet, a beam of 34 feet, and a draft of 13 feet (Holcombe 1978:16). Overall 
length was approximately 174 feet, with a maximum beam over the ship’s built-on armored 
knuckle of 44 feet (Peebles 1996:10). Figure VI.15 shows the original plans of a sister ship, 
Savannah.  All the ships were armed with at least 4 guns and driven by a single 8 to 10-foot 
diameter screw. There was considerable difference in the steam machinery acquired for each 
vessel of the class. 
Richmond was launched on 6 May 1862 at the Gosport (Norfolk) Navy Yard and finished 
at its namesake, the Confederate capital. The ship was powered by two horizontal low-pressure 
marine boilers built by either Tredegar Iron Works or the Shockoe Foundry (Confederate Naval  
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FIGURE VI.15. Plans of Richmond-class ironclad Savannah redrawn by Robert Holcombe in 
1978. Machinery is not shown but these drawings give a fairly complete overview of the layout; 
Richmond and others of the class were similar if not identical. (Adapted from Still 1994:54,180) 
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Works) in Richmond (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 8]:68). Exact dimensions for 
Richmond are not known but the boilers probably conformed to the 10-foot length, 11-foot 
height, and 6-foot 9-inch diameter dimensions of the standardized type manufactured in 
Richmond and Columbus (Figure VI.16). The engine was obtained from the former Coast 
Survey ship-turned-lightship USS Arctic built at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in 1855 (Heyl [4] 
1953:13). Nothing is known about the engine other than that it was probably a single-cylinder 
vertical inverted direct-acting type like that of most tugs and small screw steamers of the time. 
Richmond was consequently a slow and unwieldy vessel like many of its sisters. Archaeological 
surveys of the ship’s remains in the James River may reveal more clues about its power plant. 
 
FIGURE VI.16. Plans of a pair of low-pressure horizontal “Scotch” marine boilers built at the 
Columbus Naval Iron Works, redrawn by Robert Holcombe in 1978. Boilers of this type were 
used in all the Richmond-class ironclads. (Courtesy of Robert Holcombe 2012) 
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CSS Chicora 
Chicora was the second Richmond-class vessel launched, on 23 August 1862 at 
Charleston, South Carolina. It was one of very few Confederate ironclads to be photographed, as 
shown in Figure VI.17. Chicora was built by J.M. Eason & Brother, who also furnished the 
ironclad’s two new boilers (of the same type as others in the class) and auxiliary machinery. The 
engine was salvaged from the 147-ton tugboat Aid, launched in August 1852 at Kensington, 
Pennsylvania. This small vessel, also known by the possible yard name Concord, was built by 
Theodore Bireay and measured 91 feet long, 22 feet wide, and 8 feet in draft. Aid’s engine was a 
single-cylinder vertical inverted direct-acting type measuring 30 inches in diameter and 28 
inches in stroke. The piston rod measured 3.5 inches in diameter, while the crank shaft was 7.25 
inches in diameter. (Mariners’ Museum MS102 [Folder 4]:94) 
 
FIGURE VI.17. The only known photograph of a Richmond-class ironclad: CSS Chicora at its 
wharf in Charleston, circa 1863. Note the ship’s hand-operated bilge pump on the after flush 
deck. (Miller 1911:239) 
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Reaney, Neafie & Co.’s Penn Works was the manufacturer of the engine as well as all 
other ironwork in the boat, including the single 2-furnace, 21-foot long, 7-foot 6-inch diameter 
return-flue boiler and single 4-bladed 8-foot diameter screw. Figure VI.18 shows a contemporary 
sketch. Materials from these latter components, especially the propeller and shafting, may have 
been reworked by Chicora’s builders for installation into the new ironclad. (Mariners’ Museum 
MS102 [Folder 4]:94) 
 
FIGURE VI.18. This sketch depicts a new boiler fitted to Aid in May 1855, as well as details of 
the reversing gear. This new boiler is of the same type as the one originally installed on the tug. 
Material from these components may have been reworked for Chicora. (Mariners’ Museum 
MS102 [Folder 4]:94) 
 
Surveys of the scuttled Charleston Squadron ironclads in July and August 1929 by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers seem to corroborate the propulsion system details of Chicora. 
The wreck believed to be this ironclad had an engine measuring 30 inches in diameter with a 26-
inch stroke, turning a 3-bladed 8-foot diameter propeller (Harris 2003:9). The slight difference in 
dimensions is probably the result of working underwater in a murky environment like Charleston 
Harbor. Figure VI.19 shows an archaeological example of a similar engine on the excavated 
wreck of a mid-1800s Savannah Harbor tug. Future surveys of the Chicora wreck site may 
uncover more details. 
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FIGURE VI.19. Partially-scavenged engine of a mid-19th century Savannah Harbor tugboat 
excavated archaeologically in 1992. Chicora’s engine, taken from the tug Aid, would have been 
quite similar. This engine has had the steam cylinder removed, although the condenser can be 
seen at left. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1992:50) 
 
CSS Palmetto State 
Palmetto State was Charleston’s second ironclad. Although laid down before Chicora it 
was not launched until 11 October 1862 (Wexler 2008:43). Palmetto State conformed closely to 
the dimensions and tonnage of the other ships in its class but was completed with an octagonal 
casemate and pilot house placed abaft the stack, shown by a contemporary watercolor in Figure 
VI.20. The reason for these design changes is unclear (Holcombe 1993:67). The ironclad was 
built by James Marsh & Son at their Charleston shipyard with the foundry of Cameron & Co. 
(formerly the Phoenix Iron Works) building and supplying Palmetto State’s boilers and auxiliary 
machinery (Wexler 2008:39). Presumably the ship’s boilers were two of the same standardized 
kind fitted to the other Richmond-class vessels. 
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FIGURE VI.20. Contemporary watercolor of Palmetto State by Charles C. Cawson, circa 1862. 
(Online Library of Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 
Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
Like Chicora, Palmetto State’s engines were taken from another small ship. This was the 
South Carolina State Navy gunboat CSS Lady Davis, a single-screw iron-hulled tugboat 
(originally named James Gray) of 161 tons launched on 15 February 1857 at Philadelphia. This 
boat, also identified by the possible yard name Tompkins, measured 87 feet in length, 22 feet in 
beam, and 9 feet 5 inches in draft. The manufacturer of the hull and power plant was Reaney, 
Neafie & Co., Philadelphia’s largest ship and engine builder. The engines were 2 single-cylinder 
horizontal direct-acting ones measuring 30 inches in diameter and 26 inches in stroke, with a 
piston rod diameter of 3.5 inches. Figure VI.21 shows a sketch of the machinery layout. 
(Mariners’ Museum MS102 [Folder 5]:211) 
 
FIGURE VI.21. Sketch of general arrangement of James Gray’s hull and machinery, with the 
single boiler forward and twin horizontal engines placed 35 feet forward of the stern. (Mariners’ 
Museum MS102 [Folder 5]:211) 
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It is also noted that James Gray was equipped with 2 force pumps 2.5 inches in diameter 
and 26 inches in stroke. Steam was supplied by a single cylindrical 2-furnace firetube boiler 18 
feet long and 10 feet in diameter (Figure VI.22). Power was delivered to the engines at 30 PSI, 
which turned a 4-bladed, 8-foot diameter screw at 63 RPM. It is likely that some of these 
materials were adapted for use in Palmetto State. Future archaeological investigations of the 
ironclad’s wreck in Charleston Harbor may reveal more information in this regard. 
 
FIGURE VI.22. Sketch of low-pressure horizontal firetube boiler installed on James Gray. This 
layout was typical of 19th-century tugs, and some of its components may have been used in the 
construction of Palmetto State. (Mariners’ Museum MS102 [Folder 5]:211) 
  
CSS North Carolina 
North Carolina was the first ironclad built for the defense of the Confederacy’s most 
important blockade runner port, Wilmington. It is surprising to consider, therefore, that a vessel 
built for such an important station was destined to be the most decrepit Richmond-class ironclad 
commissioned (Holcombe 1978:17). The ship was built across the Cape Fear River from 
Wilmington on Eagles Island at the shipyard of Beery & Bros. and completed in June 1863 
(Watts 1999:13). North Carolina’s layout was apparently quite similar to others of its class—
archaeological surveys in 1993 and 1995 have contributed greatly to the scarce historical details 
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in this regard. Hart & Bailey Iron Works, Wilmington’s largest foundry, also built and installed 
the boilers and auxiliary equipment (Watts 1999:12). Once again, it seems that the boilers of 
North Carolina were two of the standard type used in the other Richmond-class ships. 
The primary reason for North Carolina’s unsatisfactory career was its secondhand 
engine, taken from the ex-Lake Erie tugboat Uncle Ben. This small 155-ton vessel was built in 
Buffalo, New York, in 1856 but had been captured and was serving as a Confederate gunboat at 
Wilmington (Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships 1963 [Vol. 2]:577). Nothing is 
known about its engine other than that it was too weak to propel North Carolina effectively 
(Watts 1999:13). It was probably the typical single-cylinder vertical inverted type commonly 
equipped to vessels like Uncle Ben.  
North Carolina was used as a floating battery near Smithville, but the abundance of 
saltwater near the Cape Fear River’s mouth allowed shipworms access to its unprotected bottom. 
The problem so badly deteriorated that eventually the pumps could not keep up and 
Wilmington’s first ironclad sank in shallow water. Most of the armor was removed in 1864 and 
1868. The ship’s machinery was also salvaged at an unknown time and in 1871 the majority of 
the remains were destroyed by fire (Watts 1999:14). Only the very bottom of North Carolina’s 
hull is left as an archaeological site as seen in Figure VI.23. 
CSS Raleigh 
Raleigh was the second vessel to be built in Wilmington but was not constructed in the 
same yard as its sister North Carolina. These two ironclads could not have been more different 
despite being of the same class and built in the same city—North Carolina was a poorly-built 
and slow failure, while Raleigh turned out to be a fine example of a Richmond-class ironclad 
during its all-too-brief career. The ship was built at the shipyard of J.L. Cassidy & Sons at the 
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FIGURE VI.23. Archaeological site plan of the wreck of North Carolina, with bow at top. Only 
the flat portion of the hull below the turn of the bilge is preserved. No evidence of engine mounts 
survives; the only large iron artifact remaining is the rudder, at bottom. The two iron water tanks 
shown in the plan were destroyed between 1994 and 1999. The archaeological investigation only 
surveyed the starboard side. (Watts 1999:17) 
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foot of Church Street in Wilmington. Like North Carolina it closely followed in design and 
layout the other vessels of its class, but was apparently much better-built and had a lighter draft. 
In addition, greater trouble was gone to in order to find reliable motive power for Raleigh. The 
engines ultimately used were found to be the single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting type called 
for in the original plans. Figure VI.24 shows an engine room section through the wreck site. 
(Peebles 1996:35, 99-100) 
 
FIGURE VI.24. Archaeological section of the wreck of Raleigh, looking toward the bow. The 
survey only covered the starboard side but the engines (shown here), bits of the propeller shaft, 
rudder, and propeller were located and measured. (Peebles 1996:103) 
 
Raleigh’s two horizontal low-pressure boilers and auxiliary machinery appear to have 
been manufactured and installed by the Clarendon Iron Works of Wilmington (Combs 1996:63). 
The exact source of the steam engines remains unclear. Initial attempts to procure a power plant 
from the wrecked blockade runner Modern Greece failed, so new engines of the preferred 
horizontal type were sought (Peebles 1996:35). Those put in Raleigh appear to have been built in 
Richmond, but whether they were built specifically for the ironclad is still open for debate. 
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Fortunately, Raleigh is preserved in the archaeological record due to its accidental 
grounding in the Cape Fear River near Fort Fisher on 7 May 1864. Investigations in 1993 and 
1994 revealed that its engines remain. They measure 24 inches in diameter with a 3-foot stroke. 
Each cylinder had a three-foot square built-in valve chamber and rested on concrete blocks 
instead of more usual wood ones. Piston rod diameter was 3 inches and connecting rod diameter 
4 inches, while propeller shaft diameter was 9 inches. Future investigations of the well-preserved 
wreck may finally uncover information on the true source of the engines.  
CSS Savannah 
The last example of a Richmond-class ironclad to be completed was constructed in the 
important port of Savannah, Georgia, and named for that city. Savannah was built at the shipyard 
of H.F. Willink and closely followed all its sister ships in design and layout. It was launched on 4 
February 1863, and the Columbus Naval Iron Works manufactured the engines and boilers 
(Holcombe 1978:18). These conformed to the other vessels of the class in layout, but much more 
information exists concerning Savannah’s power plant because of the fortunate survival of its 
engineering plans in the collections of the Port Columbus Civil War Naval Museum. These plans 
offer a nearly-complete look at the ironclad’s layout (Figures VI.25 and VI.26). 
Records indicate that Savannah’s engines were originally intended for a 150-foot gunboat 
built at Milton, Florida, but when that project was cancelled Secretary Mallory ordered them 
transferred to the ironclad then building in Georgia (National Archives RG 45 [Area 8 File]: 
Frame 0258). Measurements taken from the surviving engineering drawings show that 
Savannah’s 2 horizontal single-cylinder direct-acting engines were 28 inches in bore diameter 
(34.5 inches in external cylinder diameter) with a 20-inch stroke. Unlike the purpose-built 
engines of Raleigh, which were also probably obtained from an unfinished wooden gunboat, 
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FIGURE VI.25. Plans of inboard profile of Savannah showing machinery configuration and 
layout, redrawn by Robert Holcombe. Note the location of the pilot’s hatch directly over the 
engine room and behind the stack, possibly offering greater ease of communication during battle 
maneuvers. (Courtesy of Robert Holcombe 2012) 
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 Savannah’s valve chambers were on top of the cylinders. It appears that reverse motion was 
accomplished by the tried-and-true Stephenson’s valve gear. The propeller shaft was 50.3 feet 
long, 8 inches in diameter, and manufactured in 5 sections. Savannah’s 2 boilers were of the 
preferred horizontal firetube type installed on others of its class. They measured 7 feet 10 inches 
in diameter, 11 feet 2 inches in length, and 12 feet in height. 
 
FIGURE VI.26. Plans of engine room cross-section of Savannah. The connecting rods, 
eccentrics, and links for the reversing gear can be seen on the propeller shaft. Note the engineer’s 
platform with throttle wheel and other controls at berth deck level on the left. (Still 1985:103) 
 
It is fortunate that Savannah’s detailed machinery plans survive, because although the 
ironclad was scuttled in December 1864 and survives in the archaeological record, it was heavily 
salvaged in the 1890s. In those operations, the ship’s boilers and machinery were removed (Judy 
Wood 2011, elec. comm.). There appears to be little left at the wreck site, but future 
archaeological investigations are needed to verify its overall layout and condition. 
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CSS Tennessee 
Tennessee was built by Henry D. Bassett at Selma and finished in Mobile, Alabama. It 
was another Confederate ironclad forced to rely on secondhand machinery. This powerful ship 
was launched on 28 February 1863 but not finished until a year later due to shortages of men, 
materials, and modifications made during construction (Still 1985:192,195). As completed, 
Tennessee differed from the original design in having a shorter octagonal casemate with six 
guns. Dimensions were 217 feet in overall length, 209 feet length on deck, 48 feet in beam, and 
an average draft of 14 feet (Holcombe 1993:71-72; Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 
21]:547). Fortunately, several photographs exist of Tennessee after its capture by the U.S. Navy 
in August 1864 (Figure VI.27). 
 
FIGURE VI.27. Circa 1865 photograph of Tennessee off New Orleans after its capture and 
induction into the U.S. Navy. (Online Library of Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, 
Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
At the time of Tennessee’s construction no adequate engines could be built, so salvaged 
machinery was instead substituted (Still 1985:191). It has been widely stated, presumably 
beginning with the Union survey report, that this machinery came from the river steamer Alonzo 
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Child. The dimensions of that vessel’s engines do not match those of Tennessee, nor does the 
time of their removal fit with time of installation on the ironclad (Still 1985:191-192). As 
previously discussed, it appears instead that the engines came from the river steamer Vicksburg. 
This vessel was a 635-ton sidewheeler 244.5 feet in length and 36 feet in beam with a draft of 7.5 
feet built at New Albany, Indiana, in 1857 (Way 1983:468). It was powered by 5 boilers and two 
24-inch diameter engines with a 7-foot stroke. These numbers fit with those given in the survey 
report of Tennessee (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 21]:548-549). 
The official report on Tennessee described the engines as being the typical single-
cylinder non-condensing riverboat type with poppet valves, placed fore and aft in the ship. In 
order to make them effectively turn Tennessee’s single 12-foot diameter screw they were 
“…geared to an idler shaft by spur gearing with wooden teeth, and from the idler shaft to the 
propeller shaft by bevel cast-iron gear”. This interesting and surprisingly reliable arrangement is 
shown in Figure VI.28.  
FIGURE VI.28. Plans of Tennessee’s improvised propulsion system, redrawn by Robert 
Holcombe in 1982. The original was donated to the Port Columbus Civil War Naval Museum by 
descendants of Samuel J. Whiteside, a civilian engineer who was involved in the installation of 
the machinery. Note the large wooden gear wheels used to connect the horizontal paddlewheel 
engines to the single propeller shaft. (Courtesy of Robert Holcombe 2012) 
 
The ship’s 4 boilers were of the horizontal flue type and 24 feet long with a single 
furnace under all of them (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 21]:548-549). Tennessee 
was also unusual among Confederate ironclads in that it was fitted with a mechanical blower (or 
forced-draft fan) to assist in drawing the fires for better steaming. The only other Southern 
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ironclads so equipped were CSS Atlanta and Missouri (Still 1985:101). Nothing remains of 
Tennessee in the archaeological record, for following its U.S. Navy service the famous vessel 
was sold for scrap on 27 November 1867 (Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships 1963 
[Vol. 2]:574). 
CSS Columbia 
Columbia was the much-modified sister ship of Tennessee and was one of the most 
powerful vessels commissioned by the Confederates, with an armament of four pivot and two 
broadside guns (Holcombe 1993:74). This ironclad was built by Francis M. Jones at 
Charleston—laid down in December 1862 and launched on 10 March 1864 (Holcombe 
1993:72,88). Columbia was modified in the course of construction to a refined knuckle shape: 
instead of sloping back from the waterline to main deck level as on other ironclads, the new 
design continued to flare up to main deck level (Figure VI.29).  
 
FIGURE VI.29. Lines of CSS Columbia, “Iron clad six gun boat, Length between Perpendiculars 
189 [feet], Extreme 213, Beam 34, Draft 15, Tonnage 1015, Dispcmt [displacement] 1520 tons, 
John L. Porter, C.S.N.C.” Note the improved casemate and knuckle layout superimposed over 
the old design. (Still 1987:60) 
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This improved layout increased seaworthiness and gundeck room, allowing more pivot 
guns to be carried (Holcombe 1993:74). Columbia was also originally designed to be driven by 2 
propellers (Figure VI.30) but was finished with a single 3-bladed screw 10 feet 8 inches in 
diameter turning on an 8-inch diameter shaft (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 2, Vol. 
1]:251). All of these design changes resulted in an ironclad 215.78 feet in length and 48.5 feet in 
beam, with a draft of 13.5 feet (Holcombe 1993:73). Figure VI.31 shows the inboard profile. 
 
FIGURE VI.30. Columbia’s original layout with two propellers. (Holcombe 1993:74) 
 
Columbia’s power plant was brand new and manufactured specifically for the ship by the 
Columbus Naval Iron Works (Turner 1999:158). Five 5-flued horizontal boilers 22 feet long and 
4 feet wide, for a total grate area of 129 square feet, with a lower flue diameter of 12 inches and 
an upper one of 10.5 inches powered 2 non-condensing horizontal single-cylinder engines of 36-
inch diameter and 24-inch stroke (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 2, Vol. 1]:251). Columbia 
was never effectively tested in Confederate service, for just days after commissioning in January 
1865 the ship ran hard aground on a sunken wreck in Charleston Harbor. The ship seemed to 
severely crack its keel and was abandoned. Later, the Union surveyed and salvaged the powerful 
ironclad in April 1865, after which Columbia was taken to Norfolk (Dictionary of American 
Naval Fighting Ships 1963 [Vol. 2]:510). It was laid up and later scrapped. 
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FIGURE VI.31. Inboard profile of Columbia, showing machinery layout. (Coker 1987:233) 
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CSS Charleston 
 
Very little is known about the machinery of the third ironclad to be constructed in 
Charleston. Charleston was built by the firm of J.M. Eason & Brother, who began construction 
in December 1862 (Wexler 2008:64). The design of this ironclad is attributed to Acting Naval 
Constructor William A. Graves and is notable chiefly for its flat floors and soft bilge turns 
compared to Porter’s designs as well as an unusually long protruding ram. Figure VI.32 shows 
plans of the original design of Charleston, although during construction the ship was modified to 
carry two pilothouses (one forward and one aft) and the casemate was changed to the simpler 
four-sided layout. In addition, the upper bow was modified for carrying a spar torpedo. The end 
product of all this was a large ironclad measuring 180 feet between perpendiculars, 201 feet 
overall, 44 feet in extreme beam, 14 feet in depth of hold, and a little over 12 feet in draft 
(Holcombe 1993:77-79).  
Charleston was apparently finished in early 1863 and commissioned on 19 August of that 
year. The ship was driven by a single nine-foot diameter screw powered by one or two direct-
acting low-pressure engines which pushed Charleston along at approximately six miles per hour. 
The number and type of boilers are unknown. All of the existing information presented here 
comes from an August 1863 entry in the John Horry Dent Papers, a restricted collection kept by 
the University of Alabama. No other information on Charleston’s machinery or its source has 
been found. It is likely that the ship’s builder, the Eason foundry, manufactured it. Charleston 
was blown up along with the other Charleston Squadron ironclads to prevent capture in February 
1865. Like those vessels, it lies in shallow but dark, polluted, and heavily traveled waters. Future 
dedicated archaeological investigation of the wreck site in this difficult environment may 
uncover more details. 
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FIGURE VI.32. Plans of Charleston, drawn from a half-model located at the Navy Department 
in Richmond, 1865. The model is one of two located in the U.S. Naval Academy Collection at 
the Smithsonian Institution. (Coker 1987:230) 
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CSS Virginia II 
The second Confederate ironclad named Virginia was quite similar to Charleston as 
originally designed by Graves. Due to wartime experience and delays in construction, the final 
product ended up being quite different and resulted in the most powerful ironclad commissioned 
by the Confederacy. Virginia II was modified to carry a shorter, stronger octagonal casemate for 
four guns and additional armor—six inches in thickness on the sides and eight on the ends. In 
addition, cambered and sloped flush decks just forward and aft of the casemate were installed. 
These provided more ablative and angled armored surfaces for projectiles to glance off. 
Fortunately, all these design changes can be seen in the surviving blueprint drawings of the ship 
as shown in Figure VI.33. (Holcombe 1993:81) 
Virginia II was built at the site commonly referred to as “Graves’s Yard” directly across 
the James River from the more prominent Rocketts yard east of downtown Richmond (Coski 
2005:237). William Graves, the ship’s designer, had direct control over its construction from 
keel laying to launch on 29 June 1863 (Coski 2005:86). Virginia II differed slightly from 
Charleston in measurements: 203 feet long overall, 48.5 feet in beam, and a 14-foot draft 
(Holcombe 1993:90). Its general hull form remained the same. 
There is some uncertainty about the provenance and final layout of Virginia II’s power 
plant. Several records suggest that the ironclad’s machinery was built new either at Tredegar Iron 
Works or the Shockoe Foundry (Confederate Naval Works) just a few miles away from the 
shipyard (Coski 2005:72). The most prominent of these sources are Official Records, Navies 
(1987 [Ser. 2, Vol. 2]:269), and Dew (1987:122,265). The Virginia II plans also appear to show 
2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting engines approximately 40 inches in diameter and 38 
inches in stroke that were of the typical design manufactured for several ironclads. Overhead  
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FIGURE VI.33. 1863 plans of Virginia II, showing machinery layout in addition to hull 
construction. It is not known if this view represents final configuration of the engines. Several 
other details are unclear. Fortunately, the boilers are shown much more clearly. (Online Library 
of Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
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valve chests like those on Raleigh’s engines can be seen as well. Despite all this evidence,  a 25 
April 1865 survey report made by Commander William Radford, USN, of the captured 
Confederate Naval Works lists “One pair of double engines, 30” cylinder and 28” stroke, high 
pressure and similar to those used on Ram Virginia [II]” (National Archives RG 45 [PN File]: 
Roll 42). “Double engine” in 19th-century parlance generally meant a two-cylinder engine, 
lending credence to reports of Virginia II carrying British engines (Still 1994:67). British and 
Scottish manufacturers were the world leaders in iron construction for both hulls and engines by 
the 1860s. Twin-cylinder engines were successfully employed by them long before the type was 
common in the United States. 
According to the surviving plans of Virginia II and assuming they can be trusted in 
regards to boiler if not engine layout, the ship was powered by 2 horizontal boilers with 2 
furnaces each. The boilers were 22 feet long, 8 feet in diameter, and 9 feet high. Propulsion was 
provided by a single 10-foot diameter screw turning at the end of a 54-foot long, 11-inch 
diameter shaft. 
Virginia II still exists as an archaeological resource in the James River near Drewry’s 
Bluff due its destruction on the night of 2-3 April 1865 (Coski 2005:220). Future archaeological 
investigation may finally be able to resolve the question of its engine type. 
CSS Nashville 
Nashville was the only Confederate ironclad completed to take advantage of the 
availability of sidewheel riverboat machinery. Four such ironclads were originally contracted for 
but only Nashville was placed into service (Holcombe 1993:83). Contemporary sketches reveal 
its key design features (Figure VI.34), but no builders’ drafts are known to exist. Fortunately, a 
Union survey of the captured Nashville provides significant details of the machinery layout. 
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FIGURE VI.34. Contemporary drawing, circa 1865, of the large sidewheel ironclad Nashville 
(Online Library of Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 
Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
This ironclad was constructed at Montgomery, Alabama, by J.E. Montgomery and A. 
Anderson and was one of the largest in the Confederacy. Nashville measured 271 feet long 
overall with a hull beam of 62 feet, beam over the paddleboxes of 95.5 feet, 13-foot depth of 
hold, and a draft of 10 feet 9 inches (Holcombe 1993:83,91). It was taken downriver after its 
launch in May or June 1863 for completion at Mobile, but the usual lack of materials and labor 
severely delayed progress (Still 1985:195). Not least among these problems was an almost total 
lack of iron plating for armor and the new ship’s increasingly-apparent structural weakness due 
to sheer size. Enough armor to cover the fore and aft casemate ends and pilot house was obtained 
from the rotten Baltic but even with this light covering, extensive use of hogging trusses and 
chains, and a reduced armament of three guns, Nashville continued to hog (Holcombe 1993:83). 
It was eventually surrendered at Nanna Hubba Bluff on the Tombigbee River, 40 miles above 
Mobile, along with several other vessels on 8 May 1865 (Still 1985:226).  
Two Union reports, one by Rear-Admiral H.K. Thatcher, USN, and another by Acting 
Volunteer Lieutenant George P. Lloyd, USN, described Nashville’s power plant. There are some 
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minor discrepancies: Thatcher listed the engines (1 per wheel) as 30 inches in diameter with a 9-
foot stroke while Lloyd listed the cylinder diameter as 32 inches (Official Records, Navies 1987 
[Ser. 1, Vol. 22]:225; Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies 
1999 [Part 3, Vol. 3]:320). These numbers may represent bore diameter versus outside diameter 
of the engine cylinders. Nashville’s 7 boilers were reported as being of the double-flued type, 30 
feet long and either 40 inches (as reported by Thatcher) or 42 inches in diameter (as reported by 
Lloyd). Lloyd’s report also listed the paddlewheels as 28 feet in diameter and 12 feet wide 
(Official Records, Armies 1999 [Part 3, Vol. 3]:320). 
There is some uncertainty about the source of Nashville’s machinery, largely due to the 
confusion in Union reports between this ironclad and the propeller-driven Tennessee. At least 
two reports state that the river steamer Vicksburg’s engines were used for Nashville (Official 
Records, Armies 1999 [Part 3, Vol. 3]:320; Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 20]:735). 
It has already been discussed that the given dimensions of Vicksburg’s engines and the time of 
their removal fit with the available data for Tennessee. Fortunately, evidence also exists for the 
source of Nashville’s engines in yet another Union statement confusing Nashville with 
Tennessee. That report suggests they came from a wrecked Yazoo River steamboat (Official 
Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 25]:653). The only vessel in that river with machinery 
salvaged by the Confederates and with matching engine dimensions was the large sidewheeler 
Magenta, a wooden packet of 782 tons built at New Albany, Indiana, in 1861. Magenta was 265 
feet long, 40 feet in beam, and 8.5 feet in draft (Way 1983:302). Given specifications for the 
engines and boilers fit with those reported onboard Nashville.  
Dimensions of the steamer Capitol’s machinery also match those of Nashville. Capitol 
was a fast sidewheel packet built in 1854 at Jeffersonville, Indiana. The vessel measured 224 feet 
220 
 
long, 32 feet wide, and 6 feet in draft (Way 1983:71). The Confederates salvaged the ship’s 
machinery after Capitol was burned to prevent capture at Liverpool, Mississippi, in June 1862 
(Warner 1864:229; National Archives RG 45 [AC File]: Roll 6). 
CSS Tuscaloosa 
This obscure ironclad was built in Selma, Alabama, by Henry D. Bassett and launched on 
7 February 1863 (Still 1985:192). No plans of Tuscaloosa have been identified, but a single draft 
labeled “Gun Boat No. 1 with Prattville Engines” appears to depict a never-completed sister ship, 
one of the Tombigbee River ironclads (Figure VI.35).  
 
FIGURE VI.35. Partial plan view, inboard profile, and transverse sections of “Gunboat No. 1 
with Prattville Engines”, redrawn by Robert Holcombe in 1976. Note the four Western river-type 
boilers and four engines, as well as the unusual chine construction, reminiscent of Western 
riverboats. Tuscaloosa and Huntsville are thought to have been constructed in a similar manner. 
(Courtesy of Robert Holcombe 2012) 
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Recent research has revealed that this vessel is probably not Tuscaloosa as originally 
thought; the unusual machinery and contemporary accounts provide the evidence (Buchanan 
1863:Folder 2; Holcombe 1993:95-96). Measurements taken from the drawing show a diamond 
hull ironclad 43.5 feet in beam and 10.5 feet in depth of hold, with an estimated length between 
perpendiculars of 160 feet on a 9-foot draft (Holcombe 1993:93). These dimensions approximate 
those generally attributed to Tuscaloosa in contemporary accounts.  
Tuscaloosa’s machinery source is better-documented. Like Tennessee it was originally 
intended that the machinery for this vessel be built by the Columbus Naval Iron Works but there 
was not time or materials available to prepare purpose-built engines (Still 1985:191). Instead, 
high-pressure riverboat machinery from the steamer Chewala was reworked for Tuscaloosa 
(Turner 1999:145). Chewala was a 372-ton sternwheeler built in 1852 at Brownsville, 
Pennsylvania (Neville 1961:42). Its engines and boilers were taken out and the engines were 
geared to Tuscaloosa’s propeller shafts. If the “Gun Boat No. 1” draft indeed represents a sister 
vessel to Tuscaloosa, its machinery would have had similar dimensions if not so complicated a 
layout. “Gun Boat No. 1” is unusual for its 4 single-cylinder engines of 30-inch diameter and 
10.25-foot stroke turning twin 7.75-foot diameter propellers. Steam was supplied by 4 boilers 
3.25 feet in diameter and 19.5 feet long. Tuscaloosa itself had two engines and an unknown 
number of boilers from Chewala. 
While the geared engine arrangement worked for Tennessee, Tuscaloosa’s was a failure. 
The ironclad could not make more than 2 or 3 knots even with 125 pounds of steam pressure 
(Still 1985:194). Consequently it served out the war as little more than a floating battery and was 
scuttled at the confluence of the Mobile and Spanish rivers on 12 April 1865 by the retreating 
Confederates (Still 1985:224-225). The wreck was located in 1983 but exploratory surveys of the 
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seemingly well-preserved remains failed to uncover anything new (Holcombe 1993:95). Future 
in-depth investigation of this valuable Civil War archaeological resource has the potential to 
uncover a wealth of new data. 
CSS Huntsville 
It appears that Huntsville was nearly identical to Tuscaloosa, but even less is known 
about this second Selma ironclad. Huntsville was built alongside Tuscaloosa and launched the 
same day. The ship was less complete than Tuscaloosa when launched and had to be towed to 
Mobile minus its boilers and engines (Still 1985:191). The origin and type of power plant 
eventually supplied by the Columbus Naval Iron Works is unknown—all that is stated is that it 
was a high-pressure system taken from a riverboat (Official Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 
21]:363). The machinery may have come from John C. Calhoun, which was salvaged by the 
Confederates after a disastrous explosion (Way 1983:250; Mueller 1990:102). This vessel was 
built in 1859 at West Brownsville, Pennsylvania, and displaced 165 tons (Way 1983:250). Its 
engines supposedly matched those of Chewala, source of Tuscaloosa’s machinery.  
During trials, Huntsville performed just as poorly as Tuscaloosa. It presumably used the 
same geared layout as its sister ship. Also like Tuscaloosa, the ironclad was relegated to a 
floating battery and later scuttled on 12 April 1865. Their well-preserved wrecks lie close 
together near Mobile, awaiting further investigation. 
CSS Albemarle 
The shallow-draft diamond hull ironclad type was well-suited to the rivers and sounds of 
coastal North Carolina and the most famous example, Albemarle, was completed in that state. 
This vessel and its sisters differed from Tuscaloosa and Huntsville based on considerable 
surviving evidence. A simplified, hexagonal design with integrated casemate and shallow keel 
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was laid out by Porter. Albemarle was the first of these ironclads to be completed and closely 
followed this pattern. The design was 139 feet long between perpendiculars, 155 feet long 
overall, 34 feet in beam, 9 feet in depth of hold, and 6.5 feet of draft (Holcombe 1993:96-99). 
Albemarle was laid down near the Roanoke River at Edward’s Ferry, North Carolina, in 
early January 1862 under contract to Colonel William F. Martin and Lieutenant Gilbert Elliott, 
CSA (Holcombe 1993:96). The ship was launched incomplete 15 months later, on 6 October 
1863. Some damage to the keel was incurred, but the small ironclad was towed downstream to 
Halifax, North Carolina, and completed there in April 1864. The finishing touches were still 
being put on even as Albemarle was commissioned on 17 April and steamed downriver to attack 
Federal forces at Plymouth (Elliott 2005:115,166). The ironclad’s final design differed from the 
original plans with an overall length of 158 feet, extreme beam of 35 feet 3 inches, on-deck 
width of 32 feet, 8 feet 2 inch depth of hold, and loaded draft of 9 feet (Elliott 1993:164). These 
dimensions come from an 18 May 1864 Union survey of the captured ship (Figures VI.36-38). 
 
FIGURE VI.36. Original photograph of Albemarle sunk in the Roanoke River; the caption reads, 
“Rebel Ram ‘Albemarle’ sunk at Plymouth, N.C. Oct. 27-28 1864 by Cushing et als [sic]. Photo 
by W.B. Rose for J. Smith [?] of New Bern, N.C. The back ground is of swamp & woods 
directly opposite Plymouth—view taken from wharf at Plymouth.” (Online Library of Selected 
Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
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FIGURE VI.37. Photograph of the salvaged Albemarle at the Norfolk Navy Yard, circa 1865. 
The vessel is riding high in the water due to the removal of its armor. (Online Library of Selected 
Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.38. Close-up bow view of Albemarle at Norfolk. Note the lack of iron armor and 
dislodged casemate face at left—a result of the Confederate abandonment and attempted 
destruction of the ironclad after its sinking in October 1864. (Online Library of Selected Images, 
Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
Other sources suggest that the length was decreased slightly to 152 or 153 feet. The four 
corner gunports were also not cut, leaving only six total (Holcombe 1993:99). Figure VI.39 
shows the original plans, where the differences from the finished product can be readily seen. 
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FIGURE VI.39. Original plans of Albemarle, showing boilers and gundeck arrangement. Note 
the quarter-panel gunports, eliminated on Albemarle but kept on Neuse. (Online Library of 
Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
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Albemarle’s machinery was well-documented due to its sinking and salvage by the Union 
in 1864, although the source remains a mystery. It has been variously listed as having been 
manufactured new by the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, reworked from a sawmill engine, 
or even built from scratch (Scharf 1887:404; Elliott 2005:141-142). The exact source will likely 
remain a mystery due to Albemarle’s sale in 1867 (Elliott 2005:267). 
The Union report described Albemarle’s 2 engines in detail as the non-condensing 
horizontal type, 18 inches in cylinder diameter with a 19-inch stroke and geared to twin 3-bladed 
6-foot diameter propellers by 4 gear wheels. These measured 2 feet 9.5 inches in diameter at the 
pitch line and the pinions measured 2.5 feet in diameter. Powering the engines were 2 vertical 
watertube boilers with 1 furnace each, 15 feet 4 inches in length, 5 feet 2 inches in height, and 4 
feet 7 inches in diameter. The furnaces measured 4 feet 6 inches in length and 4 feet in width, 
while the flues were 1 foot 9 inches high and 9 inches in diameter. Each boiler was equipped 
with 120 watertubes and a steam drum 2 feet 8 inches in diameter and 1 foot 6 inches high. The 
report also made note that all the pipes and steam lines were made of cast iron (Elliott 2005:274). 
CSS Neuse 
Neuse was very similar to Albemarle, but generally conformed more closely to the 
original plans (Holcombe 1993:100). This is seen in a contemporary sketch (Figure VI.40). The 
ship was laid down at Whitehall (now Seven Springs) on the Neuse River in October 1862 and 
completed by Thomas S. Howard and Elijah W. Ellis. During construction, concerns over the 
ship’s draft led to a significant reduction in armor plate. Changes were otherwise minimal, and 
Neuse was launched in mid-March 1863. Its completion was delayed by materials shortages after 
being towed downstream to Kinston. The extremely makeshift nature of this ironclad’s steam 
machinery reflects the difficulties encountered by the Confederates. (Bright et al. 1981:8,150). 
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FIGURE VI.40. Contemporary sketches of Neuse by Lieutenant Richard H. Bacot, showing lack 
of armor on horizontal surfaces, an attempt to minimize draft. (Bright et al. 1981:159) 
 
The source of Neuse’s two engines is uncertain—they may have come from Richmond, 
but are also listed as having come from Pugh’s Mill in New Bern, North Carolina (Official 
Records, Navies 1987 [Ser. 1, Vol. 23]:290). It seems more likely that the engines were obtained 
from the same source as Neuse’s single 15-foot long boiler: a Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 0-8-0 
“mud digger” steam locomotive (Bright et al. 1981:153). The locomotive is thought to be No. 34 
“Gladiator”, built in 1844. If the engines indeed were the scavenged cylinders of this locomotive, 
they would have measured 17 inches in diameter with a 24-inch stroke (Bell 1912:57). Although 
Neuse was scuttled on 12 March 1865, it is unknown what happened to the machinery due to 
postwar salvage (Bright et al. 1981:153). Several conflicting accounts exist (Bright et al. 
1981:153; Campbell 2009:58-59). 
The wreck of Neuse was excavated and raised from 1961 to 1966. It is one of only three 
Civil War ironclads so preserved and is on display in Kinston, North Carolina. Unfortunately, the 
salvage effort resulted in the destruction of large portions of the wreck (Figures VI.41 and 42), 
but enough of the lower hull has been preserved for valuable construction information to be 
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learned (Figure VI.43). Archaeological evidence in the form of wooden mounting blocks for the 
engines and boiler shows that the engines were mounted next to each other on the starboard side 
to balance the weight of the boiler to port and must have been geared to the twin propeller shafts. 
The gearing arrangement was probably similar to that on Albemarle. 
 
FIGURE VI.41. When first excavated, Neuse was largely intact, and large portions of the 
casemate base were preserved along with the ironclad’s knuckle and main deck. (Bright et al. 
1981:22) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.42. The salvage effort resulted in the destruction of large portions of the wreck by 
mishandling, vandalism, exposure, and flooding, eventually leaving only a portion of the bottom 
and lower hull sides. (Bright et al. 1981:25) 
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FIGURE VI.43. Until June 2012 the remains of Neuse lay under a roofed enclosure in Kinston, 
North Carolina, not far from the Neuse River. The remains of the engine, boiler, and propeller 
shaft mounting timbers can be seen in this view from the stern. Neuse has now been moved to an 
indoor climate-controlled facility. (Photo by author 2010) 
 
CSS Fredericksburg 
Fredericksburg was the first ironclad to be built entirely in Richmond, at a newly-
established shipyard in the Rocketts suburb (Coski 2005:81). This vessel was laid down in the 
spring of 1862 and designed from the outset by Constructor Porter as an enlarged Albemarle type 
capable of carrying four guns. As a result, Fredericksburg’s dimensions were increased to 170 
feet long between perpendiculars, 188 feet overall, 40 feet in beam, 10 feet 10 inches depth of 
hold, and a 9 or 10-foot draft (Holcombe 1993:103-105). In overall appearance it closely 
resembled Albemarle but had twin pilothouses and a rectangular casemate (Figure VI.44). 
Fredericksburg was successfully launched on 11 June 1863 after a failed attempt on 6 
June, but was not completed until early 1864 for want of materials (Coski 2005:85-86). Little is 
known about the exact source and dimensions of its machinery. It is currently thought that either 
Tredegar Iron Works or the Shockoe Foundry (Confederate Naval Works) in Richmond built and 
installed the ship’s boilers and other mechanical components (Dew 1966:265; Still 1994:68; 
Coski 2005:72). No definitive information has yet been found. 
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FIGURE VI.44. Original plans of Fredericksburg: “Light draft iron clad gun Boat & Ram, to 
carry four guns with two propellers—J.L. Porter, C.S.N.C. Burned at Richmond.” The single 
engine cylinder shown does not present enough detail for any conclusions to be made on the 
power plant’s source or final configuration. (Still 1987:22) 
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According to the extant plans, Fredericksburg was powered by 3 cylindrical boilers 
approximately 15 feet long, 5 feet in diameter, and 7 feet high. The engine layout is shown by a 
single circle scaled to 24 inches in diameter. There is no way of knowing if this represents the 
actual engine size as installed because no other information has been found. Two propeller shafts 
are shown turning twin 7-foot diameter screws, but the method of their connecting with the 
engines is also not shown—they may have been geared similarly to Albemarle and Neuse. 
Fortunately, this missing information has the potential to be uncovered by archaeological 
investigation. Fredericksburg was blown up and sunk to prevent capture on the night of 2-3 
April 1865 (Coski 2005:220). Its wreck lies in unknown condition in the mud of the James River. 
CSS Missouri 
In addition to the light draft twin-screw design of diamond hull ironclad, Constructor 
Porter designed a vessel of similar form and draft to be driven by a center (or recessed) 
paddlewheel (Holcombe 1993:105). The first and only example of this ironclad type to be 
constructed as designed was Missouri, laid down in December 1862 and completed by steamboat 
captains Thomas Moore and John Smoker (Jeter 1987:267-268). Missouri was launched on 4 
April 1863 and retained the same layout on different dimensions from the original plans. They 
illustrate a vessel 193 feet long overall, 56 feet in molded beam, 58 feet in extreme beam, 9 feet 
9 inches in depth of hold, and a loaded draft of 6 feet. Missouri measured 183 feet in overall 
length, 53 feet 8 inches in beam, 10 feet 3 inches in depth of hold, and 8.5 feet in draft 
(Holcombe 1993:108).  
Interestingly, Missouri shared a number of characteristics with a widely-used class of 
Union river ironclad: the seven “City-class” vessels constructed in the autumn of 1861. These 
were also centerwheel casemate ironclads with similar dimensions. They measured 175 feet long 
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on deck, 51 feet 2 inches in beam, 6 feet in depth of hold, and 6 feet in draft (Holcombe 
1993:108). One of these vessels, USS Cairo (Figure VI.45), was sunk by a torpedo (mine) on 12 
December 1862 and raised 102 years later in December 1964 (Sheppard 1990). Compare its 
appearance with the Confederate centerwheel ironclad plans (Figure VI.46). Cairo is now on 
display at Vicksburg, Mississippi, and represents one of three preserved Civil War ironclads. It is 
also the only one with paddlewheel machinery, making for an effective comparison with the 
Confederate Missouri. It is unknown whether the design of these two ironclads was conceived 
independently for operation in a similar environment or knowingly adapted for Confederate use 
by Constructor Porter (Holcombe 1993:107-108). 
 
FIGURE VI.45. USS Cairo was the first of seven “City-class” Union gunboats to serve on the 
Western rivers. They were very similar in design to CSS Missouri. (Online Library of Selected 
Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
Missouri’s 2 engines and 4 boilers may have been removed from a 240-foot long, 40-foot 
beam, 7.5-foot draft sidewheel riverboat named Grand Era (ex-R.W. McRea) that was built at 
Jeffersonville, Indiana, in 1853 (Way 1983:196). The steamboat T.W. Roberts is another possible 
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candidate (A. Robert Holcombe, Jr. 2012, elec. comm.). This vessel was a 288-ton sidewheel 
packet measuring 158 feet long and 32 feet wide with a 6.1-foot draft (Way 1983:443). There is 
some confusion regarding the exact whereabouts, identities, and fates of these two boats during 
and after Missouri’s construction. Evidence currently points towards T.W. Roberts due to 
statements in contemporary correspondence noting the former owner of the boat purchased for 
Missouri’s machinery (Jeter 1996:6). 
A Union survey of the captured Missouri in June 1865 revealed its machinery details. 
The single-cylinder inclined poppet-valve engines measured 24 inches in diameter, 7.5 feet in 
stroke, and were fitted to turn a single 22.5-foot diameter, 17-foot wide paddlewheel. A major 
design fault was that the top 8 feet 4 inches of the wheel were exposed above the casemate top. 
Powering the ship were 4 horizontal double-flued boilers 26 feet long and 40 inches in diameter 
with 15-inch diameter flues. The report also noted a single doctor engine, 1 donkey boiler 8 feet 
long and 26 inches in diameter, and 2 donkey engines—one for running the capstan and the other 
turning a 3-foot diameter fan blower. The only other Confederate ironclads known to be so 
equipped were Atlanta and Tennessee (Jeter 1987:287). 
A look at USS Cairo’s preserved propulsion system reveals the same layout: the boilers 
were placed in the hold for protection and the inclined engines extend up onto the gundeck to 
turn the wheel (Figure VI.47). Although Cairo had 5 boilers, they were the same high-pressure 
horizontal type as most riverboats and even had similar dimensions to Missouri’s. They 
measured 36 inches in diameter and 26 feet long with 7.5-inch diameter flues (Sheppard 1990). 
The 2 cast iron engines were the typical riverboat type and closely resembled Missouri’s: they 
were mounted at a 15-degree angle and were 22 inches in cylinder bore with a 72-inch stroke 
(Sheppard 1990). Figures VI.48 and VI.49 show schematics of the engines and boilers. 
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FIGURE VI.46. Original plans of Porter’s light draft diamond hull centerwheel ironclad. The 
only ironclad completed with this general layout was Missouri, although it was altered to carry 
two pivot guns forward and the exposed stern gun position was eliminated. (Courtesy of Robert 
Holcombe 2012) 
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FIGURE VI.47. A view looking aft along the reconstructed Cairo’s port side gundeck, showing 
the port engine and pitman arm angling up through the deck to connect with the center 
paddlewheel. The internal arrangement of Missouri would have been similar. (Sheppard 1990) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.48. Engineering drawing of Cairo’s engine configuration (Sheppard 1990) 
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FIGURE VI.49. Engineering drawing of Cairo’s boiler configuration (Sheppard 1990) 
 
Unlike the Union vessel, Missouri was never sunk or preserved but instead taken to 
Mound City, Illinois, and sold for scrap (Jeter 1987:287-288). It is therefore quite fortunate that 
Cairo survives, for it is the only preserved paddlewheel-driven Civil War vessel in existence. 
CSS Mississippi 
The construction of the largest and most powerful ironclad built in the Confederacy was 
begun at the same time as Louisiana in a new shipyard at Jefferson City, Louisiana, just upriver 
from New Orleans (Still 1985:43). Asa and Nelson Tift, who had no shipbuilding experience but 
were prewar friends of Secretary Mallory, submitted plans for an enormous vessel to be driven 
by three screws and built without curved surfaces. This conception was a result of the brothers’ 
perceptive realization that the South lacked experienced shipwrights (Holcombe 1993:44). 
Mississippi was, therefore, constructed more like a ferry or flat than a ship (CSA 1863:125). Two 
rough sketches drawn by the Tifts of this unusual design exist in the Confederate inquiry records 
on the loss of New Orleans (Figures VI.50 and 51). 
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FIGURE VI.50. Sketch by Asa or Nelson Tift of Mississippi’s cross-sectional shape 
(Confederate States of America [CSA] 1863:165) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.51. The Tift’s sketch of Mississippi’s general machinery layout (CSA 1863:159) 
 
The first plank of Mississippi was laid on 14 October 1861, but construction lagged 
despite the simplicity of the ship’s design and its location adjacent to the South’s largest 
shipbuilding center (Still 1985:44). Among the most significant reasons for delay was 
Mississippi’s sheer size: 240 feet long between perpendiculars, 58 feet in extreme beam, and 15 
feet in depth of hold (Holcombe 1993:44). The length was increased by 20 feet during the course 
of construction when it was found during a consultation with experienced engineers that the 
existing boiler layout had insufficient grate and fire surface area to effectively propel the ship 
(CSA 1863:159). Mississippi’s original design called for “…11 boilers 32 feet long and 42 
inches in diameter, 2 return flews [sic], with mat [mud] drum 24 inches in diameter, steam driver 
[drum] 30 inches in diameter, about 40 feet long…” (CSA 1863:155). This already-large system 
had to be upgraded to 16 double-flued boilers 42 inches in diameter and 30 feet long, capable of 
generating approximately 1,500 horsepower (CSA 1863:159). 
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Mississippi’s triple 11-foot diameter propeller arrangement was one of the first such 
systems ever built and required powerful engines of 36-inch bore and 30-inch stroke (Holcombe 
1993:45). These engines were high-pressure horizontal direct-acting and were optimistically 
projected to drive Mississippi at 14 knots (Holcombe 1993:45). Both boilers and engines, in 
addition to two doctor engines, two blowers, and two steam pumps were constructed by the 
Patterson Iron Works (formally known as Jackson & Co.) of New Orleans (CSA 1863:155-156). 
The large central propeller shaft was forged with some difficulty by Tredegar while the wing 
shafts were forged by Clark & Co. of New Orleans (CSA 1863:112). The delays occasioned by 
the machinery revisions and making the shafting delayed Mississippi’s launch date until 19 April 
1862, just days before the Union captured New Orleans. As a result, the Confederacy’s greatest 
warship was burned to prevent capture after several attempts to tow the hulk upriver failed (Still 
1985:59). Figure VI.52 shows Mississippi as it would have appeared if completed. 
 
FIGURE VI.52. Mississippi as it would have appeared completed (Holcombe 1993:45) 
 
CSS Jackson 
Jackson, also commonly called Muscogee, was the second diamond hull centerwheel 
ironclad to be laid down. The ship was built at the great industrial center of Columbus, Georgia, 
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next to the Naval Iron Works but suffered from continuous construction problems and became 
“…the most altered ironclad built in the Confederacy” (Holcombe 1993:109). These changes 
were not represented in the historical record but are well-documented archaeologically due to the 
ironclad’s recovery in the early 1960s (Holcombe 1993:110).  
Jackson was originally laid down in December 1862 but was not successfully launched 
until after its major reconstruction into a twin-propeller vessel was recommended by Constructor 
Porter (Turner 1999:176). Porter’s visit was a result of a failed launch attempt on 1 January 1864 
in which it was revealed that Jackson was too heavy to float off the blocks even with the bow 
partially afloat (Turner 1999:170). This disturbing fact, coupled with a realization of the design’s 
unsuitably deep draft, called for the reconstruction (Figure VI.53) and further delayed 
completion. Jackson was not successfully launched until 22 December 1864 (Turner 1999:214). 
The single existing photograph of the ship (Figurer VI.54) was apparently taken soon afterward. 
 
FIGURE VI.53. Jackson’s original centerwheel design, left, and final twin-screw design, right 
(Holcombe 1993:110) 
 
Jackson’s original design conformed closely to Porter’s centerwheel ironclad plans but 
had to be extensively lengthened at the stern for twin-screw propulsion. This ultimately resulted 
in a vessel approximately 225 feet long overall, 59 feet in extreme beam, and 7 or 8 feet in 
loaded draft (Holcombe 1993:110-111). The paddlewheel machinery previously obtained for and 
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installed in the ship had to be removed (McLaughlin 1864:13 July Letter). Its source is known—
the 263-ton sidewheeler Time, built in 1860 at Louisville, Kentucky (Neville 1961:42). 
 
FIGURE VI.54. Original photograph of Jackson taken soon after launching, December 1864. 
The ship floats high in the water without armor or machinery—the opening in the front of the 
casemate was left for installation of the latter. An awning spread on the aft flush deck nearly 
obscures the wooden gunboat CSS Chattahoochee moored behind the ironclad. (Online Library 
of Selected Images, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2012) 
 
A recently-discovered drawing of this ship’s engines, labeled “Muscogee’s Engines”, 
along with another un-labeled drawing that appears to represent the same machinery (Figures 
VI.55-56) reveal the approximate cylinder diameter to be 30 inches. Other measurements 
regarding the boilers and stroke length are unknown because they are not represented. The four 
boilers from Time in the original design seem to have been kept in Jackson’s second incarnation 
as a propeller-driven vessel (Campbell 2009:82). 
The second set of engines supplied for Jackson were purpose-built by the adjacent 
Columbus Naval Iron Works and were of the typical horizontal single-cylinder direct-acting 
type, measuring 36 inches in bore and stroke (Campbell 2009:83). Each engine independently 
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FIGURE VI.55. Original engineering diagram of “Muscogee’s Engines”. Unfortunately, the 
whole cylinder is not shown, nor is the identity of the draftsman given. (Courtesy of David 
Rousar 2012) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.56. Original engineering diagram of unidentified pitman arm, crank, and cams. The 
style of the drawing matches that of the previous figure and suggests Jackson’s original 
paddlewheel engines. (Courtesy of David Rousar 2012) 
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turned a 7.5-foot diameter screw mounted on a 6.75-inch diameter shaft. The mounting timbers 
of the engines are preserved today (Figure VI.57), as are the ends of the shafts (Figure VI.58). 
 
FIGURE VI.57. Large timbers for supporting the engine mounts of Jackson as preserved today. 
They are approximately 12 inches square. The boiler bed mountings were farther forward, but 
those timbers were not preserved. (Photo by author 2011) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.58. Jackson’s twin 7.5-foot diameter iron propellers and the sections of the shafts 
where they pass through the hull are preserved on the wreck today. (Photo by author 2011) 
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While the engines of Jackson no longer exist, those of the wooden Columbus-built 
gunboat CSS Chattahoochee are preserved at the Port Columbus Civil War Naval Museum 
(Figures VI.59-63). These represent the only preserved examples of the preferred engine type for 
Confederate ironclads and measure 28 inches in bore, 34.5 inches in exterior diameter, and 20 
inches in stroke. In addition, Chattahoochee’s preserved stern effectively shows how the 
machinery was mounted (Figure VI.64).  
 
FIGURE VI.59. Starboard engine of Chattahoochee, which turned the port propeller. Both of the 
gunboat’s massively-constructed engines are preserved, but this one is in better condition. The 
remains of the valve chest can be seen on top of the cylinder, and the condenser is prominent in 
the center of the assembly. (Photo by author 2011) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.60. Front of the starboard engine. The cylinder head has been removed, showing the 
28-inch diameter piston. (Photo by author 2011) 
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FIGURE VI.61. Chattahoochee’s starboard engine seen from above. The condenser, left, part of 
the crosshead guides for the connecting rod, and piston rod can be clearly seen. (Photo by author 
2011) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.62. The 34.5-inch diameter cylinder head for one of Chattahoochee’s engines. The 
valve was used for the occasional drainage of condensed steam from the cylinder. (Photo by 
author 2011) 
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FIGURE VI.63. Side view of the cylinder head, showing thickness of solid iron construction. 
(Photo by author 2011) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.64. Engine mounting timberwork for the starboard engine in the preserved stern 
section of Chattahoochee. The timbers measure 9 inches sided by 12 inches molded on average, 
and the bolts measure 1.25 inches in diameter. Part of the port propeller shaft connecting 
assembly can be seen at the top of the image. (Photo by author 2011) 
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The machinery mountings on Jackson were similar but more working room was provided 
by the large ironclad’s wide hull. Other machinery parts representing a thrust bearing and parts 
of a reversing gear (Figures VI.65-67) from one of these two vessels are also located on the 
museum grounds. 
 
FIGURE VI.65. Large cast iron thrust bearing mounting block from either Jackson or 
Chattahoochee. (Photo by author 2011) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.66. Part of reversing gear assembly for either Jackson or Chattahoochee. (Photo by 
author 2011) 
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FIGURE VI.67. More parts of reversing gear assembly. The bricks at right were initially thought 
to be boiler bed firebricks but are not from either vessel. (Photo by author 2011) 
 
Jackson’s late launch date resulted in its never being finished, and the ship was set on fire 
by invading Union troops on 17 April 1865 (Turner 1999:237). The burning ironclad drifted 
downstream for 30 river miles before grounding; in 1910 the Army Corps of Engineers dredged 
around the wreck and removed the machinery (Campbell 2009:79). The recovered remains are 
now on display at Port Columbus. They have provided significant information on the 
construction of diamond hull ironclads, as well as Jackson’s ill-fated design changes. 
CSS Milledgeville 
This one-off vessel was a late-war design intended to be an improvement over the earlier 
standard hull types such as the Richmond-class (Holcombe 1993:123). As such, Milledgeville 
had a similar hull structure to earlier ironclads but incorporated significant design changes. 
Fortunately, these changes are shown in extant plans of the ironclad bearing Constructor Porter’s 
signature (Figure VI.68). Milledgeville was a twin-screw standard hull ironclad laid down in 
February 1863 by H.F. Willink, constructor of CSS Savannah. It was 175 feet in length between 
perpendiculars, 185 feet in overall length, 35 feet 2 inches in molded beam, and 48.5 feet in 
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FIGURE VI.68. Porter’s plans of Milledgeville, showing details of engineering and gundeck 
arrangements. The final configuration of Milledgeville’s power plant was reportedly nearly 
identical to other Columbus-built examples. (Emory University Archives 2011: Collection 
Number 243, Plan File CX1) 
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extreme beam (Holcombe 1993:125). It featured the late-war improved flush deck design of 
Columbia and a shortened casemate with 6 inches of armor. Most importantly, the ship had an 
increased depth of hold of 12 feet, resulting in a reduced draft of 9 feet (Holcombe 1993:125). 
The Milledgeville plans also show the general machinery arrangement of the ship, 
although its final configuration may have differed slightly. Two approximately 30-inch diameter 
single-cylinder horizontal engines are shown in the starboard plan view along with a 14-foot 
long, 6-foot diameter boiler. Dimensions taken off the plans show that Milledgeville had two 
boilers, although the half-breadth / gundeck plans do not show them from above. Twin 7-foot 
diameter propellers are shown at the stern. All of the machinery was built by the Columbus 
Naval Iron Works and should have given good service (Holcombe 1993:126). 
Milledgeville’s completion was severely delayed like many other Confederate ironclads. 
Willink’s prior commitments and design changes made to the ship while under construction were 
the biggest factors (Holcombe 1993:123). Milledgeville was launched in early fall 1864 and 
nearly complete when burned to prevent capture by Union forces on 21 December 1864 
(Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships 1963 [Vol. 2]:549). The ship’s engines and most 
of its armor had been installed by that time, but were mostly salvaged by the Army Corps of 
Engineers in the 1890s (Judy Wood 2011, elec. comm.). The current condition of the wreck is 
unknown—future archaeological survey of the site may uncover new details. 
CSS Wilmington 
The design of the last ironclad constructed at Wilmington and informally named for that 
city (an official naming ceremony never seems to have occurred) reflected both lessons learned 
in ironclad design and the unique nature of its probable mission. Wilmington was one of the very 
last Southern ironclads to approach completion. It was never launched and was burned on the 
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stocks as Federal troops reached the Confederacy’s last open port in February 1865 (Holcombe 
1993:127,130). Fortunately, enough information exists on this unique vessel for an accurate 
reconstruction to be made—an engineering diagram (Figure VI.69) and the original plans (Figure 
VI.70) have been preserved. 
 
FIGURE VI.69. Robert Holcombe’s 1981 re-drawing of an engineering diagram of a twin-screw 
vessel fitted with “Engine No. 15.” Dimensions and layout indicate that this vessel is 
Wilmington. Note that the plans do not show the piston or connecting rods. (Courtesy of Robert 
Holcombe 2012) 
 
Wilmington was designed by Constructor Porter as an effective replacement for the 
wrecked Raleigh and rotten North Carolina in May 1864. It was laid down at the Beery shipyard 
on Eagles Island where North Carolina was built and some of the armor from that ship was 
actually used in construction. The design of this ironclad reflects a possible intention for use as a 
blockade-breaker: Wilmington had very sleek lines, with a length between perpendiculars of 224 
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feet and a molded beam of 34 feet. An overall length of 233 feet 4 inches, extreme beam of 41 
feet, depth of hold of 12 feet, and draft of 9.5 feet resulted in an ironclad not only very different 
from the Richmond-class vessels, but superiorly adapted to its operating environment (Holcombe 
1993:130). A high design speed and low, rakish appearance with twin single-gun casemates only 
adds to the hypothesis that “…Wilmington was to be used for other than harbor defense 
purposes” (Holcombe 1993:127-130). A severe lack of iron for armor at that late stage of the war 
certainly cannot alone explain these sleek design features. 
The engineering diagram showing this ironclad’s high-speed machinery is also quite 
informative. Wilmington’s power plant was built by the Columbus Naval Iron Works but never 
delivered (National Archives RG 56: Case File 825). The ironclad was to be equipped with 4 
triple-furnace boilers approximately 16 feet long, 6.5 feet high, and 8 feet wide powering 2 high-
pressure single-cylinder horizontal engines 28 inches in bore, 24 inches in stroke, and placed fore 
and aft in the hull. Each engine was connected to the propeller shafts by 2 gears, one 4.5 feet and 
one 3 feet in diameter, which allowed for potentially greater speed through higher revolutions 
(Holcombe 1993:130). Twin eight-foot diameter propellers were prevented from independent 
maneuvering by the use of an idler shaft. The reasoning behind this design handicap is unknown.  
The engines and boilers of Wilmington never left Columbus and were captured in April 
1865 (National Archives RG 56: Case File 825). In many ways it is a shame that this ironclad 
and other late-war designs were never completed because not only did they reflect significant 
design improvements, but their purpose-built machinery should have been among the best built 
by either side at that late stage of the war. Wilmington perhaps emphasizes best of all the 
incredible growth and development of Confederate naval industry during the Civil War and at 
the same time that system’s failure. 
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FIGURE VI.70. Porter’s plans of Wilmington, showing hull construction and some engineering 
detail. (Courtesy of Robert Holcombe 2012) 
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Conclusions 
The preceding pages have compiled for the first time most relevant available data on 
Confederate ironclad steam engines and propulsion systems. Hopefully, this will lead the way for 
further studies. More data may become available to fill the existing gaps as new documents are 
discovered or funding and time appropriated for archaeological surveys of the many remaining 
ironclad wrecks. In the meantime, the information presented has revealed the three main types of 
engine installed on Confederate ironclads: inverted vertical single-cylinder direct-acting models 
taken from tugs, inclined single-cylinder high-pressure direct-acting models taken from river 
steamers, and purpose-built horizontal single-cylinder direct-acting engines. It has been seen that 
the latter, most of which were made in Columbus, Georgia, generally proved superior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
The general failure of the Confederate Navy to effectively construct quality marine steam 
machinery until war’s end played an important role in the outcome of its shipbuilding programs. 
The ironclad program was the most important of these in resources allocated and sheer numbers. 
By 1865, approximately 50 ironclads had been laid down or contracted for, and of these 23 were 
placed into service (Still 1985:227). These numbers far exceeded those of the wooden gunboats 
and other small craft actually constructed (as compared to the vast numbers initially intended) in 
the early years of the war. As a result, the ironclads demanded a huge amount of material and 
technical knowhow that was often not available in time or of usable quantity. It is all the more 
remarkable, then, to consider the fact that any suitable steam machinery was obtained and that 
Secretary Mallory’s program achieved as much as it did. 
A significant lack of experience in machinery manufacturing was just one of many 
hurdles Mallory and the fledgling Confederate Navy had to overcome in 1861. It is remarkable 
that the South started with essentially nothing but a set of experienced officers resigned from the 
Union Navy, but had pioneered the organizational and technical basis of a modern navy by 1865. 
This included not only an ironclad fleet, but also mine, submarine, and commerce raiding 
warfare. All of these elements reflected the revolutionary new nature of war at sea (Luraghi 
1996:346). Several Southern industries greatly scaled up production and achieved significant 
successes in heavy industrial manufacturing in order to provide these modern weapons to the 
Confederate cause. The Tredegar Iron Works, Shockoe Foundry (later the Confederate Naval 
Works), Charlotte Navy Yard, and Columbus Naval Iron Works were the greatest among these. 
The latter especially contributed to the manufacture of steam machinery in the Confederacy, and 
by war’s end several complete and well-built sets had been delivered for installation in ironclads. 
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The various sets of machinery supplied to the Confederate ironclads ultimately reflected a 
combination of sources. Single-cylinder vertical inverted direct-acting tugboat engines, high-
pressure inclined riverboat systems, and horizontal single-cylinder direct-acting engines were the 
three most important groups utilized. The purpose-built specimens represented by the horizontal 
direct-acting type were overwhelmingly the best of these. This was largely due to the simple fact 
that each set of new engines was specifically intended for a certain ironclad from the outset, and 
also as a result of refinements in manufacture during the war years. The secondhand power 
plants were usually unsatisfactory, although it appears that many of the scavenged riverboat 
systems such as those on Missouri and Tennessee performed surprisingly well.  
Many ironclads, especially those of the Richmond-class, utilized former tugboat engines. 
These were often the most temperamental sets of machinery due to hard usage, age, and 
overstressed working when placed in a heavy ironclad. Those vessels so equipped were 
invariably underpowered. This was not necessarily a crippling problem, as virtually all the 
Confederate ironclads built after 1862 were intended for harbor defense (Still 1985:228). Lack of 
speed did render ramming more difficult in many cases, perhaps best emphasized by the January 
1863 sortie of Chicora and Palmetto State from Charleston Harbor. In at least one case, that of 
North Carolina, a weak engine indirectly resulted in sinking by shipworm damage. Often the 
purpose-built boilers and auxiliary equipment manufactured by local industry were the best part 
of the power plants of the ironclads equipped with tug engines. 
Civil War-era steam boilers came in a variety of types like the engines they powered, but 
onboard the Confederate ironclads the most common were the low-pressure horizontal “Scotch” 
firetube type and the Western rivers-style horizontal high-pressure flue type. Both were ideally 
suited to their purpose, although the high-pressure type was generally more prone to explosion. 
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Boilers were fairly easy to maintain or build unlike steam engines and the Confederates had no 
problem in procuring them for ironclads. Several local firms in Wilmington, Charleston, 
Savannah, and elsewhere had the capability of producing even the newer designs, rendering 
effective construction times and local deliveries. As a whole, the boilers and auxiliary equipment 
of the Confederate ironclads were standard for the day and much less troublesome to 
manufacture and operate than the engines.   
Propellers and paddlewheel propulsion existed simultaneously by the Civil War, 
sometimes even on the same ship (such as Louisiana). Propellers had only just begun to 
supersede paddlewheels, and only then mostly on oceangoing vessels. Despite its seemingly-
vulnerable and antiquated form, the paddlewheel continued to be a viable and effective means of 
propelling shallow-draft coastal and riparian vessels well into the 20th century. As regards the 
Confederate ironclads, no truly effective comparison can be made between those vessels fitted 
with paddlewheels and those with propellers due to differences in construction and operating 
environment, and the general prevalence of screw propeller designs. In fact, the only ironclads 
driven by paddlewheels that were finished (Baltic, Louisiana, Missouri, and Nashville) reflected 
different operating philosophies and layouts. Of the paddlewheel ironclads, Baltic and Nashville 
were sidewheelers and Louisiana and Missouri were centerwheelers. Only Missouri can be 
considered as somewhat of a success out of these. This was largely a result of design rather than 
engine type, as the Western riverboat-style power plants provided for these vessels generally 
functioned well even under the strain of guns and armor.  
The vast majority of the Confederate ironclads were screw-propelled. This was mostly a 
result of the desire to protect the ship’s drive system from battle damage and ramming. As 
emphasized spectacularly by Nashville, paddlewheels, especially sidewheels, were not suited for 
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coupling to the angled casemate and often resulted in vessels too large to effectively move 
themselves or support their own weight. The submerged, recessed nature of the propeller allowed 
for greater protection, although its more complicated emplacement and machinery connections 
often caused trouble in those early days of steam propulsion. In addition, the use of twin 
propellers on shallow draft designs like Albemarle potentially allowed for greater maneuvering 
ability. Often this layout was handicapped for unknown reasons by complicated gearing or 
coupling to prevent independent turning of the screws. Propellers were also more difficult to 
manufacture and maintain than paddlewheels but no significant problems in this area seem to 
have been encountered, even with ironclads operating in extremely shallow water such as Neuse. 
It has been commonly emphasized since the Civil War that all Southern ironclads were 
inherently defective. This is not true—while their machinery often left much to be desired, the 
Confederate ironclads were strongly-built and adequately (most of the time, anyway) armed. 
Even the use of green wood in many cases did not negate their strength in battle; for example, 
Louisiana withstood the heavy guns of Farragut’s fleet with only superficial damage and 
Arkansas was able to survive the gauntlet of the combined Union fleets above Vicksburg. It must 
be remembered that Union officers often made every effort to capture a Confederate ironclad 
when possible. Two, Tennessee and Atlanta, served effectively later in the war as Union vessels. 
This thesis has resulted in a compilation of data on 27 Confederate ironclads and their 
steam machinery—23 finished and 4 nearly finished. It has put together for the first time detailed 
descriptions of machinery types commonly used on ironclads of the Civil War and afforded a 
view of those vessels in action. The firsthand engineering accounts from Confederate officers 
have proven to be quite rare and represent only a handful of ironclads, but offer an invaluable 
insight into the lives and dedication of these early steam pioneers. Without their services, which 
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in the agrarian Confederacy were scarce to begin with, Mallory’s new state-of-the-art steam navy 
could not have functioned. The testimony of these men also offers valuable insight into the 
defects of their charges and aids in a final summation. 
Trends in building and purchasing marine steam machinery, and also the testimony of 
engineers, have been clearly revealed by this thesis. Only one large gap remains—a conclusive 
appraisal of Confederate Engineer-in-Chief William P. Williamson’s career and contributions. 
Unfortunately, this may never be possible due to the dearth of information relating to his work. 
The overall conclusions have not changed regarding Confederate marine steam machinery, 
particularly onboard ironclads, and this study has only corroborated them. The final summation 
is best made by Dr. William N. Still, Jr., author of the landmark Iron Afloat: The Story of the 
Confederate Armorclads (1985:102-104): 
Of all aspects of the Confederate shipbuilding program, the marine engineering industry 
was by far the most backward, as it was in the United States as a whole. There was little 
scientific study of engineering before the war; construction of marine engines was 
frequently by rule of thumb. This was true throughout the war, in the North as well as in 
the South. All parts were generally made by hand, and although the concept of 
interchangeable parts for engines was quite common in the arms industry, it had not 
reached the marine engineering industry. In a field where all knowledge was empirical, it 
was inevitable that the Confederacy’s first engines and other machinery would be 
inefficient. Nevertheless, Confederate marine engines, like the vessels themselves, 
improved with time, and by the end of the war a few satisfactory engines were being 
produced. 
 
Credit for this was due to the dedication and drive of the men in charge of the Southern 
industries and their leadership in Navy Secretary Mallory. They made incredible gains in the face 
of overwhelming odds to not only industrialize during wartime, but to render a navy from 
scratch. Although the Confederate Navy and its ironclads played mostly a defensive role, several 
major ports such as Wilmington, Charleston, and Mobile were kept open until nearly war’s end 
by the presence of steam-powered armored vessels. Thus the crucible of war in the United States 
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paved the way for the birth of a modern navy: steam-powered sail-less warships, mines, 
submarines, and commerce raiding; all hallmarks of those great naval actions beginning half a 
century later in the First World War. It is remarkable to consider the fact that an agrarian nation 
was able to make such gains in four short years and just as remarkable that the North was able to 
improve upon and counter these gains, leading to an explosion of new technical developments at 
sea. Just 20 short years after the Civil War these continuing developments allowed the United 
States Navy to compete successfully on the world stage for the first time with the launch and 
shakedown of its first modern seagoing armored cruisers. 
Although it is not widely appreciated today, or even was in its own time, the Confederate 
Navy was responsible in large part for many new technical developments. The ironclad program 
is probably the best-known of these. Secretary Mallory’s vision allowed for the creation of what 
may be tentatively labeled the first “all-modern” navy. The Confederate Navy represented an 
impressive achievement, especially in the development of the naval-industrial complex and 
marine machinery manufacture, despite lasting only four years. These facts were certainly not 
lost on Mallory, who despite his deficiencies can be considered a visionary and the South’s best 
man for the job (Luraghi 1996:10). The final statement on the Confederate Navy is in his words: 
I am satisfied that, with the means at our control and in view of the overwhelming force 
of the enemy at the outset of the struggle, our little navy accomplished more than could 
have been looked or hoped for; and if I have ever felt any surprise connected with its 
operations, it was that we accomplished so much. (Still 1985:227, from James H. 
Rochelle Papers, Duke University) 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A: CONFEDERATE IRONCLAD STEAM MACHINERY SPECIFICATIONS 
 
Conversions 
CSS Manassas (ex-Enoch Train)……………………………un-surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder inclined direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 36-inch diameter x 34-inch stroke 
Engine Builder: Loring’s City Point Works, Boston, MA 
Engine Notes: low-pressure, condensing 
 
 Boiler Type: 1 or 2 horizontal 
Boiler Dimensions: unknown 
Boiler Builder: Loring’s City Point Works, Boston, MA 
Boiler Notes: low-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, 9-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Loring’s City Point Works, Boston, MA 
Propulsion System Notes: independently turning 
 
CSS Virginia (ex-USS Merrimack)………………………….un-surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal return piston rod (“back-acting”) 
Engine Dimensions: 72-inch diameter x 36-inch stroke 
Engine Builder: West Point Foundry, Cold Springs, NY 
Engine Notes: low-pressure, condensing 
 
 Boiler Type: 4 Martin vertical watertube, 3 furnaces each 
 Boiler Dimensions: 15 feet high, 14 feet wide, 12 feet long 
 Boiler Builder: West Point Foundry, Cold Springs, NY 
 Boiler Notes: low-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 17-foot 4-inch diameter  
 Propulsion System Builder: West Point Foundry, Cold Springs, NY 
 Propulsion System Notes: Griffiths-patent propeller with variable pitch 
 
CSS Baltic………………………………………………………………………..scrapped postwar 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder inclined direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 22-inch diameter x 7-foot stroke 
Engine Builder: unknown 
Engine Notes: high-pressure, standard Western river type 
 
 Boiler Type: 4 horizontal return flue 
Boiler Dimensions: 24 feet long x 3 feet diameter 
Boiler Builder: unknown 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, standard Western river type 
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 Propulsion System: 2 sidewheels, 29 feet diameter x 8 feet wide 
Propulsion System Builder: unknown 
Propulsion System Notes: independently turning 
 
Early Non-standard Types 
CSS Arkansas………………………………………………..un-surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting  
Engine Dimensions: 30-inch diameter x 30-inch stroke  
Engine Builder: Union Foundry & Machine Shop or S.M. Coates foundry, Memphis, TN 
Engine Notes: high-pressure, non-condensing  
 
 Boiler Type: 6 horizontal 
Boiler Dimensions: unknown 
Boiler Builder: Union Foundry & Machine Shop or S.M. Coates foundry, Memphis, TN   
Boiler Notes: high-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, 8-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Leeds & Co., New Orleans, LA 
Propulsion System Notes: independently turning 
 
CSS Louisiana……………………………………………….un-surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder inclined direct-acting, 2 unknown 
Engine Dimensions: 28-inch diameter x 7-foot stroke, propeller engines unknown 
Engine Builder (paddlewheel): Roach & Long, Louisville, KY 
Engine Builder (propeller): Kirk & Co., New Orleans, LA 
Engine Notes: high-pressure paddlewheel engines taken from river steamboat Ingomar 
 
 Boiler Type: 6 horizontal return flue 
Boiler Dimensions: unknown 
Boiler Builder: unknown 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboat Ingomar  
 
 Primary Propulsion System: 2 centerwheels, 27 feet diameter x 19 feet wide 
Secondary Propulsion System: 2 propellers, 4-foot diameter  
Primary Propulsion System Builder: E.C. Murray, Jefferson City, LA 
Secondary Propulsion System Builder: Kirk & Co., New Orleans, LA 
Propulsion System Notes: completely ineffectual 
 
CSS Georgia………………extensively surveyed archaeological resource, plans for conservation 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 24-inch diameter x 39.5-inch stroke 
Engine Builder: probably Alvin N. Miller foundry, Savannah, GA 
Engine Notes: low-pressure, condensing 
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 Boiler Type: 1 or 2 horizontal firetube 
Boiler Dimensions: approximately 18 feet long x 7.5 feet wide 
Boiler Builder: probably Alvin N. Miller foundry, Savannah, GA 
Boiler Notes: low-pressure, standard marine variant of locomotive boiler 
                      
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, 8-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: probably Alvin N. Miller foundry, Savannah, GA   
Propulsion System Notes: completely ineffectual 
 
Richmond-class Vessels 
CSS Richmond................................................................partially surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 1 single-cylinder vertical inverted direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: unknown 
Engine Builder: probably Reaney, Neafie & Co., Penn Works, Philadelphia, PA 
Engine Notes: taken from steamer CSS Arctic (ex-USS Arctic, ex-Lightship No. 8) 
 
 Boiler Type: 2 horizontal “Scotch” firetube  
Boiler Dimensions: approximately 10 feet long, 11 feet high, 6 feet 9 inches wide 
Boiler Builder: Tredegar Iron Works or Shockoe Foundry, Richmond, VA 
Boiler Notes: low-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 8 or 10-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Tredegar Iron Works or Shockoe Foundry, Richmond, VA   
Propulsion System Notes: standard single-propeller design 
 
CSS Chicora...................................................................partially surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 1 single-cylinder vertical inverted direct-acting  
Engine Dimensions: 30-inch diameter x 28-inch stroke  
Engine Builder: Reaney, Neafie & Co., Penn Works, Philadelphia, PA  
Engine Notes: low-pressure, taken from steam tug Aid 
 
 Boiler Type: 2 horizontal “Scotch” firetube 
Boiler Dimensions: approximately 10 feet long, 11 feet high, 6 feet 9 inches wide 
Boiler Builder: James M. Eason & Brother, Charleston, SC 
Boiler Notes: low-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 8-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: James M. Eason & Brother, Charleston, SC 
Propulsion System Notes: standard single-propeller design 
 
CSS Palmetto State.................................................................un-surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting  
Engine Dimensions: 30-inch diameter x 26-inch stroke 
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Engine Builder: Reaney, Neafie & Co., Penn Works, Philadelphia, PA  
Engine Notes: low-pressure, taken from CSS Lady Davis (ex-steam tug James Gray) 
 
 Boiler Type: 2 horizontal “Scotch” firetube  
Boiler Dimensions: approximately 10 feet long, 11 feet high, 6 feet 9 inches wide 
Boiler Builder: Cameron & Co., Charleston, SC 
Boiler Notes: low-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 8 or 10-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Cameron & Co., Charleston, SC 
Propulsion System Notes: standard single-propeller design 
 
CSS North Carolina.......................................................partially surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 1 single-cylinder vertical inverted direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: unknown 
Engine Builder: Bidwell and Banta, Buffalo, NY 
Engine Notes: low-pressure, taken from steam tug Uncle Ben, weak and ineffectual 
 
 Boiler Type: 2 horizontal “Scotch” firetube  
Boiler Dimensions: approximately 10 feet long, 11 feet high, 6 feet 9 inches wide  
Boiler Builder: Hart & Bailey Iron Works, Wilmington, NC 
Boiler Notes: low-pressure 
                            
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 8 or 10-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Hart & Bailey Iron Works, Wilmington, NC 
Propulsion System Notes: standard single-propeller design 
 
CSS Raleigh...................................................................partially surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 24-inch diameter x 36-inch stroke 
Engine Builder: Tredegar Iron Works or Shockoe Foundry, Richmond, VA 
Engine Notes: probably from unfinished wooden gunboat at Washington, NC 
 
 Boiler Type: 2 horizontal “Scotch” firetube   
Boiler Dimensions: approximately 10 feet long, 11 feet high, 6 feet 9 inches wide 
Boiler Builder: Clarendon Iron Works, Wilmington, NC 
Boiler Notes: low-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 8 or 10-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Clarendon Iron Works, Wilmington, NC  
Propulsion System Notes: standard single-propeller design 
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CSS Savannah.........................................................................un-surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 28-inch bore (34.5 inch external diameter) x 20-inch stroke 
Engine Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Engine Notes: low-pressure, originally for unfinished wooden gunboat at Milton, FL 
 
 Boiler Type: 2 horizontal “Scotch” firetube, 3 furnaces each 
Boiler Dimensions: 11 feet 2 inches long, 12 feet high, 7 feet 10 inches wide 
Boiler Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Boiler Notes: low-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 8-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Propulsion System Notes: standard single-propeller design 
 
Tennessee-class Vessels  
CSS Tennessee.......................................................................................................scrapped postwar 
 
 Engine Type: 2 adapted single-cylinder inclined direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 24-inch diameter x 7-foot stroke 
Engine Builder: unknown 
Engine Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboat Vicksburg 
 
 Boiler Type: 4 horizontal return flue, 1 furnace under all   
Boiler Dimensions: 24 feet long, other dimensions unknown 
Boiler Builder: unknown 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboat Vicksburg  
 
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 12-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Charlotte Navy Yard, Charlotte, NC 
Propulsion System Notes: geared to engines 
 
CSS Columbia........................................................................................................scrapped postwar 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 36-inch diameter x 24-inch stroke 
Engine Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Engine Notes: high-pressure, non-condensing 
 
 Boiler Type: 5 horizontal return flue 
Boiler Dimensions: 22 feet long x 4 feet diameter 
Boiler Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 10 feet 8-inch diameter  
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Propulsion System Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Propulsion System Notes: standard single-propeller design 
 
Vessels Designed by William Graves 
CSS Charleston.......................................................................un-surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 1 or 2 unknown direct-acting types 
Engine Dimensions: unknown 
Engine Builder: probably J.M. Eason & Brother, Charleston, SC 
Engine Notes: reportedly underpowered 
 
 Boiler Type: unknown 
Boiler Dimensions: unknown 
Boiler Builder: probably J.M. Eason & Brother, Charleston, SC   
Boiler Notes: probably low-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 9-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: probably J.M. Eason & Brother, Charleston, SC   
Propulsion System Notes: standard single-propeller design 
 
CSS Virginia II........................................................................un-surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal or 2 British 2-cylinder compound 
Engine Dimensions (if American): approximately 40-inch diameter x 38-inch stroke 
Engine Dimensions (if British): unknown 
Engine Builder (if American): Tredegar Iron Works or Shockoe Foundry, Richmond, VA 
Engine Builder (if British): unknown 
Engine Notes: referenced as having “nearly 800 horse[power]”  
 
 Boiler Type: 2 horizontal firetube, 2 furnaces each 
Boiler Dimensions: 22 feet long, 9 feet high, 8 feet wide  
Boiler Builder: Tredegar Iron Works or Shockoe Foundry, Richmond, VA  
Boiler Notes: probably low-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 1 propeller, 10-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Charlotte Navy Yard, Charlotte, NC 
Propulsion System Notes: standard single-propeller design 
 
Large Sidewheelers 
CSS Nashville........................................................................................................scrapped postwar 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder inclined direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 30 or 32-inch diameter x 9-foot stroke 
Engine Builder: unknown 
Engine Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboats Capitol or Magenta 
 
266 
 
 Boiler Type: 7 horizontal return flue 
Boiler Dimensions: 30 feet long x 40 or 42-inch diameter 
Boiler Builder: unknown 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboats Capitol or Magenta 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 sidewheels, 28 feet diameter x 12 feet wide 
Propulsion System Builder: J.E. Montgomery and A. Anderson, Montgomery, AL 
Propulsion System Notes: independently turning 
  
Diamond Hull Vessels 
CSS Tuscaloosa..............................................................partially surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 adapted single-cylinder inclined direct-acting  
Engine Dimensions: unknown 
Engine Builder: unknown 
Engine Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboat Chewala 
 
 Boiler Type: probably horizontal return flue 
Boiler Dimensions: unknown 
Boiler Builder: unknown 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboat Chewala 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, approximately 8-foot diameter 
Propulsion System Builder: William Penny & Co., Prattville, AL 
Propulsion System Notes: geared to engines, completely ineffectual 
 
CSS Huntsville...............................................................partially surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 adapted single-cylinder inclined direct-acting  
Engine Dimensions: unknown, probably similar to Tuscaloosa 
Engine Builder: unknown 
Engine Notes: high-pressure, possibly taken from river steamboat John C. Calhoun 
 
 Boiler Type: probably horizontal return flue 
Boiler Dimensions: unknown, probably similar to Tuscaloosa 
Boiler Builder: unknown 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, possibly taken from river steamboat John C. Calhoun 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, approximately 8-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Propulsion System Notes: geared to engines, completely ineffectual 
 
CSS Albemarle.......................................................................................................scrapped postwar 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting  
Engine Dimensions: 18-inch diameter x 19-inch stroke 
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Engine Builder: uncertain; possibly Tredegar Iron Works, Richmond, VA  
Engine Notes: high-pressure, non-condensing, may have been scratch-built 
 
 Boiler Type: 2 vertical watertube, 1 furnace each 
Boiler Dimensions: 15 feet 4 inches long, 5 feet 2 inches high, 4 feet 7 inches wide 
Boiler Builder: uncertain; possibly Tredegar Iron Works, Richmond, VA 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, may have been scratch-built 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, 6-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Charlotte Navy Yard, Charlotte, NC 
Propulsion System Notes: geared to engines 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
CSS Neuse.............................................................raised and preserved, on display at Kinston, NC 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: probably 17-inch diameter x 24-inch stroke 
Engine Builder: probably Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
Engine Notes: high-pressure, probably taken from B. & O. locomotive # 34 “Gladiator” 
 
 Boiler Type: 1 horizontal firetube, 1 furnace  
Boiler Dimensions: 15 feet long, other dimensions unknown 
Boiler Builder: Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
Boiler Notes: taken from B. & O. locomotive # 34 “Gladiator” 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, 6-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: unknown 
Propulsion System Notes: geared to engines 
 
CSS Fredericksburg................................................................un-surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 24-inch diameter, other dimensions unknown 
Engine Builder: Tredegar Iron Works or Shockoe Foundry, Richmond, VA 
Engine Notes: probably high-pressure 
 
 Boiler Type: 3 horizontal 
Boiler Dimensions: approximately 15 feet long, 7 feet high, 5 feet diameter 
Boiler Builder: Tredegar Iron Works or Shockoe Foundry, Richmond, VA  
Boiler Notes: probably high-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, 7-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Tredegar Iron Works or Shockoe Foundry, Richmond, VA   
Propulsion System Notes: unknown method of connection with engines 
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CSS Missouri.........................................................................................................scrapped postwar 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder inclined direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 24-inch diameter x 7.5-foot stroke 
Engine Builder: unknown 
Engine Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboats Grand Era or T.W. Roberts 
 
 Boiler Type: 4 horizontal return flue 
Boiler Dimensions: 26 feet long x 40-inch diameter 
Boiler Builder: unknown 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboats Grand Era or T.W. Roberts 
 
 Propulsion System: 1 centerwheel, 22.5 feet diameter x 17 feet wide 
Propulsion System Builder: probably Thomas Moore and John Smoker 
Propulsion System Notes: similar to Union “City-class” ironclad gunboats 
 
Uncompleted Vessels (>50% complete) 
CSS Mississippi.............................................................partially-destroyed remains scrapped 1862 
 
 Engine Type: 3 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 30-inch bore x 36-inch stroke 
Engine Builder: Patterson Iron Works (Jackson & Co.), New Orleans, LA 
Engine Notes: high-pressure 
 
 Boiler Type: 16 horizontal return flue 
Boiler Dimensions: 30 feet long x 42-inch diameter  
Boiler Builder: Patterson Iron Works (Jackson & Co.), New Orleans, LA 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, capable of approximately 1,500 horsepower 
 
 Propulsion System: 3 propellers, 11-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder (center shaft): Tredegar Iron Works, Richmond, VA 
Propulsion System Builder (wing shafts): Clark & Co., New Orleans, LA 
Propulsion System Notes: one of first triple-screw systems designed 
 
CSS Jackson......................................................raised and preserved, on display at Columbus, GA 
 
Original Design 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder inclined direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 30-inch diameter, other dimensions unknown 
Engine Builder: unknown 
Engine Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboat Time 
 
 Boiler Type: 4 horizontal return flue 
Boiler Dimensions: unknown 
Boiler Builder: unknown 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, taken from river steamboat Time 
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 Propulsion System: 1 centerwheel, approximately 20 feet diameter x 20 feet wide 
Propulsion System Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Propulsion System Notes: similar to Missouri 
 
Final Design 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 36-inch bore x 36-inch stroke 
Engine Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Engine Notes: high-pressure 
 
 Boiler Type: 4 horizontal return flue 
Boiler Dimensions: unknown 
Boiler Builder: unknown 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure, retained from original design 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, 7.5-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Propulsion System Notes: independently turning 
 
CSS Milledgeville....................................................................un-surveyed archaeological resource 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: approximately 30-inch diameter, other dimensions unknown 
Engine Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Engine Notes: probably low-pressure, similar to Columbia 
 
 Boiler Type: 2 horizontal  
Boiler Dimensions: 14 feet long x 6 feet diameter 
Boiler Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Boiler Notes: probably low-pressure 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, 7-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Propulsion System Notes: unknown method of connection with engines 
 
CSS Wilmington.............................................................................................burned on stocks 1865 
 
 Engine Type: 2 single-cylinder horizontal direct-acting 
Engine Dimensions: 28-inch bore x 24-inch stroke 
Engine Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Engine Notes: high-pressure 
 
 Boiler Type: 4 horizontal, 3 furnaces each 
Boiler Dimensions: approximately 16 feet long, 6.5 feet high, 8 feet wide  
Boiler Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Boiler Notes: high-pressure 
270 
 
 Propulsion System: 2 propellers, 8-foot diameter  
Propulsion System Builder: Columbus Naval Iron Works, Columbus, GA 
Propulsion System Notes: geared to engines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B: AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT 
An obscure but vital part of any steamship’s power plant is the auxiliaries; as Alan Bates 
writes on page 53 of his 1996 work The Western Rivers Engineroom Cyclopoedium: “Every 
transportation vehicle must do more than move.” Everything from automobiles to steamships 
must have auxiliary systems that run off the main engine to do any number of lesser tasks. 
Especially onboard ships these duties revolve mostly around pumping. There were a number of 
auxiliary systems in use on steam vessels during the Civil War era, but they remained highly 
non-standardized for many years. This more often than not reflected the business practices of the 
Western rivers, where the adoption of new technology was often seen as unnecessary. 
Nevertheless, by the 1860s important advancements had been made. 
There were some important differences in auxiliary equipment between riverboats and 
oceangoing vessels. The latter, including warships, utilized low-pressure engines. These lent 
themselves to a process termed condensing which allowed for the exhaust steam from the 
engines to be recycled into water and returned to the boilers via a small reservoir and filter called 
the “hot well.” This was an important function on oceangoing steamships without a constant 
supply of freshwater for the boilers, and condensers often took up a great deal of space in the 
engine room. Condensers were rare onboard high-pressure riverboats, which instead simply 
filtered boiler water from fresh river water. 
The most common type of condenser up to the 1870s was the jet. It worked by mixing a 
jet of cold water with the exhaust steam, condensing the water and creating a vacuum, which 
allowed for pumping into the hot well. Jet condensation had no real competition until the 1830s 
with the development of the closed (or surface) condenser by Samuel Hall (Smith 1937:153). 
Surface condensing worked as a sort of “reverse” boiler: cold water tubes were surrounded by 
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exhaust steam. As the steam cooled it created a partial vacuum which allowed for pumping and 
removal of air (Bates 1996:20). Both condenser types were considerably less common on 
American rivers, but did see use when there was assurance of deep, relatively clean water. The 
surface condenser came to be the preferred type. Figure B.1 shows both condensers. 
 
FIGURE B.1. Upper left: cross-section of a typical surface, or closed, condenser. Lower right: 
cross-section of a typical jet condenser. (Adapted from Bates 1996:20-21) 
 
Other auxiliary equipment was common onboard both riverboats and blue water vessels.  
By the Civil War, systems had been introduced for powering capstans, fan blowers, bilge pumps, 
firefighting equipment, and boiler feedwater devices. The steam whistle had also been introduced 
on the rivers in the 1840s, but is not known to have been used on any Confederate ironclad. The 
other systems listed were common by the 1860s but any one ship did not necessarily have all of 
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them. Fan blowers in particular were a recent innovation. In this system a small vertical boiler, 
usually called a “donkey”, coupled to a small engine turned a fan or fans placed in the 
smokebox, the entrance to the funnel(s). This created a forced draft for the boiler fires. Only 
three Southern ironclads, Atlanta, Tennessee, and Missouri, are known to have used this system. 
Forced draft fans never became common during the Civil War because of scarcity of materials 
for them, excessive wear, and the common belief that natural draft was better. 
Donkey boilers, seen in Figure B.2, and their engines could be used to power other 
auxiliaries such as steam capstans. This arrangement was not common on warships because of 
the abundance of manpower but at least one ironclad, CSS Missouri, had it. Steam-driven 
capstans were considerably more abundant onboard sailing merchantmen, which had small crews 
for economical reasons. A diagram of this system is shown in Figure B.3. 
 
FIGURE B.2. Profile and cutaway of typical small vertical firetube boiler, or “donkey” (Bates 
1996:12) 
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FIGURE B.3. Steam-driven capstan with horizontal below-deck engine, similar to that onboard 
CSS Missouri (Bates 1996:54) 
 
The rest of the auxiliary machinery carried onboard steamships during the 1860s related 
to boiler feedwater and pumping. Pumping duties not directly connected with the boilers were 
absorbed by the hand-powered main force pump, seen in Figure B.4. Every vessel had at least 
one of these placed near the boilers. In the early days before steam pumps were common 
onboard ship, the main force pump was used for filling the boilers, making hydrostatic tests, and 
emptying the bilges. As can be imagined, this was time-consuming and strenuous work, but even 
when more automated systems came along the manual pumps were retained as backup. 
Vessels were fitted with improved and powerful pumps driven by steam beginning in the 
1860s. Probably the best of these was that invented by Henry Worthington. His design was a 
compact single-cylinder “simplex” pump in which the steam and water pistons were attached to 
the same rod (Bates 1996:16). A larger duplex pump was also developed by Worthington and 
saw widespread use onboard larger vessels. Figure B.5 shows both Worthington pumps. 
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FIGURE B.4. Typical main force pump. Wooden cross-handles are fitted in time of use. (Bates 
1996:25) 
 
 
FIGURE B.5. Top: photograph of Worthington simplex (single-cylinder) pump. Bottom: 
Drawing of Worthington duplex (two-cylinder) pump. The balloon-shaped extensions are air 
expansion chambers. (Adapted from Bates 1996:16) 
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The final sets of auxiliaries in common use by the Civil War were related to boiler 
feedwater. As Bates 1996:13 states: 
Boilers absorb the work of a lot of machinery that has nothing to do with propelling the 
boat. The most vital of these is the feedwater system, for without water there can be no 
steam. Too little water can result in a disastrous explosion. To prevent that, steamboats 
are required to have more than one feedwater system. 
 
The earliest steamships had pumps that ran directly off the main propelling engine. While simple 
and effective when the vessel was in operation, no water could be supplied when the engines 
were stopped. This caused many explosions. Beginning in the late 1830s the “doctor” engine 
became common. It got its name because it “cured” the ills of the previous system. A doctor 
engine was simply a small vertical walking beam type of one or two cylinders attached to pumps 
(Figure B.6). This arrangement was efficiently used for supplying the boilers, supplying 
firefighting water, and pumping the bilges. Doctors were equipped with at least one feedwater 
heater which heated the water before returning it to the boilers, lessening the chances of cold 
shock and explosion. Figure B.7 shows a typical closed feedwater heater. 
 
FIGURE B.6. Typical doctor engine with two feedwater heaters (Bates 1996:14) 
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FIGURE B.7. Typical closed feedwater heater (Bates 1996:19) 
 
A final important piece auxiliary equipment connected with the boilers was the live steam 
injector, first invented by M.H. Gifford in the 1850s (Bates 1996:15). This elegantly simple 
device augmented the doctor engine as a feedwater supply, contained no moving parts, and was 
compact and cheap. Injectors worked by firing a steam jet through a Venturi tube in the 
feedwater line. Sufficient velocity was therefore created to drive the mix into the boiler. The 
water-steam mixture was effectively introduced at high pressure and temperature like that inside 
the boiler. This efficient system is shown in Figure B.8. 
Aside from other small components such as gauge cocks for determining boiler water 
levels, simple lever safety valves, and hydrostatic lubricators for supplying cylinder oil (Figure 
B.9), auxiliary systems onboard 1850s-1860s steam vessels were primarily concerned with 
pumping and feedwater supply tasks. This was also the case on ironclad warships. Often, the 
arrangement of these systems only added to the great complexity of the steam power plant. The 
early days of a simple layout of boilers, engines, and manual pumps were long gone by the 
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1860s. Steam propulsion was quickly becoming the amazingly complex, powerful, and reliable 
mode of power generation utilized until the mid-20th century. In the midst of all this progress, 
auxiliary systems continued to perform their important but obscure role in steam navigation. 
 
FIGURE B.8. Typical live steam injector (Bates 1996:15) 
 
 
FIGURE B.9. Upper left: typical boiler gauge cocks. Upper right: typical hydrostatic lubricator 
with cutaway view. Bottom: Cross section of typical lever safety valve, showing movable 
weight, or “pea” (Adapted from Bates 1996:17,19,28)
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